

However, first of all, Ivan III needed to solve the "Novgorod issue". It was not finally decided by Ivan III Vasilyevich, it fell to the lot of another Ivan Vasilyevich - IV the Terrible, but already in the era of Ivan III the question was ripe. And it was ripe not only (and, perhaps, not so much) because of the pro-Lithuanian and pro-Polish sentiments of the Novgorod elite, but also for a more significant reason. On the one hand, the attraction of the Novgorod oligarchy to Poland was long-standing, and in the last years of the reign of Vasily the Dark, blinded by Dmitry Shemyaka, Novgorod openly turned to the Poles for support ... Shemyaka sheltered Novgorod and the opponent of centralization Shemyaka. But, on the other hand, that was not all! The Novgorod elite in relation to the all-Russian fate was potentially twice treacherous. The fact was that by the

second half of the 15th century, Novgorod had firmly entered the system of the Hanseatic League. The Hansa had the main foreign trade offices in Bruges, Ghent, London, Bergen, Stockholm, Kovno ... And yet, the Novgorod office was of particular importance, because a number of Russian goods were, in fact, unique - the same hemp, necessary for the military and the merchant fleet. Separatist sentiments began to intensify among the wealthy elite of Novgorod. There was a threat of a political separation of the northern Russian lands from Rus'. The Novgorod elite turned out to be in Rus', in modern terms, a collective agent of the influence of the West.

In 1994, the largest specialist in that era, Ruslan Skrynnikov, published a separate monograph with the characteristic title "The Tragedy of Novgorod", where he questioned the conclusion of Soviet historiography that the interests of the Novgorod boyar oligarchy were incompatible with the interests of Russia. In 1994, it was fashionable to praise democracy and stigmatize "totalitarianism", and Skrynnikov, indeed the largest specialist in the history of Russia in the 16th – early 17th centuries, referring to the repressions against Novgorod already undertaken by Ivan the Terrible, argued that "there is no reason to consider the fall of Novgorod and the triumph of Moscow centralization as the triumph of historical progress.

However, long before Skrynnikov - in 1906, a prominent Russian bourgeois liberal historian Nikolai Kostomarov published the work "Russian Republic". Very sympathetic to Novgorod in it, Kostomarov also wrote about the "Novgorod catastrophe", but attributed it to the time of the defeat of Novgorod by Ivan

III ... The picture of the then intra-city strife described by Kostomarov is curious: "... the strife in Novgorod was of such a nature that when the boyars themselves quarreled among themselves then they looked for support in the black people; and the black people armed themselves against the boyars, and at the same time joined other boyars. This is how the political parties revolved, and one against the other picked up accomplices from the mob, exposed opponents as

oppressors, and themselves as guardians of the black people. This medieval political farce is really very reminiscent of the "triumph of democracy" of the New York "Tammany Hall" and the current "Russian democracy" of the

Zhirinov model. The following passage from Kostomarov's work, describing the situation in 1479, is also quite indicative: "Novgorod remained in Casimir's heart (we are talking about

Casimir IV Jagiellonchik. - S.K.). He promised help. The Lithuanians did not give him money: he turned to the pope with a request for money, and meanwhile sent to the Khan of the Great Horde to move him against the Moscow sovereign, his former tributary. There was a hope of the Novgorodians even for help within the great reign: the brothers of the Grand Duke - Andrei and Boris, who fought Novgorod together with their brother, became dissatisfied; they themselves experienced the burden of

Moscow autocracy ... They talked with the conspirators and agreed to act together ... ". That's all - on the eve of Khan Akhmat's campaign against Russia, which was potentially fraught not with a "Novgorod", but

with an **all-Russian** catastrophe! This is the true essence of the Novgorod factor in that era, fateful for the future of Russia ...

Kostomarov was not absolutely categorical in condemning the "Novgorod" policy of Ivan III the Great, but modern Russian liberals with might and main began to popularize the opinion that the damned totalitarian de

freedom of Novgorod... But if it were not Asiatic Moscow that prevailed in Rus', but enlightened, closely connected with Europe, "Mr. Veliky Novgorod", then the light of the emerging European democracy would be shed on Russian expanses, and in a touching unity with Europe, Rus' would move towards welfare and prosperity.

But what would happen if the Moscow "sovereigns of all Rus'" (for the first time Ivan III the Great called himself that) did not firmly and consistently suppress the separatism of Novgorod and did not also subjugate the Tver principality?

About the last princes of Tver, one can say the words of Fyodor Tyutchev about Tsar Nicholas I: "You did not serve God, and not Russia, you served only your vanity ..." However, the same can be said no less about the Novgorod boyars and the Novgorod merchant nobility. Here is how a Soviet historian, also quite professionally competent, writes about it - Yu.G. Alekseev:

"Novgorod land, unlike all others, has never been subjected to the Horde invasion. The Tatar "princes" did not plunder the Novgorod churchyards... Novgorod was part of the federation of Russian lands and formally recognized the power of the Grand Duke (of Moscow. – S.K.), the head of this federation. But in his relations with the Grand Duke, he adopted a proud and independent tone and, in fact, pursued his own policy, in no way considering the interests of the Russian land as a whole. The Novgorod boyars negotiated and concluded independent agreements with the Grand Duke of Lithuania and the master of the Livonian Order, entering into deals with them at the expense of their "younger brother" - Mr. Pskov (who gravitated towards Moscow. - S.K.) . Without openly intervening in the princely strife, the Novgorod authorities used them to strengthen their position. They gave shelter to antagonistic princes and thus contributed to the continuation of the feudal war. Already from this it

should be clear that Novgorod would not take on the task of gathering and reuniting the Russian lands into a single powerful state. On the contrary, in the selfish interests of the Novgorod nobility was the fragmentation of Rus' and its weakness, which excluded a threat to Novgorod.

So what would have happened if Moscow, in a series of military expeditions, had not subordinated Novgorod to all-Russian interests, and also had not subordinated the Tver principality to them?

The answer is easy to find - a powerful Russian state would not become a historical reality, and above all Novgorod, but, very likely, Tver, would turn out to be conductors of foreign interests that are alien to the national, state, economic and cultural interests of the Russian people. Choosing the path of Moscow, the Russian people chose the path

of centralization and autocracy of the Russian sovereign. But at that time, autocracy was not equivalent to the tyrannical power of one person, but was equivalent to the political independence of the country. The autocracy of the Muscovite tsar was then identical with the freedom and independence of Russia.

Following the example of Novgorod, the Russian people would have chosen the path of supposedly small-town "freedom", but in reality - licking European backsides. Moreover, the Novgorod boyar "republic" was not a Russian analogue of the Venetian and Genoese trading republics. The Italian city-republics were the European centers of advanced technologies, while Novgorod was content with profits of a purely raw material nature - in the manner of the current Russian "rulers". Having centuries-old developed ties with Europe that were not broken by the Mongols, Novgorod did not become a conductor of European culture - the walls and towers of the Moscow Kremlin under Ivan III were erected under the guidance of not Novgorod, but Italian masters.

Taking as a model the way of thinking and actions that reigned in the Russian city-republic - "Mr. Veliky Novgorod", Rus' would doom itself to a miserable fate.

And it did not become clear after centuries - after the fact ... The essence of the "Novgorod" problem, the Russian people understood correctly even then, in real time. In 1471, a battle

took place between the Moscow army of Ivan III and the Novgorodians on the Shelon River, when Novgorod, which was trying to fall under the hands of Poland and Lithuania, was defeated and annexed to Moscow. But the campaign against Novgorod was decided not just in the grand ducal peace,

the campaign plan was developed at a meeting of the service nobility in Moscow, and the troops of not only Moscow, but also many other Russian principalities participated in

the campaign. It was a national matter ...

The course of the battle itself was such that Moscow squeakers, archers and crossbowmen tried to shoot not at the heavily armed armored horsemen, but at the legs of their horses, so as not to shed Russian blood in vain. The Novgorod infantry, which consisted of artisans, did not show much zeal in battle.

Then a series of boyar conspiracies followed, and ended with the mass "withdrawal" of boyar and merchant families from Novgorod and their resettlement in Pereyasavl, Vladimir, Yuryev, Murom, Rostov, Kostroma, Nizhny Novgorod ... Part of the Novgorod "tops" was

executed or imprisoned.

The anti-national essence of these "tops" is well revealed in the personality and fate of Marfa Boretskaya, who remained in history under the name of Marfa Posadnitsa. According

to the chronicler, she was a "evil wife", from the Loshinsky boyar family, she was the widow of the Novgorod mayor Boretsky, also from the ancient Novgorod boyar family, hostile to Moscow for a long time. Having been widowed, Martha became the owner of a huge fortune and, together with her son Dmitry Isaakovich, led those Novgorod boyars who began negotiations with the Grand Duke of Lithuania and Poland, Casimir IV Jagiellonchik, on the transfer of Novgorod to the citizenship of Lithuania. In full accordance with the logic of the old woman from Pushkin's fairy tale about the goldfish, Martha desired to become the wife of the Lithuanian prince Mikhail Olelkovich, "yes, with him they want to own from the king all Novgorod

earth"...

Dmitry Boretsky and commanded the Novgorod army in the Battle of Shelon, after which he was captured and executed. Marfa, in 1478, after the annexation of Novgorod to Moscow, was arrested by order of Ivan III and sent to Moscow along with the veche bell removed. All her property was confiscated to the treasury, and she herself was forcibly tonsured a nun.

In 1830, a young Moscow professor-historian Mikhail Pogodin completed the tragedy "Marfa Posadnitsa", on which Pushkin

responded with a review. The review was imbued with an understanding of the historical correctness of Ivan III, who asserts Russia "on its enormous foundation." Pushkin wrote: "John fills the tragedy. His thought sets in motion all the colossus, all passions ... We hear exactly John, we recognize his powerful state meaning ... Martha predicts family misfortunes and the death of his family. He answers: *"Whatever the Lord pleases, let it be done! / I am calm, having fulfilled my feat"* ... ". "This is the image of John," Pushkin summed up,

"an image consistent with history..." Liberal historians, starting with Nikolai Kostomarov, report on Ivan III's

brutal mass terror against the inhabitants of Novgorod, referring, among other things, to foreign sources of the time. So, Kostomarov tells about the resettlement of "seven thousand families in the Moscow region, in winter, in the frost ...", however, such information is more reminiscent of a pamphlet than historical data. With such mass repressions, Novgorod would simply have succumbed, but Ivan III did not even deprive him of the right to independently communicate with the Hansa. Hanseatic trade in Novgorod was stopped only during 1493-1494, and not because Novgorod was deserted, but after the closure of the German court due to external circumstances.

To the "withdrawn" Novgorod boyars, sometimes it's just new estates were provided in the southern and Volga regions.

This does not mean, of course, that the pacification of Novgorod was carried out by Ivan III in white gloves, and not with iron gloves. There were excesses, but such was, alas, the style of the era, and - not only in the Russian lands or in the Wild Steppe, but also in the civilizing Europe of the Renaissance.

Sometimes the confrontation between Moscow and Novgorod is presented as a struggle for markets, which, of course, is stupid. The suppression of the Novgorod boyars was an objective historical necessity. And you can't even seriously talk about a certain alternative of those times - Novgorod, from any point of view, could not become a historical, fateful alternative to Moscow, or rather, Novgorod

separatism could not become an alternative to a centralized and administratively strong state.

The Russian people learned all the delights of separation in their own skin during the rule of the Golden Horde in Rus', which was the result of separation. Therefore, the Russian masses willingly stood up under the banner of that force that wrote on its banner: "For All Rus'!". And this force was

Moscow. The "Novgorod" "republican" version, as a general Russian one, was not viable in conditions when external pressure on Rus' changed only its geographical coloring, still remaining the most serious threat to the future of Rus' and the Russian people. More

precisely, the "Novgorod" version was deadly for the future of Rus'. Conscious of this threat, the Moscow sovereign of "all Rus'" Ivan III Vasilyevich fought against Novgorod. It was not about ambition, but about strengthening the state. Ivan III

also actively fought for the return to Russia Russian Baltic lands.

It was he who, in 1492, set up the Russian fortress Ivan-gorod on the banks of the Narova opposite the Swedish Narva. For the fattening Novgorod of the 15th century, the Swedes were hostile only insofar as they threatened Novgorod directly. The city-republic of Novgorod could have come to an agreement with the Swedes - due to the neglect and even betrayal of all-Russian interests. And only the principality of Novgorod, as an integral part of the Muscovite state, could and was obliged to stand in the general line of struggle against any external enemy of

Rus'. In 1496-1497, Russia waged another war with Sweden, but the Livonian Order turned out to be the most painful problem. He was invariably aggressive and in the spring of 1501, in alliance with Lithuania, dealt a serious blow to Russian maritime trade in the Baltic. 200 Russian ships with goods and 150 merchants were captured. This, by the way, in itself speaks of the scale of trade relations between Rus' of Ivan III with

Western Europe. The very new confrontation between the Livonian Order and Moscow, the Swedes and Russians, Rus' and Lithuania was the result of the strengthening of Moscow, and this confrontation had yet to unfold in

In the era of Ivan III, a certain internal confrontation also took shape - a spiritual one, which, without dwelling on it in detail, one cannot but mention. In personal terms, this confrontation was personified by two major figures of the church - Nil Sorsky and Joseph Volotsky. Nil Sorsky (1433–1508), in the world Nikolai

Fedorovich Maiko (c), was born into a Moscow service family close to the Grand Duke. Starting as a scribe at court, Nicholas soon abandoned a brilliant career, became a monk, traveled to Palestine, and from the beginning of the 80s founded a skete on the Sora (Sorka) River 15 versts from the Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery. Nicknamed therefore Sorsky, Nil preached the asceticism of the monks, the rejection of the church from land ownership and peasants. He and his followers - the "Volga elders", were called "non-possessors" and embodied the truly spiritual side of Orthodoxy.

The spread of ideas of non-acquisitiveness could not but disturb the church hierarchs, who were already mired in the majority in luxury. The ideologist of the opponents of Nil Sorsky was Joseph Volotsky (1440–1515), the son of a wealthy patrimony in the Volokolamsk (Volotsk) principality, in the world Ivan Sanin. In 1479, Joseph founded a monastery in the Volokolamsk region. Joseph was associated with the specific Volotsk princes, brothers of Ivan III, and was in opposition to the great prince.

Ivan III was close and beneficial to the position of "non-possessors", and he, trying to eliminate church land ownership and gain access to church wealth to finance state projects and troops, supported Nil Sorsky and his teacher, the elder Kirillo of the Belozersky monastery Paisius Yaroslav. Ivan was even ready to transfer the management of the Russian church into the hands of Paisius, but the leaders of the "non-possessors" did not consider it possible for themselves to take on power functions. Not in words, but in deeds, they strove for a solitary righteous life in sketes. In 1500, after Ivan III distributed the Novgorod church lands to

boyar children, he came to the conclusion, as Karamzin reports, that "the clergy, and especially the monks (i.e. monks. - S.K.), it is indecent to own countless villages and villages,

who placed upon them many worldly concerns." Metropolitan Simon was not delighted with this idea, and after the Council of the Russian Church, in a message to the Grand Duke, he referred to the prescription of the custom for saints and monasteries "to keep cities, authorities (volosts. - S.K.) and villages." In 1503, at a church council, when Nil Sorsky and the

Trans-Volga elders supported Ivan III's proposal to transfer church lands under the jurisdiction of the Grand Duke, a controversy arose between Nil and Joseph Volotsky. As a result, the "Josephites" prevailed, but not because of the strength of the arguments, but because of the selfish motives that drive the hierarchs. At the same time, Joseph Volotsky came up with the theory of the divine origin of the grand duke's power, which could not but receive the support of Ivan III.

Even the Soviet anti-religious propaganda, not to mention historians, did not focus on this point of bifurcation of Russian history - the church councils of 1500 and 1503, but in vain. The significance of this point is objectively great both in purely historical and

and in the "sign" relation.

During the formation of Kievan Rus, the adoption of Christianity in its most unperverted - Orthodox interpretation played an outstanding role in the centralization of Rus. During the period of Mongol domination, the

Russian Orthodox Church played an outstanding role in preserving and developing the idea of the unity of the Russian land...

Now, when the church began to lose its authority due to the worldly vices of a considerable part of the clergy, the acceptance by the Russian church of the ideas of the "non-possessor" Nil Sorsky and the invariable adherence to this idea could have an impact on the development of Rus' in the greatest and most beneficial way. The "Josephites"

aspired to the primacy of the church over the state, they actively and, as a rule, negatively interfered in the affairs of secular power. And the "non-possessors", following the commandments of Christ, believed that God's is God's, and Caesar's is Caesar's, and completely gave priority in worldly affairs to secular rulers.

Having understood this, it is not difficult to answer the question: "What would happen if in the following centuries the Russian church became the church of Nil Sorsky?" IN

In this hypothetical case, the Russian church, which found itself at its own historical crossroads at the beginning of the 16th century, would strengthen its spiritual influence on society from century to century - the only one of all European churches. And this would force secular authorities to reckon with the laws

of morality, forcing them to think about the interests of the Fatherland, and about the interests and rights of the people that make up the Fatherland ... Russian history could unfold more humanely, cleaner, smarter, more efficiently ... It, for example, did not have would be that strong obscurantism - the rejection of the ideas of science and European culture, with which pre-Petrine Russia was so strongly imbued precisely because of the negative influence of the church. And how the transfer of church wealth to the treasury would have strengthened the power of the state! And if the Russian people in the great era of Ivan III the Great passed their historical test with honor, then

the Russian Church, having become "Josephite", failed its historical test.

The Russian people, led by Ivan III the Great, were able not only not to miss the historical development opportunities presented to them, but also created such opportunities themselves, in turn using them in full ... As a result, Rus' took the path to more and more elevation.

The Church, having placed at the head of itself the ideas of the "Josephites", and not Nil Sorsky, went along the path of worldly money-grubbing, intrigues and an ever greater loss of spiritual authority in the developing Russian society. Rus' from the time of Ivan the Great, despite all

future tests, only progressed.

The Russian Church since the time of Ivan the Great's peer, Joseph Volotsky, despite a number of major and future merits to Russia, has only degraded, dropping its authority among the people by 1917 almost to zero.

Since 1472, Ivan III Vasilievich was married to Zoya (Sofya) Paleolog, from whom he had five sons: Vasily, Yuri, Dmitry, Semyon, Andrey, and three daughters - including Elena, married

for the Grand Duke of Lithuania Alexander (the marriage had a "diplomatic" character).

After the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 and the death of Emperor Constantine IX Palaiologos on its walls, his niece Zoya Palaiologos was sheltered by Pope Paul II. There were no special hunters in Europe for the hand of a dowry princess living on a modest papal pension. In Moscow, which was thinking about taking on the role of the "third Rome", the heiress of Byzantium, the candidacy of Zoya Paleolog as the wife of the widowed Ivan was considered not without interest.

Metropolitan Philip was afraid, however, that Zoya would bring with him the Byzantine idea of the complete subordination of the church to secular power, and the emerging activity of Paul II, who was wooing Zoya to Ivan, also worried the church hierarchs. Nevertheless, negotiations began in 1469, ending with Zoya's arrival in Moscow on November 12, 1472 and the wedding in the Assumption Cathedral. Paul II expected

that Zoya, who had lived in Rome under the tutelage of the papal throne from the age of 5, would become a conductor of his influence in Moscow, but it turned out quite the opposite - the 24-year-old Sophia Paleolog felt herself in Moscow as the plenipotentiary heiress of the sovereigns of the thousand-year-old Orthodox Byzantium, transferring everything to her husband sovereign and spiritual rights of the Byzantine emperors. Sophia's influence on Ivan in this regard was noted by all contemporaries - after his marriage, he became more majestic, demanded great signs of external reverence, which Sophia encouraged. The factor of Zoya-Sophia Paleolog, who died in 1503, is an interesting phenomenon in Russian history.

Touching upon dynastic conflicts, it should also be noted that the first heir to the great table - in fact, almost the throne, Ivan the Young died in 1490, and Ivan III declared his son, 7-year-old grandson Dmitry, to be the heir.

At the court, two groups immediately arose - one was a supporter of Dmitry, the second - Vasily, Ivan's eldest son from Sophia. If earlier conflicts of power in Rus' had a princely specific character, now they became palace ones. Well, this also testified to a certain social progress ...

The intrigues of Dmitry's party led to the bitterness of Ivan III against Vasily and Sophia, and on February 4, 1498, Ivan III in the Assumption Cathedral crowned his grandson to the kingdom with a hat and barmes of Vladimir

Monomakh according to the Byzantine rite (later the wedding rite was used in the development of the wedding ceremony of Ivan the Terrible).

However, Dmitry did not have to become the king of all Rus' - in 1499 it turned out that Vasily and Sophia were victims of intrigue, and Dmitry "Grandson" with his mother were removed from the court and later kept under arrest. Vasily was declared the Grand Duke of Vladimir and Moscow and All Rus' autocrat.

Ivan III the Great was personally outstanding both internally and externally - tall, thin, fit, he had such a menacing look that women fainted from him. No wonder some foreigners called him "Terrible." However, Ivan III was the most outstanding as a historical figure. He served his country and people in a way that few of the world rulers did - it was not for nothing that Karamzin wrote that he "is a Hero not only of Russian, but also of World History."

The same Karamzin considered the activities of Ivan III against the backdrop of global events, when "politics became more cunning, more long-term, more complex", and when "when concluding state agreements, ministers looked at geographical drawings and calculated trade profits." Karamzin wrote: "John, born and raised by

a tributary of the steppe Horde (Vasily the Dark. - S.K.), similar to the current Kyrgyz ones, became one of the most famous sovereigns in Europe, honored, caressed from Rome to Constantinople, Vienna and Copenhagen, not yielding primacy neither emperors nor proud sultans; ... accepted alliances, but with the condition of a clear benefit for Russia; I was looking for tools for my own plans and did not serve as a tool for anyone ...

What did Alexander the Great leave the world? - Glory. John left a state, amazing in space, strong in peoples, even stronger in the spirit of government ... ". Nothing is

exaggerated here, but Karamzin was mistaken, arguing that Ivan "without teaching, without instructions, guided only by the natural mind, gave himself wise rules in foreign and domestic politics ..." Ivan III the Great (he received this nickname from European, by the way, historians of the 16th century) was indeed born a "tributary of the steppe Horde" Vasily the Dark, but Ivan was brought up

his father and predecessor on the great Moscow throne as a ruler whose task was to get rid of tributary dependence, which Ivan the Great achieved. The "Academy" of public administration for

Ivan was his father's involvement in public affairs from childhood.

Ivan III the Great created, in fact, a new Muscovite Rus as a continuation of the old Kievan Rus, and the West did not forgive him for this either in real time or beyond the grave. Hosking, a London professor of Russian studies, even in the 21st century, could not resist petty slander, arguing that Ivan was a talented, cunning and flexible politician, but for the sake of power over all the territories of Rus', he was allegedly ready to sacrifice any family ties. Alluding to Ivan's

remarriage to a Byzantine princess, Hosking writes that Ivan de divorced his "childless" first wife for this. But not only did Ivan the Great have a son from the "childless" Mary, Ivan the Young ... And there was no divorce, which Hosking, as a specialist in the history of Rus', could not help but know. Maria Borisovna died in 1467, and there is reason to believe that the deacon's wife Natalia Poluektova poisoned her. Ivan was a widow for five years, and only then married Sophia Paleolog.

Hosking's accusations that Ivan de sacrificed his daughter Elena, passing her off as "Lithuanian" and thereby "dooming her to imprisonment and death," are no more solid. The marriage of Elena with the Grand Duke of Lithuania Alexander Jagiellon turned out to be a factor in stabilizing relations between Rus' and Lithuania, in 1503 Elena contributed to the conclusion of a truce between them for the first time, and in 1508 for the second time. Her father had already died by that time, and only six years after the death of her father, Elena, at the intrigues of the Polish-Lithuanian prince Radziwill, was imprisoned, where she was poisoned. Could Ivan have foreseen such an end for his daughter?

Karl Marx, summing up the activities of Ivan III the Great, wrote: "Amazed Europe, at the beginning of Ivan's reign, barely noticing the existence of Muscovy, squeezed between Tatars and Lithuanians, was struck by the sudden appearance of a huge state on its eastern borders, and Sultan Bayazet himself, before whom she trembled Europe, for the first time heard the arrogant speeches of a Muscovite.

Such an assessment is quite historically correct and capaciously reflects the essence and significance for Russia of the figure and era of Ivan the Great. His son Vasily III Ivanovich inherited a great power.

Ivan III the Great died in October 1505 and was succeeded by Vasily III. In the year of his father's death, Vasily III was twenty-six years old - he was born on March 25, 1479. My father managed to do more than a lot during his long reign, although not more than he could do. Historical opportunities were fully used by him, and, nevertheless, obstacles in the way of Russia were foreseen in

abundance. Karamzin wrote about Russia of Ivan III that she, "as an independent power, majestically exalted her head within Asia and Europe, calm inside and not afraid of external enemies." In many respects, this was the case in reality, but this did not mean for the new Grand Duke of Moscow either the internal, or, even more so, the external world. One could not be afraid of external enemies only in the sense that any of them could hardly have passed through Rus' the way Batu and Tokhtamysh did. However, Rus' and Vasily III had enough strong and dangerous enemies until the end of his reign.

Until 1509, when a potential contender for the great table, Vasily's nephew, Dmitry Ivanovich "Grandson", died, the young Grand Duke of Moscow could fear a palace coup. Vasily III generously presented Dmitry in captivity, but he could not be completely calm.

However, external threats turned out to be both more annoying and more dangerous. In 1507, the first raid on Rus' by the Crimean Tatars was made, and from now on, the Krymchaks became a serious problem for Russia for almost three centuries. According to later estimates, from the beginning of the 16th century until 1783, when the Crimea was annexed to Russia, Great and Little Russia lost from 3 to 4 million people due to raids. In Istanbul, the former Constantinople, the nurses and nannies of the Mamluks, the Sultan's Guard, were Russians. Russian captives filled harems, became free servants. Russian slaves in shackles turned the oars on the French and Venetian galleys...

So, in the south, the Crimean Khanate of Mengli Giray grew. Former ally, the Crimean Khan was intensifying, focused on

the co-religious Ottoman Empire and strengthened its borders. On the left bank of the Dnieper near the fords, the Tatar fortress Islam Kermen arose, another stone fortress was erected by the Tatars at Perekop, and the Ak-Chakum (Ochakov) fortress

appeared in the west ... If in 1480 Mengli-Girey, with his raid into Lithuania, helped the Russian success of "standing Ugra", then in 1507 he concluded an alliance with Lithuania, and this allowed the latter to start

military operations against Russia. On July 2 of the same year, Mengli Giray issued the Polish king and Grand Duke of Lithuania Sigismund I the Old a label to rule many Russian cities, including Kiev, Vladimir Volynsky, Smolensk and even

Novgorod and Pskov ... Vasily III waged an inevitable war for Russia with Lithuania for the return of Russia Russian lands. And when in 1514 the Russian troops took Smolensk, Mengli-Girey sent Vasily III an ultimatum message, where he stated that he had granted the "Smolensk Yurt" into the possession of Sigismund, and the Russians did not have the right to annex Smolensk to their possessions. Mengli Giray also demanded that Bryansk, Karachev, Novgorod-Seversky, Pochep, Putivl, Radgoshch, Rylsk and Starodub be transferred to him. Khan wrote to Vasily that "those written eight cities from antiquity were ours, and we gave them to your father, Grand Duke Ivan" ...

Mengli-Girey made claims for another 35 Russian cities. Under these conditions, it was difficult to engage in powerful civilizational construction and development, but. perhaps that is impossible. Concerns about the

external security of the state ate up both strength and means, and time ... The Crimean Tatar khans, just like the earlier Mongol khans, did not have the slightest civilizational potential, and, as you know, to break, not to build ... Rus' lived on the ideas of creation and prosperity on the basis of creation, and

Khan's Crimea grew on the ideas of robbery and prosperity on the basis of robbery. For the prospects of Poland, neither the Tatars nor even the Turks posed any particular danger - they were opposed primarily by Russia. But for the southern Ukrainian lands that fell under the rule of

more or less sustainable development - instead of new construction, it was necessary to engage in the restoration of the destroyed one every now and then.

Almost immediately, Vasily III Ivanovich had to solve the problem of relations with the Kazan Khanate. Three times he had to organize trips to Kazan - to Khan Mohammed-Edin, until he recognized himself as a Moscow assistant on the same terms.

Success was then, alas, temporary. So, in 1531, instead of the Crimean prince Safa-Girey, who was expelled by the Russians, Kasimov's pro-Russian prince Jan-Ali, Genghisides, was elevated to the Kazan throne. However, in 1535, two years after the death of Vasily III, Jan Ali was killed by the inhabitants of Kazan, and Safa-Girey was again invited in his place ... Rus', however, continued to gain a

foothold on the Volga. In 1523, Prince Alexander Borisovich Gorbaty-Shuisky Suchok, sent by Vasily III voivode, founded on the high right bank of the Volga, 1 kilometer from the confluence of the Sura River, a fortress city named after Vasily Vasil (later - Vasilsursk). Prince Humpback Shuisky, by the way, generally "specialized" in the Tatars - both Kazan and Crimean, later became a major military leader of Ivan IV the Terrible, participated in Ivan's Kazan campaign ...

Relations with Lithuania and Poland also represented an almost constant conflict, since Vasily III was consistent in continuing the foreign policy of his father and grandfather. When Ivan III, the father-in-law of the Polish king Alexander Jagiellon, died in 1505, Alexander immediately began to prepare for a war with Moscow for the return of the former "Lithuanian" possessions in Western Rus'. But when Alexander himself died without an heir in 1506, Vasily III tried to succeed his son-in-law on the Lithuanian throne and unite Eastern and Western Rus' by personal union. This project was quite real, since there were more Russian lands in Lithuania than actually Lithuanian ones, and Vasily's sister Elena was the widow of Alexander Jagiellon. However, the Polish throne was occupied by Alexander's brother - Sigismund I the Old, naturally hostile to Rus'. Wars began, which went on with

varying success, and with the expansion of Rus' into its former western limits, things were still tight, although in 1516 Vasily III concluded

an agreement with Denmark on a military alliance against Sweden and Poland. The second war with Lithuania in 1512–1522 returned Smolensk to Russia.

The problem of Novgorod persisted, and the problem of Pskov, which was dissatisfied with the Moscow governor, acquired new content. It ended with the peaceful annexation of Pskov to Moscow in 1510 and the transfer of 300 of the most influential Pskov families to the central volosts. Unlike the dubious “Novgorod” figure from the time of Ivan III to “seven thousand families” brought out of Novgorod, the “Pskov” figure looks reliable. Following the example of his father, Ivan III, who brought the Novgorod

veche bell to Moscow, Vasily III did the same with the Pskov veche bell, prescribing: “hang the veche bell so that from now on there will not be a veche, but to be in Pskov for two governors, and to be in the suburbs

also to the governors ... ”.

During the reign of Vasily III Ivanovich, the last semi-independent principalities were annexed to the Moscow state - Volotsky in 1513, Ryazan in 1521 and Novgorod-Seversky in 1522. Strategically important stone fortresses were built in Kolomna, Nizhny Novgorod, Tula and Zaraysk.

Vasily III was not a founder, but a successor, but he coped with his historical tasks with dignity and was fully aware of them - both external and internal.

Paolo Giovio, Bishop of the Italian city of Como, never visited Moscow himself, but left notes of the stories of Dmitry Gerasimov, a Russian translator and ambassador to Pope Clement VII in 1526. Giovio's notes testified: “Vasily also established a detachment of horse archers; in addition, in the Moscow Fortress one can see many copper cannons cast by the art of Italian masters and put on wheels. Others wrote about Russian artillery and its abundance under Vasily ... It is no coincidence that the mention of Italians - it was Italian masters who brought European

element.

Vasily worked hard, led the state, improved legislation ... In Novgorod, he established, in fact, a jury, taking into account the past social experience of Novgorodians. Night and fire guards appeared in Moscow and Novgorod. Streets on

the night was blocked by slingshots-barriers, the guards were on patrol, and theft and robbery in Moscow began to decline sharply.

These testimonies of the Russian chroniclers are confirmed by Giovio's notes: "The guard duty is carried out by the faithful urban population. At the same time, every quarter of the city is blocked by gates and slingshots, and at night it is not allowed to wander around the city idle; in any case, you must have a

lamp with you ... ". For all that, Rus' was plagued by epidemics that claimed tens of thousands of lives, and droughts, followed by famine, which carried away no less. Russian lands suffered from Tatar raids - both from the east and from the south. Life, however, continued in ascending order - Rus' developed.

Letters to Pope Clement VII by Albert Campenze (Piggius) have been preserved, who wrote down the information reported by his father and brother, who lived in Russia for a long time in the era of Vasily III. Kampenze also writes about the vastness and wealth of the Russian principalities, about the large population, about the fact that "men are generally tall,

strong and accustomed to all labors ...". In the light of the subsequent numerous insinuations against the Russians, the following testimony of Campenze is interesting: "To deceive each other is revered by them as a terrible, heinous crime; adultery, violence and public debauchery are also very rare; unnatural vices are completely unknown, and perjury and blasphemy are not heard at all.

Kampenze noted that Russia's borders were well guarded. And since, because of forests and swamps, roundabout roads are dangerous, and one must keep to the big roads, "vigilantly guarded by the princely guards," then "no one, even settlers or free people, can leave the state or enter it without a special grand ducal letter." The scrupulousness of the

Russians in this regard testified, however, not to the rejection of someone else's, but to the fact that the centuries-old negative experience of contacts with a hostile outside world developed quite understandable caution among the "Muscovites".

I must say that this moment did not cause condemnation in Campenze. Kampenze noted that Vasily III "never consumes foreign warriors, but recruits his own army from his own

subjects", and that "many noble horsemen voluntarily fit into military service", and "the sovereign can, whenever he wishes, assemble 60 and 70 thousand infantry from young men, courageous and already completely armed."

Speaking about the fact that "Muscovy is rich in

coins", Campenze reported that its inflow is ensured primarily by foreign trade, and also by the fact that "the export of gold and silver outside the state is strictly prohibited" ... The objectivity of Campenze, as well as of Italian authors in general, and loyalty to Russia

was understandable - the Italian states and Russia had no points of possible conflicts. Territorial claims were excluded: where is the Apennine Peninsula, and where is the Central Russian Upland ... The strengthening of Russia also could not be dangerous to the Italians.

It turned out differently with many German authors who wrote about Rus', what will be said in its place.

During the reign of Vasily III, Rus' was visited twice (in 1516 and 1525/27) by the Austrian diplomat Baron Sigismund von Herberstein, who left "Notes on Muscovite Affairs". Information about Rus' and Russia from foreign sources, when they scold us, must be trusted with caution, but when something is boasted, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the author, because Europeans do not have the habit of flattering the "Muscovites" had.

So, Herberstein reported that, thanks to the system of postal stations, he covered the 500-kilometer journey from Novgorod to Moscow in just 72 hours, and further noted that this turned out to be much faster than anywhere else in Europe.

For all that, the civilizational lag behind Europe not only was not eliminated, but increased. And the complete absence of domestic science against the background of its constant development in Western Europe was especially threatening. Compared with the bulk of the population of Europe, the bulk of the population of Russia was not so "barbaric", as Herberstein described it, but the general level of the higher, and especially educated, strata of European and Russian society was already strikingly different.

The great reign of Vasily III Ivanovich lasted more than 27 years, and all these years within the state not only did not stop, but also gained momentum, a two-pronged process that was very dangerous for the future. On the one hand, the internal opposition of the boyars intensified, and on the other hand, the departure of the boyars and princes began outside of Muscovite Rus', mainly to Lithuania and Poland, which created the

basis for successful external subversive work. At the end of the reign of Ivan III, the boyars took the side of Dmitry "Grandson" against Vasily out of hatred for Sophia Paleolog - her authority and encouragement of her husband's autocratic moods were not to the liking of the ancient and arrogant boyars. Cold relations between the boyars and Vasily III Ivanovich persisted even after the latter came to power. Vasily limited the rights of large feudal lords and relied more on service people - clerks, nobles of small estates ... Vasily rarely consulted with the boyars and for the sake of formality, but his closest adviser was Ivan Shigona Podzhogin, the son of a boyar from a seedy branch of the

The ancient boyars responded to Vasily III with alienation and distrust. Ineptly and unfriendly, even hostile, also behaved Vasily's brothers - specific princes: Prince Yuri Ivanovich of Dmitrov, Prince Dmitry Ivanovich Zhilka of Uglich, Prince Semyon Ivanovich of Kaluga and Prince Andrey Ivanovich of Staritsky. However, the inheritances of Semyon (in 1518) and Dmitry (in 1521), who died childless, Vasily annexed to the Moscow principality, since, according to the will of Ivan III, the inheritances of his childless sons passed to his elder brother. And besides,

the behavior of the princes, the descendants of the former appanage princes, Rurikovich and Gediminovich, did not alleviate the position of Vasily and all of Rus'. The most prominent princes (from the old Russian *prince* - the son of a prince) were part of the titled boyars, and the term itself arose in Russian law in the middle of the 15th century - at a time when the fragmentation and "selfhood" of the specific Russian principalities was replaced by their subordination to Moscow and joining the new unified centralized state. The former independent specific princes with an ancient pedigree had numerous sons - from them (and their descendants) the institute of princes was formed.

The possessions of the princes did not differ from the possessions of the other boyars, however, due to hereditary rights in the territory of the former appanages of their ancestors, the princes enjoyed special privileges and claimed independence from the central government. It was a small, but influential and dangerous social group, systemically similar to Polish magnates.

The princes were already a problem for Vasily III's grandfather, Vasily II the Dark, and, even more so, for Vasily's father, Ivan III the Great. For Vasily, the princes became a constant headache. He also took from them the boyars - for example, from Prince Shuisky, the princes of Belsky, Vorotynsky, Mstislavsky - oaths of non-departure from the boundaries of the Moscow Grand Duchy, but not everyone kept the

promise. And those that observed were still internally disloyal and unreliable, because for self-confident boyars and arrogant princes, Poland and Lithuania turned out to be more and more attractive ... And not even these two neighboring states themselves, but the orders that reign in

them. However, it would be more correct to call these orders legalized. state disorder.

The Polish feudal lords from time immemorial were more arrogant and self-willed even the old Russian princes, who were little accustomed to internal self-discipline. The logical conclusion of the moral, civil and state degradation of the Polish gentry was subsequently the principle of "liberum veto" - the right of any Sejm delegate to his only "I won't allow!" reject any decisions made collectively. Historically, such a "gentry republic" was doomed to the loss of statehood, which happened in the 18th century. The power of the Polish king had long been limited by the magnate senate

(the senatorial title was highly valued in Poland). And in 1505, the Polish gentry Sejm, convened in Radom, also adopted the so-called Radom constitution. It began with the words in Latin, adored by the gentry, "Nihil novi" ("Nothing new ...") and made the royal power dependent not only on the senate, but also on the gentry "ambassadors". Now the adoption of new laws and decisions on the most important state issues depended on the general consent

of the entire Sejm, in which the decisive role passed to the lower house - the "embassy hut", which consisted of deputies (ambassadors) of the gentry

sejmiks. Could the Russian boyars and princes not look at their neighbors with envy, could they not dream of something similar in the Muscovite state? And could the Poles not provoke the "Muscovites" into opposition and conspiracies against the Moscow Grand Dukes, who were working to strengthen a united and indivisible Russia?

Usually, historians stick out the conflict between the boyars and Ivan IV the Terrible, and the Terrible is now and then presented as a bloodthirsty tyrant, a despot who groundlessly executed the tribal boyars and gave the country to the guardsmen for desecration. However, this is not only a false, but also a historically untenable scheme. In reality, Ivan IV had to solve that old problem that began to take shape even under his great-grandfather Vasily II the Dark - when the intensive subordination of the Russian principalities to Moscow began.

Then Ivan III, the grandfather of Ivan the Terrible, and his father, Vasily III, fought with the boyars and princes, who did not want to understand the historical necessity and even the salvation of centralization for Rus'. Moreover, all of them, like Ivan the Terrible, relied in the anti-boyar policy on the same layer of ignoble service nobles, only they were not called "oprichniks", and could not give them as many rights as Ivan the Terrible gave to the guardsmen.

In the era of Vasily III Ivanovich, the time for a tough and, yes, cruel suppression of the anti-national line of that part of the Russian elite that looked back at Poland and Lithuania had not yet come. Vasily III did not execute a single influential noble boyar or prince, but he never turned his back on them, not so much for fear of offending someone, but for reasons of personal security.

In domestic politics, Vasily III at first tried to rely on the "non-possessors", but they still did not want to interfere in worldly affairs, and the "Josephites" supported the Grand Duke in his struggle against the boyar-princely opposition. Therefore, Vasily III, although he respectfully treated the followers of Nil Sorsky, Vassian Kosoy and Maxim the Greek, was forced to reorient himself to

"Josephite". It was the "Josephite" Philotheus who put forward the idea: "Moscow is the third Rome", and the church council of 1531 condemned Nil Sorsky and

the "non-possessors". The first wife of Vasily III, Solomonina Sverchkova-Saburova, turned out to be barren, and the absence of a son-heir made Vasily's position precarious - there was always the danger of a conspiracy in favor of one of the brothers, and especially Yuri. Being the second oldest brother after Vasily, Yuri did not really hide his

claims. Vasily loved his wife - in 1504 she was chosen to be his wife from 1500 girls from boyar, princely and noble families. It is significant at the same time that the father of Solomonina was an ignorant service nobleman. Years passed, the need for a new marriage became obvious, but only in 1525 Vasily went for a divorce from Solomonina. She was tonsured under the name Sophia, and she retired to a monastery, where she died in 1542.

At the beginning of 1526, Vasily III married Elena Vasilyevna Glinskaya, the niece of the Lithuanian magnate Prince Glinsky-Dorodny, but the first son Ivan, the future Ivan IV the Terrible, was born only in 1530, and the second

son Yuri was born in 1533. In October 1533, Vasily fell seriously ill and discussed with his close advisers a lot about the possible prospects for one or another option for taking the throne after his death. The legitimate heir was only three years old, but he had two quite mature and experienced uncles, including Yuri Ivanovich, the specific prince of Dmitrovsky, who could compete with Vasily's young son. Dmitry Ivanovich was already fifty-three years old. Thus, exactly half a century separated the two most likely contenders for the throne.

Feeling the approach of death, Vasily forced Yuri Ivanovich and his second brother, Andrei Ivanovich, the specific staritsky prince, to kiss the cross on the fact that they would not challenge the throne from Ivan. As his executors, to whom he entrusted the fate of the state and his sons, Vasily III appointed Prince Mikhail Lvovich Glinsky-Dorodny, the close boyar Mikhail Yuryevich Zakharyin and his "gray cardinal" Ivan Yuryevich Shigon-Podzhogin.

On December 4, 1533, Vasily, having taken the monastic vows before his death under the name Varlaam, died, and on the same day Metropolitan Daniel performed in the Assumption Cathedral the rite of setting the three-year-old Ivan IV Vasilyevich to the great reign. The administration of the state was entrusted to Elena Glinskaya as a regent with the assistance of the Boyar Duma, and there was no doubt that difficult times were ahead for Russia ...

The full title of Vasily III looked like this: "The Great Sovereign Vasily, by the grace of God the Tsar and Sovereign of All Rus' and the Grand Duke of Vladimir, Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Tver, Yugra, Perm, Vyatka, Bulgarian and others; Sovereign and Grand Duke of Novgorod of the Nizovskiy land, and Chernigov, and Ryazan, and Volotsky, and Rzhevsky, and Belsky, and Rostov, and Yaroslavl, and Belozersky, and Udorsky, and Obdorsky, and Kondinsky, and others. And it was not just a sonorous and magnificent title - behind

each part of it stood the sweat and blood of generations of Russian people ... Someone worked peacefully in the fields and in

cities, strengthening and developing Rus', and often rebuilding it ... Someone in military labors beat back his own, previously lost and

pressed down by an eastern or western, but foreign boot ...

Behind this title were the efforts of those Russian people whom will soon be called "forerunners" ...

Russian foremost workers, that is, those who go ahead of others, lead them and show the way, from year to year and from century to century expanded the boundaries of the Russian lands east and east, moving deep into Siberia without strong military contingents, reaching the shores of the ice-covered "icy" seas, and then - and on the shores of the Great, Pacific Ocean ...

But it will be later, later, and now - after the death of Vasily III, Rus' again found itself at a crossroads, a bifurcation point again arose in its development. The choice of the Russian people in favor of Moscow became the only right choice in the then Russian history, but the time for a new Russian alternative was not far off - the era of Ivan the Terrible.

Chapter 6. 1533-1584 The dilemma of Ivan the Terrible: the autocracy of the tsar or the self-will of the boyars

Ivan IV Vasilyevich the Terrible (1530-1584) is not only an outstanding layer in our history, but also the personification of the most important historical choice in the pre-revolutionary history of Russia. Under Ivan the Terrible, and primarily due to the activities of Ivan the Terrible, Russia found itself at one of its most important historical crossroads.

The grandfather of Ivan the Terrible - Ivan III the Great, was, of course, a great sovereign, but personally he cannot be considered a critical, "bifurcation" figure. Ivan III generalized the inevitable, he gathered under the hand of Moscow everything from the Russian lands that could then be collected, and expanded the Russian borders to the size of a great power.

Ivan IV the Terrible became a figure who **personally concentrated in himself** the ripened next "bifurcation point" and passed this point in a positive direction. Of all the outstanding figures of Russian history, and, perhaps, world history, this can be said, except for Grozny, only about our own Peter the Great, Lenin and Stalin ...

A short but quite complete answer to the question: "What would happen to Russia if it were not for the many years of state activity of Ivan the Terrible?" You don't have to look for a long time: "That Russia, the great world power that we know, would simply not exist without the policies of Ivan the Terrible and without Ivan the Terrible personally!".

And the point is not that under Ivan IV Vasilyevich, vast territorial gains were ensured almost without war (even the war for Kazan cannot be considered aggressive) - especially in the East and South-East. The main result of the reign of Ivan the Terrible was the eradication of that boyar self-will, which would inevitably undermine the great future of Russia, just as the lordly, magnate self-will of the Polish elite undermined and destroyed the power and possible great future of Poland.

To remove the head of the boyar threat - to remove, including in the literal sense of the word, with the executioner's ax, then only an autocratic,

absolute sovereign. Ivan the Terrible turned out to be like

that. However, it all began in such a way that not only the future reign of Ivan was in question, but also his very life. The turn of events turned out to be the most dramatic ...

Despite the kissing of the cross, the eldest uncle of the three-year-old Ivan IV, Yuri Ivanovich, almost immediately led an intrigue in order to replace his nephew on the throne with his own special one. The potential usurper was quickly neutralized - at the end of 1533, Yuri was thrown into prison and in 1536 he was killed there. The second

uncle, Andrei Ivanovich, behaved loyally in the first weeks after the death of Vasily III, but then demanded new land holdings from Elena Glinskaya, and when he was denied this, he left for his inheritance - in Staritsa beyond Tver, and gradually became a natural center the attraction of all dissatisfied.

Dissatisfied

was enough.

According to her husband's will, Elena was to share power with the Boyar Duma, where the first person was the boyar Vasily Shuisky - a powerful, unpleasant and ambitious person. Metropolitan Daniel enjoyed the influence. In addition, there was a formal, but uncohesive "triumvirate" of Mikhail Glinsky-Dorodny, Mikhail Zakharyin, Ivan Shigona-Podzhogin. The eyes of other boyars and princes flared up from the influx of opportunities, for example, the princes of Belsky - Gediminovich. And the regent's uncle, Prince Mikhail Lvovich Glinsky-Dorodny, stood out in

particular. He was a colorful figure - he was an adventurer, but a bright and high-flying adventurer. Glinsky was brought up at the court of the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire Maximilian I, then he served Albrecht of Saxony, in Italy he converted from Orthodoxy to Catholicism, and after returning to Poland and Lithuania he became the largest magnate, enjoyed great influence on King Alexander Jagiellon. Glinsky led combinations with King Sigismund I, the Crimean Khan Mengli-Girey, the Moscow Grand Duke Vasily III, either collaborating with them or

betraying them ... In 1508, Mikhail Lvovich had to flee from Lithuania to Moscow, where Vasily III gave him Maly Yaroslavets and Borovsk - Glinsky's Lithuanian possessions were confiscated. Then Mikhail Lvovich tried to arrange an alliance

Maximilian I and Vasily III, in order to break Lithuania and at the same time return their possessions, however, betrayed Moscow during the battle of Orsha. The Russian troops were defeated, and Glinsky ended up in prison until 1526, from which he left only after the marriage of Vasily III to Glinsky's niece, again falling into favor with Vasily ...

To top it all off, after the death of Vasily III, Elena's favorite, Prince Ivan Fedorovich Telepnev Ovchina-Obolensky, came to the fore. In other words, it was

not even the plot of Krylov's fable "The Swan, Cancer and Pike" that was realized in life, but something even more sad and counterproductive. Once again, at a critical moment for the stability of the state, the Russian princely and boyar elite behaved - as a social group, exceptions do not count - anti-social and anti-state. One can only be surprised that in the years before

the real accession of Ivan - and it took place only in 1547, nothing catastrophic happened in Rus' and with Russia. Moreover, quite successful external wars were fought with Lithuania, the western borders against Lithuania and Sweden were strengthened, the southern ones against the Crimean Khanate, and the eastern ones against the Kazan Khanate. In 1535, a decree was

issued prohibiting monasteries from acquiring, by purchase or bequest, the land of service people without the permission of the government. In 1536, many lands were taken away from the Novgorod monasteries, and in Moscow and Novgorod the Great, the clergy began to be involved in city service. During 1535-1538, a monetary reform was carried out, which resulted in a unified monetary system of the state. An important factor in stabilization was the large Russian army, which at that time constituted a formidable force with advanced weapons and clever tactics. Here, the activity of the political bed "duet" of Elena

Glinskaya and her energetic and intelligent favorite, Prince Telepnev-Ovchiny-Obolensky, combined with the daily work of those humble "cogs" of the state mechanism, which was thoughtfully created by Ivan III the Great and Vasily III Vasilyevich, affected. This actual government during the period, in fact, the interregnum, quite effectively supported the state

"afloat", not only preserving, but also strengthening centralization, which was already an achievement in that situation.

The princely-boyar elite did not like this course of events. In 1534, a conspiracy of well-born boyars, led by Glinsky, was formed against the not very well-born, although sensible Telepnev-Ovchiny Obolensky. The plot was uncovered, as a result of which Glinsky was again imprisoned, where he died. As already mentioned, in 1536

the elder uncle of Ivan IV, Yuri Ivanovich, died in prison, and in the same 1536, the second uncle, Prince Andrei Staritsky, who either led an intrigue, seeking the throne, or was about to flee to Lithuania, was killed. Subjected to repression and his boyars - they were tortured and executed by commercial execution. Some of Andrei's accomplices were hanged.

And in April 1538, Elena Glinskaya died suddenly ... According to Herberstein, the author of "Notes on Muscovite Affairs", she was poisoned by Shuisky, which is very similar to the truth - if you know the nature of this princely family, prone to intrigue, and the subsequent course of events. A week later, Telepnev-Ovchin-Obolensky was

thrown into prison. The mother (nanny) of Prince Ivan, the future Grand Duke Ivan IV, was Ovchin's sister Agrafena Chelyadnina. Ivan, who was 8 years old at the time of his mother's death, was attached to both Agrafena and her brother. Therefore, Ivan, formally a full-fledged Grand Duke, very emotionally protested against the arrest of Ovchina, but the boyars who seized power simply ignored the boy's protests. Sheepskin was killed in captivity, Agrafena was forcibly tonsured a nun and exiled to Kargopol.

This was, if you think about it, a key moment in the formation of both the human and state character of Ivan the Terrible. At the age of 8, he was left without a single loved one nearby. Even then, feeling like a sovereign, he found himself in the position of a powerless boy, forced year after year to watch how the strife of the Rurik Shuiskys and the Gediminovich Belskys flourished in the Boyar Duma, who were united and agreed only on one thing - in bullying the growing Ivan.

For the umpteenth time, the Russian ruling elite has demonstrated its anti-national and anti-social nature. For the first time in many decades, such a young sovereign was on the throne that the most mature and experienced nobles had to temporarily take over the real rule. Their formal and civic duty should have been the development of the state and its well-being, and instead they began to satisfy their base desires and tear each other's shreds of power. At the same time, the princes interfered with those who really led the state, and ended up eliminating their opponents physically - in front of the young and powerless Ivan. The question is quite legitimate - what would have happened if Shuisky had not poisoned Elena Glinskaya and eliminated Ovchina-Obolensky, but the

“duet” of Elena and Ovchina decided on large-scale repressions against the Shuiskys, and in general the boyars and princes? Well, nothing sad would happen - on the contrary, everything could

turn out quite successfully and positively ...

The state activity of the regent's government was quite constructive. Young Ivan had the makings of a great sovereign ... The internal situation did not inspire much anxiety ... So the development

of events, while maintaining the power of Glinskaya and Ovchina, would most likely go in approximately the same direction in which it really went later ... If not during the regency, then after the accession of Ivan, supported by his mother and her favorite, would have taken place the annexation of Kazan and Astrakhan; advance to Siberia, wars for access to the Baltic, and so on and so forth necessary for the development of Rus', including the strengthening of the significance of the service nobility ...

Only this would have happened without those excessively bloody excesses that occurred in the Russia of Ivan IV, warped, in fact, not by Ivan the Terrible, but by the princes and the boyars.

However - and this must be understood clearly! - a smoother, less conflicting, but constructive for Russia, development of hypothetical events **still** could not have taken place without preventive repressions of the hypothetical regime of Glinskaya-Ovchina against those very princes and boyars who were cruelly dealt with by the real regime of Ivan the Terrible.

That is - and this is usually overlooked - large-scale anti-boyar measures, the widespread suppression of the tribal boyars turned out to be an **objective** historical need in Russia by the middle of the 16th century. Without the neutralization and elimination of the boyar threat to society, Russia could simply collapse and again fall under foreign power emanating from the west, north, south and east.

At the age of thirteen, Ivan received another powerful instant psychological and nervous shock. The Shuiskys noticed that the boyar and voivode Fyodor Semyonovich Vorontsov was beginning to influence Ivan. In September 1543, right at the meeting of the Boyar Duma in the presence of the Grand Duke and Metropolitan Macarius, Princes A.M. and I.M. Shuisky, princes F. Skopin-Shuisky, Dm. Kurlyatev, I. Pronsky, as well as the roundabout Basmanov and others, attacked Vorontsov, tore off his clothes, began to brutally beat him and beat him if it were not for Ivan, Metropolitan Macarius and several boyars who stood up for Vorontsov ... Ivan begged the Shuiskys so that Vorontsov would not be sent away from Moscow, insisted on Kolomna, but the boyar was exiled to Kostroma.

Perhaps this was a turning point for Ivan - he was shocked, frightened and outraged at the same time. Even earlier, at the beginning of 1542, the Shuiskys defeated the Belskys, and during this coup, the supporters of the Shuiskys broke into Ivan's bedroom and forced him to read morning prayers in the cross chamber. How could Ivan

be formed in these conditions? And who could he trust completely? Almost all the

participants in the bloody drama of September 1543 in Ivan's dining hut later paid with their heads, starting with the "first boyar councilor" A.M. Shuisky. In December 1543, Ivan ordered to give it to the kennels, who killed the prince. The famous accuser of Ivan, Prince Andrey Kurbsky, describes young Ivan as a bloodthirsty teenager, prone to cruel amusements, murder, etc. After so many years and with Ivan

having so many contemporaries' opponents, it is difficult to separate the pamphlet's lies from historically reliable data, but rather of all, the first Russian tsar did not really differ in softness of nature and had an impulsive character, capable of cruelty for the sake of cruelty. However, it must be remembered

that Ivan IV the Terrible was brought up by those very princes Rurikovich-Gediminovichs and noble boyars, who then themselves went to the sovereign's chopping block. Ivan grew up

with a complex, restless nature, but he was clearly able to think deeply about future actions, and then act. Before leaving Shuisky to the kennel in December 1543, Ivan went to the Trinity-Sergius Monastery in September 1543, and there, presumably, he not only prayed. He began to think his own thoughts, and what he then thought remained between him and God. Although something can be assumed if you carefully read Ivan's later correspondence with Andrei Kurbsky - especially Ivan's first letter ... And, by the way, the

second. Only a black

slanderer can claim that young Ivan's pastime was limited to baiting bears and people. Grozny was one of the most educated - in the humanitarian and military spheres - people of his time, he was very well-read. And literacy is either formed from childhood and adolescence, or it is not formed at all. Therefore, it is correct to assume that Ivan did not amuse himself in a base way, as the Kurbskys claim, but read a lot - which there is extraneous evidence.

The unsystematic reading at a young age - which is also written about, had not only minuses, but also pluses. The sovereign does not need to be a formal erudite, but the ability to quickly grasp the essence and move from one problem to another is very useful for the monarch-manager, and a wide range of children's reading certainly contributes to the formation of a broad outlook.

Bearing in mind Grozny's first letter to Kurbsky, V.O. Klyuchevsky wrote about his informational background: "Long and short extracts from Holy Scripture and the Church Fathers, lines and entire chapters the Old Testament from New Testament teachers - Basil of prophets, ... the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, John Chrysostom, images from classical mythology and epic - Zeus, Apollo, Antenor, Aeneas, ... episodes from Jewish, Roman and Byzantine history, and even from the history of Western European peoples with the medieval names of Zinzirich of the Vandal, Goths, Savromats, French, subtracted from chronographs ...".

This is an indisputable evidence of Ivan's erudition and culture, coming from himself. His accusations of sadism come from enemies, and there are, to put it mildly, grounds to doubt their veracity.

No, the maturing Ivan was thinking his own thoughts and so far was only getting close to comprehending himself and his tasks in conversations with the new Metropolitan Macarius (1482–1563). Previously a Novgorod bishop, a Josephite, a staunch supporter of autocracy, Macarius took the post of the highest church hierarch in 1542 and was a strong figure capable of influencing the king.

The last ones who had a decisive influence on the formation of Ivan as a state figure were, perhaps, the devious Alexei Adashev and the priest of the Annunciation Cathedral in Moscow, Sylvester, about which - a little later.

On January 16, 1547, Ivan was "crowned" by Metropolitan Macarius in the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin and took the title of "Tsar and Grand Duke of All Rus'." At first glance, this step was not very revolutionary - the words "Great Sovereign, by the grace of God, Tsar and Sovereign of All Rus'" were already included in his title by Ivan's father Vasily III.

But, firstly, now this title was solemnly accepted, with the laying on of Ivan the royal crown. Secondly, for

Vasily III, the royal title was the result of many years of personal efforts of him and his father, and Ivan IV placed royal signs on himself at the very beginning of his reign. Thirdly,

and this was the most significant, Ivan, when he was crowned, made it clear to the boyars that he did not accept their claims to complicity in governance, and denied the rights of certain lands to political isolation.

The concept of autocracy merged so firmly with the name of Ivan IV Vasilyevich that even such a major Slavist as the German professor Max Vasmer, in his "Etymological Dictionary of the Russian Language", reporting that the word "autocrat" is a tracing paper from the Greek αὐτοκράτωρ ("autocrat") , further claims that such a title was adopted by Ivan the Terrible "after the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan." However, the word is already found in the annals of the Kyiv period in relation to the Kyiv grand dukes ... Joseph Volotsky in

in a letter to Vasily III Ivanovich in 1515, he addressed him: "To the noble and Christ-loving self-supporter, tsar and sovereign of all Russia." Ivan IV took the title only of "king and sovereign" - officially the title of "autocrat of all Rus'" was adopted after Ivan. But even this step annoyed some. On June

21, 1547, there was a big fire in

Moscow - then Metropolitan Macarius almost died and the royal palace burned down. A fire in Moscow is not God knows what an event, among the people the saying is compounded: "Moscow burned down from a penny candle." But here the fire coincided with the riot of the townspeople, and one of the reasons was the rumor that the fire was conjured by the grandmother of the new king by mother Anna Glinskaya, the daughter of

the Serbian governor Stefan Yakshich. The rumor was spread by the opponents of the Glinskys, and the crowd, having tore Yuri Glinsky to pieces, went to the tsar in the village of Vorobyovo on the Sparrow Hills, demanding the extradition of Anna. Many of the arrivals were captured and immediately executed, but the situation was critical. The internal situation of the country because of discord in the "top" was difficult, and the uprising of the urban lower classes, no matter what it initiated - superstition or provocation of a number of boyars, there were objective reasons. The arbitrariness of the boyars and officials, poverty, famine in a lean

year, increased oppression - all this, even without a fire, created a tense atmosphere. That time is very poorly documented - even if we mean just records of events, and after all, the record could be biased, or even false ... For example, in one of the Russian chronicles there is a record that Dmitry Donskoy allegedly cowardly fled from the field of Kulikovskaya battle and waited for the outcome in the grove, simulating a wound. However, such a record is explained

by the fact that the abbot of the monastery where this chronicle was kept was disloyal to Donskoy. Nevertheless, it seems quite reliable historically and psychologically the information that the turning point in the situation that developed in the summer of 1547 after the Moscow fire was made by a passionate diatribe against the tsar of the Annunciation Archpriest Sylvester.

Threatening with heavenly punishments, accusing Ivan of neglecting his duties, Sylvester urged Ivan to take up real

management. Everything then combined into one thing - a spiritual shock, the end of adolescence, the difficult internal and external situation of the country ... And in the young tsar, judging by the future, a moral upheaval really took place: from 1547, not only the reign, but also the reign of Ivan IV began.

The working tool was the so-called "Chosen Rada" - the first government of Ivan, the backbone of which was the Duma nobleman Adashev, Archpriest Sylvester, Metropolitan Macarius, the Duma clerk Viskovaty and Prince Kurbsky - the same one ...

The fates of the secular members of the "Chosen Rada" turned out to be different ... Adashev played prominent government roles, but during the Livonian War he died in 1560 in Yuryev-Derpt under house arrest ... Sylvester, to whom Ivan, for a number of reasons, including objective ones, later lost interest, died in 1566 in Kirillo Belozersky Monastery ... Kurbsky - an ideologist autocratic boyars, betrayed and fled to Poland ... Ivan Viskovaty - an outstanding man, his royal namesake called "his neighbor and faithful Duma", but Viskovaty ended badly - accused of involvement in a conspiracy and treason, he was publicly executed in 1570. The name "Chosen Council" was not,

however, the self-name of Ivan's first state circle - this term, Polish-Lithuanian in origin, was used by Kurbsky in his messages from Poland, and it later became fixed in the everyday life of historians. Historians like to give facts and events capacious definitions - for example, the participants in the Hundred Years War of England and France themselves did not know that they were waging a war with that name - historians later gave it to that period, and quite successfully.

Another example is the historical nickname of Ivan IV - "The Terrible". Neither he nor his contemporaries-subjects called Ivan that, but the nickname - although it narrows the essence of the nature and figure of Ivan IV - is

historically correct. But sometimes the name takes the fact out of the context of the era, as happened in the case of the historically established name of the Grozny circle. It was both politically and morally beneficial for Kurbsky to present the matter in such a way that, they say, Tsar Ivan ha

The "chosen" leading "team", and the tyrannical despot Ivan executed and dispersed it.

But it wasn't so... The

Chosen Rada, or rather, the regime of the Chosen Rada, could not but be effective at first, since it was formed as an instrument of large-scale and overdue reforms and state actions. At the same time, the regime of the Chosen Rada **objectively** could not be durable - since it gathered by no means like-minded people, and after the most pressing and indisputable problems were resolved under the leadership of the "chosen ones", disagreements and mutual intrigues were bound to arise. So, alas, it happened - by 1560, the Chosen Council had exhausted its potential ...

A number of historians, for example, S.V. Bakhrushin, considered the "rada" as the "nearest thought" of the tsar and saw in it a compromise group, and I.I. Smirnov generally considered the concept of "rada" a fiction. The latter estimate is, of course, incorrect. Young Ivan simply could not help but assemble his "team", because no one has ever done big state affairs alone - this

is simply impossible. It's another matter that rarely does a leader's entourage not try to achieve a decisive influence on the leader - the "gray eminence" syndrome is characteristic not only of "gray eminences", but also of nobles, especially such arrogant ones as Kurbsky and Adashev. As for Sylvester, he was unambiguously ambitious in nature - it was he who owns the extended edition and addition of "Domostroy" - the famous set of rules for life. That is, Sylvester loved to teach and instruct ... Ivan grew more and more mature not only physically, but also as a top manager, and his "neighbors" tried to manage him. As a result, the scythe found a stone, and if the "stone" is the king, then any "spit" will be bad, especially if the king is for

And here, speaking about the ideological base of the era of Ivan IV Vasilyevich, one cannot but touch upon another

most curious moment ... Young Ivan was influenced - and, perhaps, much stronger than members of the "rada" and the "near Duma" - a certain "royal nobleman", a native of Russian Lithuanian lands, known in history as Ivan Semyonovich Peresvetov. Information about his life

are scarce, and after Karamzin first encountered Peresvetov's "pleas" at the beginning of the 19th century, his very existence as a specific person was questioned for almost a century and a half. Peresvetov's writings were considered either apocrypha - later forgeries, or the result of the work of Grozny himself ...

Already in the 50s of the twentieth century, the then young A.A. Zimin, after much research, published two monographs on Peresvetov, a most interesting figure in our history. He saw and traveled a lot, served in Lithuania, but around 1539 he left for Russia and tried to attract the attention of the authorities with a number of purely military proposals. In 1549, Peresvetov, pinning his hopes on changes under the really reigning young Tsar Ivan, gave him a number of his "petitions" (in modern terms, memorandums) and "The Tale of Makhmet-Saltan" ...

In the "Tale" the ideas of a strong sovereign were presented in the form of a parable, the memorandums - "petitions" were more specific. Peresvetov had seen enough of domineering self-interest and swagger in Europe, and sharply opposed the boyars, calling them "lazy rich people."

The definition, it should be noted, is capacious and accurate ... In other countries, the idle rich grew long nails as a sign that they did not need to work with their hands, and in Rus' the boyars wore fur coats and caftans with long sleeves in high throated hats - as a sign of the same. Ordinary Russian people - unlike the noble boyars, such sleeves did not fit, they had to *roll up normal sleeves every now and then* ... Having "lazy" and arrogant sleeves was out of hand for

the service element - the nobility. So, in general, Peresvetov's journalism, expressing anti-boyar noble views, was a well-thought-out program of state reforms ... In The Tale of Mahmet-Saltan, the weak "Tsar Konstantin" was opposed to the "Turkish Tsar Mahmet",

in which Ivan was immediately guessed, because about Mahmet it was said: "The lords of the tsar grew rich from their unclean assembly until the age of the tsar; at the age of the king, the king began to sober up from his youth and began to come to great military wisdom and to his royal birth.

The nobles of "Konstantin" were excited about this, realizing that they would have a "vain life" from such a king ... Mehmet said

"his wise philosopher": "You see, they, rich and deceitful, settled (entangled, - S.K.) the king with enmity and caught him with their great cunning and intrigues, devilish charm, and tamed his wisdom and happiness ... "Already not to the parable

Mehmet-Saltan, but to the historical Tsar Ivan suggested:

- rely not on the boyars, but on the service people of the "warriors", putting forward cadres not by nobility, but by merit, and rewarding the "warriors" with land with the peasants;
- "from all over the state, all incomes to their treasury imati";
- to create a permanent powerful regular army of "great archers with fiery arrows";
- introduce a right court and "do not give governorships to anyone in any city "so that they are not tempted to judge by unrighteousness"; - to annex the

Kazan Khanate ... Peresvetov was an

unambiguous, staunch supporter of autocracy and wrote: "Like a horse under a king without a bridle, so a kingdom without a thunderstorm", "It is not powerful (impossible. - S.K.) to keep the king of the kingdom without a

thunderstorm" , etc. P. Peresvetov also formulated the following state principle: "In which kingdom people are enslaved, and in that kingdom people are not brave and do not dare to fight against an enemy: an enslaved person is not afraid of shame, but does not earn honor for himself ...".

Historians did not agree on whether Peresvetov's programmatic journalism became the basis of Ivan IV's real program of action? But one can doubt, perhaps, one thing - did Peresvetov's papers reach Grozny or not? And since the inventory of the royal archive, compiled around 1562, says that the 143rd box contains the "black list of Ivashka Peresvetov", it is clear that Ivan the Terrible was familiar with the ideas of Ivan Peresvetov, and, therefore, accepted them for execution. The ideas of Ivan Peresvetov and the actions of Ivan IV the Terrible turned out to be very similar. The fate of Peresvetov himself is unclear and vague. But

it seems that a number of his innovative ideas, such as that "truth is higher than faith," led him to

the number of victims of anti-heretical trials. The contribution of Ivan Peresvetov to the reforms of Ivan the Terrible is beyond doubt.

One way or another, for the first thirteen years of the reign of Ivan IV, much was done that was necessary for the development of Russia, as, indeed, for all thirty-seven years of his reign. And it will be useful to immediately give a short summary list of the main events of the state life of Rus' Ivan IV Vasilyevich the Terrible ...

By February 1549, the first Zemsky Sobor was prepared - an organ that had not previously existed in Rus'. In fact, here we can talk about rethinking the idea of the Russian veche, since the Council was an elective body in many respects, and resolved the most important issues not formally, but in discussion and reflection. It was the king's council with the society. However, it is possible that the precedent of the French States General, first convened in 1302, was also used.

Already the creation by Ivan of a new class-representative institution - the Zemsky Sobor, refutes the assessment of his reign as tyrannical. Tyrants don't need advice. Ivan, however, considered it necessary for himself to convene a second Zemsky Sobor - already after the introduction of the oprichnina, in 1566. Moreover, at this second Council, its members included not only boyars, nobles, clerks, and church hierarchs, but also commercial and industrial leaders.

The first Zemsky Sobor of 1549 (this dating, however, is approximate) was aptly called the "Cathedral of Reconciliation". On it, Ivan, in a frank speech, outlined a gloomy picture of the internal and external situation of Russia, accused the boyars, repented himself, asked the estates to reconcile and promised to continue to be a judge and protection for the people.

One of the important results of the first Council was the withdrawal of the "children of the boyars" - petty feudal lords, from the jurisdiction of their former "feeders" - the large landed nobility. Now the nobles became the servants of the sovereign, and not the boyars. The paths of state and judicial reform were also outlined, and in 1550 the Zemsky Sobor adopted the Sudebnik of Ivan IV. This Sudebnik was an outstanding step towards the centralization and strengthening of the Russian state. He eliminated the judicial privileges of the specific princes and strengthened the role of the central judiciary ...

The "feeding" system was abolished and a system of elected zemstvo authorities was introduced. Since 1555, hard-working townspeople and black-haired peasants began to elect zemstvo elders ("beloved head"); separately elected zemstvo

elders in the cities. The subject of constant attention and concern of Tsar Ivan was the development and improvement of the system of state administration - under him many new departments-orders were formed and the old ones were expanded: the Order of the Grand Palace, the Great Parish, Streltsy, Pushkarsky, Kholopy, Ambassadorial orders, etc. A significant innovation was the formation of the Petition Order headed by A.F. Adashev.

The main thing is that in 1550 the military reform began. The first six regiments of the regular troops - the archers - were formed from the "lightweight" people. At first there were 3,000 of them, by the end of the reign of Ivan IV - already 12,000 people ... Ivan attached great importance to artillery, the number of large guns in his army rose to 200 (the total figure is called in 2000), and Ivan also formed regimental artillery of infantry regiments for the first time. In the West, the latest innovation was introduced much later. Under Ivan, the first standards for

cannon calibers were introduced in Russian artillery. In the era of Ivan the Terrible, the activities of the outstanding cannon maker Andrei Chokhov began, who cast at least 20 heavy guns, including: "Fox" (1575), "Wolf" (1576), "Inrog" (i.e. unicorn, 1577) and etc. Already after the death of Grozny - in 1586, Chokhov cast the Tsar Cannon. Moreover, it was not a decorative work - at least once from the "Tsar Cannon", which was actually not a cannon, but a bombard, they shot. A decree of 1550 established a new order of appointment to

command positions, and preference was given to abilities and personal merit, rather than nobility. Localism (that is, finding out who is more noble and higher in "place") was not completely canceled then, but it was allowed only at the level of governors. This changed the entire psychological background of team activity, where earlier boyar localism often led to defeats simply because commands were not executed.

In the same 1550, on the steep bank of the Sviyaga opposite Kazan, the Russian fortress Sviyazhsk was built. The Kazan Khan immediately returned 60,000 (!) Russian Polonians to Russia ...

In February 1551, Metropolitan Macarius convened a separate church council, called the "Stoglav" ... It was named so because its decisions in one hundred chapters formalized answers to one hundred questions, formulated with the personal participation of the king. In the

summer of 1551, Chuvashia was annexed to the Russian state, and in 1552, Ivan IV's campaign against Kazan ended with its capture and the annexation of the Kazan Khanate to Russia.

In 1556, Astrakhan was taken by Russian troops, and the Astrakhan Khanate became part of Russia, and even earlier Bashkiria was annexed to Russia ... In other words, it was Ivan IV the Terrible who made the Volga a purely Russian river and once and for all eliminated the threat to Russia's security from the east. In the era of Ivan IV, 88 kilometers below Nizhny Novgorod, the annual Makariev Fair began to emerge, where merchants from Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Persia, India began to gather ... The

fundamental difference between the Tatar and Russian civilizational line was reflected in the fact that the Tatars, like their predecessors before the Mongols took cities in order to plunder and burn, and Ivan IV took Kazan and Astrakhan in order to involve new subjects in the sphere of the common Russian cause - the development of the territories that make up the Russian state. Ten years later, the Volga Tatar cavalry will take part in the Russian Livonian War. After the Volga successes of Ivan IV, the

Khan of the Siberian Khanate, Yedigey, recognized himself as a tributary of Moscow (in 1571, Khan Kuchum stopped paying tribute, which was one of the reasons for Yermak's campaign in Siberia). In the 60s, Circassian and Kabardian princes recognized vassal dependence on Rus'.

On the occasion of the annexation of Kazan, Ivan IV in 1555 began the construction of the eight-domed Intercession Cathedral on Red Square, which became better known as St. Basil's Cathedral ... St. Basil's Cathedral is a recognized masterpiece of architecture, but with all the grandeur of the plan of its builders, one should not forget about the customer ... A place for the temple, its compositional solution and architecture in no w

could have been chosen without the participation of Ivan IV, and in the appearance of the Church of the Intercession, not only the genius of the architect Postnik, but also the taste of the tsar, and the spirit of the time, manifested itself. And what an idea! Multicolor, diversity of the Russian land, but at the same time - united and united into one harmonious whole ...

In the future, in the campaigns of Yermak, the Siberian Khanate was also attached, after which they will begin to talk about the "conquest of three kingdoms" - Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberia. However, the civilizational meaning of Russia's "conquest" of its East was directly opposite, as already mentioned, to the meaning of the former conquest of Russia by the East. The Russian campaigns of Batu and Tokhtamysh brought death, separation, desolation and regression to Rus', and the Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberian campaigns of Rus' brought to the peoples - both Russian and "conquered", the possibility of a new common life, development and progress. In 1564, at the initiative of Ivan and with the assistance of Metropolitan Macarius, the pioneer printer Ivan Fedorov, together with Peter Mstislavets,

published the first Russian printed book, The Apostle, in Moscow. The ignorant, incited by the reactionaries from the clergy, burned down the printing house, and then the tsar took the printing business under his protection and set up a "printing" in his Alexander settlement. Perhaps, in this - at first glance, private - fact, **the fundamental** fact of the growing intellectual savagery of Russian society in its mass of people was manifested. Pre-Mongolian Kiev-Novgorod Rus was a society, if not universal, then mass literacy. Literacy was

understood even by smerds. Now, even in the Russian capital, the bearers of the new knowledge were beaten by the mob. However, the general state line was not alien to education, which is clear not only from the organization of the printing house in Aleksandrovskaya Sloboda, but also from the fact that the head of the 26th decision of the Stoglavy Cathedral decided to establish schools "in Moscow and in all cities (cities. - S.K. .)", and after the council, Metropolitan Macarius, in his instructions, proposed "to establish

book schools ... in the city, and in the suburbs, and in the volosts, and in the graveyards." Ivan - like his predecessors and his successors - had to fight a lot ... Fight, mainly in the west and south.

Already the father of the Terrible - Vasily III, in 1521 began the construction of the Great Barrier Line to the South of Moscow, which ran from Ryazan to Tula. In the reign of Ivan, it was basically completed, but the southern "Crimean" threat still manifested itself in the seventies - during the Western Livonian War. It manifested itself in the most meaningful and tragic way.

The Livonian War - we will dwell on it separately - became another great deed of the era of Ivan the Terrible, despite its uneven course and the negative problems that it gave rise to. This war began in 1558 - against the backdrop of the impressive successes of Rus', and ended, in fact, only in 1721 with the Treaty of Nystadt, which ended the Northern War already of Peter the Great.

Moreover, without taking into account the "Livonian" and Swedish aspects of the era of Ivan the Terrible, it is hardly possible to understand what Ruslan Skrynnikov called the "tragedy of Novgorod", that is, Ivan's campaign against Novgorod and Pskov in December 1569 - February 1570, and pogroms, culminating in this journey.

The "Novgorod case" of Ivan IV the Terrible, as well as his entire repressive policy in general, cannot be assessed in the "universal" categories of "good and evil", bringing this side of the Grozny era into a kind of historical timelessness and separating the mores of that era in Rus' from world mores. Cruelty was then the norm, and not only in the East, but also in enlightened Europe. For example, wheeling - the most painful type of execution, used by Grozny, was in use back in Ancient Rome, then in Germany for murderers "acting from ambushes", and in France for highway robbers. Grozny only borrowed wheeling, like other tortures, from the European arsenal of executions. Not the best borrowing,

but ... On the night of August

23-24, 1572, on the feast of St. Bartholomew in Paris, the French king Charles IX, his mother Catherine de Medici and the house of Guise organized a massacre of French Huguenots treacherously and without objective grounds. In one night, 3,000 people were killed in Paris alone, among them many noble Huguenot nobles who had come to the wedding of the Catholic king's sister Margaret with the Huguenot Henry of Navarre. In total, up to 30,000 were destroyed in France then.

Human. Moreover, none of them posed any threat to the future of France, no one was a conductor of the interests of external forces and did not plot against the king.

The pogrom of Novgorod and Bartholomew's Night are, in fact, separated by a little over a year. However, even in Russia this night, no one blames Europe, but only the lazy does not rant about the Russian "bloody despot" Grozny.

But was everything so bloody in Rus'? And **is it really**
Were Grozny's repressions groundless?

The numbers of repressions of Ivan IV the Terrible are, most often, malicious and deliberate lies with the aim of discrediting both Ivan and Russian history. Thus, Jerome

Horsey, who has been in Russia since 1573 as an agent of the English "Moscow Company", established in 1555 to conduct trade with Russia, stated in his memoirs that the tsar killed 700,000 (seven hundred thousand!) People in Novgorod ... If we even we are dealing with a typo that increases the figure by an extra zero, it still turns out 70,000 ... The Pskov chronicler calls the figure 60 thousand

people. Andrei Kurbsky claims that 15,000 people were killed in Novgorod in one day. The Italian diplomat Jerio recorded *a rumor* about the beating of 18,000 people. Russian historian of the late 19th century A.G. Ilyinsky, based on the records of the Novgorod (yup!) Chronicle, writes about 40,000 people who died in the pogrom, and the Soviet historian A.A. Zimin

agree with him.

This anti-historical "digital" paranoia painfully resembles the "parade" of fictional "numbers" of "Stalinist repressions" and "demographic crimes of communism", calculated by Western and homegrown liberals in tens or even hundreds of millions of "victims". However, the same Ruslan Skrynnikov points to the real

reason for the mass death of people in Russian cities, including Novgorod, in the early 70s - famine due to another crop shortage and epidemic. Perhaps, epidemics, including the plague, were especially significant just for Novgorod, a city actively trading with Europe, where the plague then became an element of being.

Skrynnikov directly notes that "the damage inflicted on Novgorod by famine and plague in 1570-71 far exceeded the consequences of the oprichnina defeat. Numerous descriptions, patrols and searches of Novgorod churchyards and villages testify to this. Russian historian A.M. Gnevushev at the beginning of the 20th century, on the basis of scribe books of 1581-1584, also came to the conclusion that "the year of the oprichnina defeat does not stand out among other crisis years in the history of

Novgorod." An illustrative example ... The Germans Johann Taube and Elert Krause, the authors of a pamphlet against Grozny and participants in the oprichnina campaign against Tver, in one case indicate the number of beaten in Tver at 90,000 people, and in another case they write that 27 thousand Tver residents died of starvation, and guardsmen killed 9 thousand ... Reporting this, R. Skrynnikov, who is by no means pro-Ivanovo-minded, notes that the figures given "many times

exceed the population of Tver in the 16th century." The German Pomeranian nobleman Albert Schlichting served in the troops of Ivan IV, but in 1570, during the Livonian War, he fled to Lithuania and published "News from Muscovy, reported by the nobleman A.Sh. about the life and tyranny of Emperor Ivan". Perhaps Schlichting limited himself to the initials in the title, hoping to return to Moscow again for a living. "Information" he clearly invented for the sake of the Lithuanian anti-Russian propaganda. In addition to the usual description of the "horrors", Schlichting reported that the oprichnina de plundered "twenty-

year-old" (!!) stocks of goods "intended for export to Europe" in Novgorod ... Heinrich von Staden, a German adventurer, became an active participant in the oprichnina exclusively in the form of robbery, in which he succeeded. Having set out on a campaign against Novgorod with one horse and two servants, he recruited a gang of vagabonds, made his own raid and returned to Moscow with 49 horses and 22 sledges with loot. The modern liberal "historian" Irina Karatsuba, using the figure of "beaten" in 40,000 people, cites Staden's boast and summarizes: "To appreciate this news, we must take into account that the oprichnina army, which moved north from Moscow in December, numbered

occupied no leading positions in this army "... The hint is obvious: if Staden had 49 horses, then ...

The multiplication of real, presumably, 49 horses by the obviously mythical 15,000 "horsemen" gives 735,000 horses allegedly taken away from Novgorod. The figure is absurd to the point of obviousness, but Irina Karatsuba is not embarrassed by this, just as she is not embarrassed by the uncritical reference to Staden's writings. He, having left Moscow in 1576, immediately began - as an "expert on Russian affairs" - to develop plans for intervention in "Muscovy" for the German Emperor Rudolf II and the Swedish King Johan III ... And in addition, he published notes "Country and rule of the Muscovites", full of those "information" that would justify the aggression of the West

against Russia. As you can see, Dr. Goebbels is looking for very old predecessors...

But what were the real scales of Ivan the Terrible's terror? In 1582, when Ivan had less than two years to live, he ordered the compilation of the "Synodik" - a list of all the disgraced who suffered **throughout** his reign. The list consisted mainly of specific names, for example: "Matthew Bukharin with his son, ... Roman Nazariyev's son Dubrovsky ...", etc., but there are also nameless entries like: "And there are 20 zemstvo kennels in the village in Bratoshin". The Synodik, in fact, opens with the most massive unnamed entry: "According to Malyutin's tale (that is, according to the report of Ivan Malyuta Skuratov's colleague. - S.K.), 1490 people killed Novgorodians, and 15 people were killed" ...

The calculation of the victims of repressions was carried out, presumably, carefully and zealously - after all, it was necessary to pray for those killed in order to atone for the sovereign's sins from God, so one cannot but agree with Ruslan Skrynnikov, who considers Sinodik as the most reliable source for determining the scale of repressions and evaluates them at the level in 4000 people. Based on the data of the Synodic and introducing a double coefficient, we get the total real figure of repressed no more than 8,000 people - for many years.

It is impossible not to compare the figure of Grozny with the figures of "civilized" European repressions. People killed in those ... "Bartholomew" 30,000

at the same time... Tens of thousands of people beaten in the Netherlands in a matter of years by the Spanish Duke of Alba... Tens of thousands executed in the "Ivanovo" XVI century by the English Henry VIII... And the earlier atrocities of the feudal lords during the Jacquerie and the Peasant War in Germany, where, if not hundreds of thousands? .. This is not to mention the genocide of the Spaniards in relation to the indigenous peoples in the New World ... Against such a background and taking into account the complexities of the era, Grozny's figure is not impressive - if you do not start chattering that the happiness of mankind is not worth tears of an innocent child. It was under such chatter that millions of innocent children's lives were destroyed

only in the 20th century ...

And they are being destroyed to this day. "Dozens" of thousands, and even more so, "hundreds of thousands" of "innocently killed" by the "tyrant" Grozny arose in Europe in the 16th century in full accordance with the principles of the future Goebbels propaganda. (However, as we see, this kind of propaganda should rather be called - according to priorities - Shtaden-Gorseev). Then Russia started the Livonian War; At first, the war went on successfully for Russia, and it was urgently necessary to portray the Russians and Ivan personally as exclusively beasts. About the latter

- propaganda, the background of the case will be discussed later. This is about the "digital" side of the Novgorod-Pskov campaign of Ivan the Terrible. But there were also political reasons for such a campaign - both internal

Even Andrei Staritsky, in his opposition to the regent Elena Glinskaya after the death of Vasily III, counted on the Novgorod "forged army", and counted not without reason - Andrei Novgorodians suited much more than the centralizing regime of Glinskaya-Ovchina. Andrei claimed the regency, but his

"bid" for the throne was not ruled out. At the same time, Andrei was an absurd, petty person, inclined to whine even during the life of Vasily III. His son Vladimir Staritsky, the cousin of Tsar Ivan, was also not distinguished by any special originality, although he had claims, and his mother Euphrosyne, Andrei's widow, warmed them up.

Euphrosyne Staritskaya - nee Princess Khovanskaya, is certified by historians as a woman of an extraordinary mind, however, weighing the circumstances, she should be assessed rather as an evil, domineering and self-confident fool, who got one thing in her head: her son Vladimir can be a king no worse than her nephew Ivan . That is why Euphrosinia was so stubborn and persistent in her rejection of the king. After the death of Andrei,

Vladimir Staritsky - in the event of Ivan's death - would have been the first contender for the throne, and he would have been supported by the boyars. In such a situation, certain anti-Ivanov conspiracies were simply inevitable.

Both Andrey Staritsky and Vladimir Staritsky had in Novgorod residences were popular because, firstly, they stood in opposition to Moscow - like Novgorod traditionally, and, secondly, gravitated towards Poland and Lithuania - like Novgorod. At the same time, Novgorod turned out to be the only serious channel of influence in Russia for Poland, Lithuania and Western Europe in general. He still played the role of the second political center of Rus', and was the bearer of an anti-national, in fact, trend. It is significant that in Albert

Kampenze's notes about Novgorod it is said that "this famous city, ***which was previously under the rule of Lithuania*** (bold italics mine. - S.K.), was taken with all the lands belonging to it from Casimir, one of the predecessors of Sigismund, Grand Duke John (Ivan

III. - S.K.) in the summer of our Savior 1479 and annexed to the Moscow possessions.

Novgorod has never been under the rule of Lithuania, but the fact that Kampenze's informants - his father and brother, who lived in Russia, were sure of the opposite, speaks of a very definite "image" of the then Novgorod. And all this

- at the time of the difficult external war that began in 1558 and in a tense internal situation. In 1569, Ivan was stunned

by the news of the deposition in Sweden of his ally Eric XIV by the king's rebellious brothers Johan and Karl. Ivan knew that Eric had long feared a rebellion and had preventively executed many nobles. The new king Johan III, Eric's brother, ascended the throne, leading a conspiracy of the highest nobility.

The situation was so reminiscent of the one in which Ivan himself was psychologically for many years that the Swedish syndrome became one of the factors in the murder of Vladimir Staritsky and the subsequent pogrom of Novgorod and Pskov. The tsar's nerves were in constant tension, and there was a reason - secret, unknown, but real dangers are always worse than open dangers, and Ivan had enough of those and those ... So, in addition to internal, there were a number of external factors that prompted Ivan to secure its northern rear from

Novgorod. An important consideration - R.G. Skrynnikov believes that this was generally one of the main reasons for the campaign - it obviously became an opportunity to correct the financial difficulties of the treasury by robbing the church and monastery wealth of the Novgorod-Pskov diocese, the largest in the country. This, of course, is a guess in the right direction - the treasury was devastated by wars, crop failures, current government spending. Ivan could not encroach on the all-Russian church wealth - his attempts to secularize church lands were immediately stopped. The situation with Novgorod was

traditionally special. Along with undermining the forces of the influential Novgorod clergy, the task of undermining the influence of the church in general was solved, since this influence played an increasingly negative

But in addition to foreign policy and financial considerations, there was such a significant domestic political aspect that in itself could induce Ivan to solve the problem of Novgorod once and for all.

Novgorod

at any moment could become a serious internal danger, since the interests of the richest Novgorod separatists (and there were still enough of them) overlapped very well with the magnate de-centralization interests of the princes and boyars. And all this together naturally led internal forces hostile to Grozny to an alliance with Poland and Lithuania. Novgorod could be "postponed" by force,

including not only the Poles, but also the Swedes ... However, this would be half the trouble. Another thing is that "Posadnik", "Hanseatic" in spirit, Novgorod could be deposited itself - under the rule of either the Poles or the Swedes. And this would

have been a betrayal not only of Tsar Ivan and then Rus'.

This would be a betrayal of the future great Russia. Could Ivan maintain such a threat? As already mentioned in its place, the real post-Mongolian dilemma of Rus' was not the dilemma: "Autocratic Moscow or "republican" Novgorod?". The problem of Novgorod - as a potential collective agent of the influence of the West, Poland and Lithuania - turned out to be just one aspect of the most significant and fundamental Russian dilemma: "centralization or preservation of fragmentation?", "Autocratic power or power of the gentry?"

This last dilemma was personified in the systemic confrontation between Ivan the Terrible and the Staritskys and Kurbsky, as an individual personification of the princes and boyars ... Moreover, to the question - what would happen if not the autocracy of Ivan III and Ivan IV won in Rus', but the line of Andrei with Vladimir Staritsky and Andrei Kurbsky? history gave the answer.

Direct historical experiment - when it is possible to implement two possible options in practice and, as a rule, it is impossible to compare them. But to find an answer to the question posed above, even a thought experiment is not required - the experiment was carried out on a real scale of historical time, for more than two centuries, in a particular country - the Polish "gentry republic". "The Commonwealth" is a literal translation from the Latin "Res publica" ("republic" - "common cause"). And how did this supposedly "republican" elitist, powerful in the 15th century, threatening the future of Rus' in the 16th - early 17th centuries, Poland was exhausted by magnate quarrels in the 17th century, and then in the 18th century successively divided three experiment, known: times between neighboring powers. (Russia, however, in the first two sections only returned its own lands to its composition, including the lands of the former Galicia-Volyn principality, which will be discussed in its place). Something similar could well have been expected by Rus' - in the implementation of the "Staritsky-Kurb" option. Moreover, external threats not only to security, but also to the very existence of a strong Russia from Crimea and Turkey were then much larger and more serious than similar threats to Poland.

We habitually say and write: "the reforms of Ivan the Terrible", "the Muscovite state of the 16th century", "the diplomatic activity of Ivan IV", but behind all these concepts is not at all what we mean by such concepts, defining the current state of affairs. In the historical reality of that very 16th century, none of

this could have happened - neither the reforms of Ivan the Terrible, nor his diplomatic activities ...

Not the Muscovite state itself in the form in which we
we know.

It was that still transitional period of Russian history, when Ryazan, Kaluga or Tula, and Moscow itself could suddenly turn into a pile of smoking ruins, and the position of the Russian Tsar was unstable - literally unstable!

Back in 1541, the Crimean Khan Sahib-Giray came to the Oka near Kolomna (near Kolomna !!) and left home only insofar as he found a huge Russian army in front of him. On the way, he wanted to take possession of Pronsk, was repulsed, but on the way back he wrote Ivan IV an abusive message, beginning with the words: "Cursed and outcast, lawless, Moscow plowman, my slave ...", and containing threats to harness Ivan to a plow, force him to sow ashes and etc. (By the way, Sahib-Girey, it seems, was well aware of the life of the Moscow court - young Ivan was really for fun, as the chroniclers say, "he plowed spring land and sowed buckwheat from the boyars ...") And the threats of Sahib-Girey cannot be considered powerless, unable to be

fulfilled. Much then depended on many things, because in the era of Ivan the Terrible, Russia approached the most important point of "bifurcation" for its future. Having passed it correctly, Russia secured an already indestructible great future for itself. Having gone wrong, she could quickly and irreversibly fall into insignificance.

We will not understand anything about the era of Grozny and his actions if we do not understand that in historical terms, the most significant and potentially deadly for Russia was then the threat of systemic " **Polonization**" of Russia - Polonization not in the sense of its capture and absorption by Poland, but in the sense of establishing on Russia of the political system copied from

Polish ... In real Poland, magnates ruled, in virtual "Staritsko-Novgorod-Kurb" Russia, princes and boyars would rule. At the same time, there were no deadly external threats for Poland - the Polish magnates themselves and the Polish gentry were the threat to Poland. And the Rus of Ivan IV managed to eliminate only one external threat - the eastern one, and even that is problematic. The Turkish Ottoman Empire was extremely dissatisfied with the transition of the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates under the jurisdiction of Russia, the Ottomans themselves expected to patronize these lands, like the Crimean Khanate. Therefore, instead of the eastern threat, a southern threat arose.

In the north of Rus', Sweden threatened, blocking access to the Baltic and claiming Novgorod lands ...

In the northwest, this blocking was provided by German Livonia, led by the Livonian Order, which settled on the territory of present-day Latvia and Estonia, and in the west, the traditional ill-wishers and rivals of Rus', Lithuania and Poland, did not disappear.

The German "Holy Roman" Empire and Transylvania (Semigradye), dependent on Turkey, could not be attributed to the well-wishers of Rus' either. Rus' did not have

and could not have any allies - Ivan's improved trade relations with England rather kindled unhealthy appetites in London than contributed to England's support for Rus'. And the planned union with Denmark did not change the general state of affairs.

In these external hostile - totally hostile - conditions, the preservation and development of Russia turned out to be possible only with a strong, politically and spiritually unified centralized state and an autocratic sovereign with exclusive personal rights. Not a whim, not the pride of Grozny, and in general not anyone's desires or inclinations programmed the historical necessity for autocracy in Russia at that time, but three objective circumstances, three factors. First: the geographical location of Rus' in the middle between the nomadic

East, which destroyed the Russian development potential in the XIII century, and the civilized West, the development potential of which was saved in the XIII century by the presence of Rus' on the path of the nomadic East.

The second factor: the unique, long-established ability of the Russian Slavs to spread over vast territories and develop them without losing touch with their historical ancestral home... The third factor was formed by the 16th century as a result of the first two and

represented a totally hostile external environment of Russia along the entire geopolitical perimeter... The outside world began to fear and hate the growing Russia, also because it was afraid. And he was afraid of her also because he could not understand the source of the power of Rus'.

That's how far, for example, the Italians stepped in comparison with "Muscovy" in the civilizational relation to the XVI century - and science, and culture, and social relations were immeasurably more developed ... But how the Italians crowded for a thousand years on their peninsula - "boot", so they couldn't jump above this "boot". And outwardly "barbarian" Russia not only was not trampled down by the boots of the steppe dwellers forever, but rose and included the former kingdoms of these same steppe dwellers.

There was something to be surprised, there was something to envy, but there was something to fear. There was only one way out: to slow down, to conquer, to dismember, to decompose from the inside, to fit it to oneself, to one's own measure ...

The Boyar Novgorod veche republic, the Staritsky and other princes, the Kurbsky magnates were just right for such a "convergence" with the West, when civilizational, and then political, and then economic and social supremacy in Rus' would pass to the West. This is, after all, what was the main Russian dilemma in the era of Grozny: to develop further in an original and sovereign way, or to accept the leadership of the West, which is leaving in isolation, and to accept it not for the sake of the prosperity of Rus', but for the good of the West. Only a society that rallied around the clear idea of a mighty White Tsar could solve this dilemma in favor of Rus'. Yes, at

some point autocracy would begin to become (and by the 19th century became) redundant for Russia, but before that it was necessary to live and live, before that Russia had to be preserved and developed. The princes did not care about such considerations - just as the Polish-Lithuanian magnates spat on the interests of Poland. Ivan is this

understood in the real scale of historical time - we will see this shortly. If we begin to

understand the legitimacy of certain executions of certain specific persons under Ivan the Terrible, if we begin to meticulously ascertain the degree of their guilt or innocence, then we will not understand the main thing: if it were not for the domestic and foreign policy of Ivan the Terrible, Rus' would certainly have waited for a

miserable fate . From the south - Crimea and Türkiye, from the north - Livonia and Sweden. From the east - if it were not for the reconciliation and subjugation of Kazan and Astrakhan - the Tatar khans, from the west and south-west -

Poland, Lithuania, Germany and Semigradye ... And at the head of the gentry-boyar Moscow

"veche" Rus' - the Staritsky and Kurbsky ... Here is the beauty - it would be - to the delight of the "democrats" and liberals from Bolotnaya Square! No Ivan the Terrible on the throne, no oprichnina for you, no tragedy of Novgorod and the debilitating Livonian War, no Malyuta Skuratov-Belsky, no Yermak

in Siberia ... Yes, and no

Siberia ... That's what "Echo of Moscow" would be glad, and with it the "New newspaper" at the same time!

The word "oprichnina" has existed in Russian for a long time, coming from the word "oprish" - "except, excluding." Oprichnina was a separate possession, inheritance, in particular - a special specific possession of women from the Grand Duke's land. However, since the era of Tsar Ivan IV Vasilyevich, the old word has acquired one meaning: "oprichnina" is the territories specially allocated by Grozny from the whole state and a special regime of control on them.

Unfortunately, the historical meaning and essence of the "oprichnina" is still not understood correctly by everyone. So, for example, the seemingly professionally qualified (his Ph. and left behind a huge, albeit discordant glory over the centuries, ... was the most important work of the life of the Terrible Tsar "...

Of course, this is not so - the oprichnina was only an instrument in carrying out the most important work of Grozny's life, and this work was the expansion of the Russian state towards its natural borders and the strengthening of the position of the Russian state. On the one hand, this was

understood a long time ago, on the other hand, by many, for various reasons, as already mentioned, it is not understood even now. Soviet historian A.A. Zimin devoted the first chapter of his monograph "Oprichnina" to a thorough analysis of the historiography of the problem, and from it it follows that already pre-revolutionary historians were often directly opposite in their assessment of Ivan the Terrible and the "oprichnina", and Soviet historians in this respect differed little from the tsarist ones, despite the fact that that Stalin established the fundamental view of Grozny in the USSR. His view, by the way, is the most historically correct. In particular, it is interesting how Stalin compared the figures of Grozny, Peter and a number of their successors. On February

26, 1947, Stalin, Molotov and Zhdanov had a long conversation with the director of the film "Ivan the Terrible" Sergei Eisenstein and actor Nikolai Cherkasov, who played the role of Ivan, about the just completed film.

Here is a part of this conversation, recorded from the words of Eisenstein and Cherkasov:

"Stalin. Have you studied history?

Eisenstein. More or less... Stalin.

More or less?... I am also a bit familiar with the history... Your oprichnina is shown incorrectly. Oprichnina is the royal army. Unlike the feudal army, which could fold its banners and leave the war at any moment, a regular army, a progressive army, was formed ... Your king turned out to be indecisive, similar to Hamlet. Everyone tells him what to do, but he does not make

decisions himself ... Tsar Ivan was a great and wise ruler, and if you compare him with Louis XI (have you read about Louis XI, who prepared absolutism for Louis XIV?), then Ivan the Terrible relation to Louis in the tenth heaven. The wisdom of Ivan the Terrible consisted in the fact that he stood on the national point of view and did not let foreigners into his country, protecting the country from the penetration of foreign

influence... Peter I is also a great sovereign, but he was too liberal towards foreigners, he opened the gates too much and allowed foreign influence into the country, allowing the Germanization of Russia...".

Then, among other things, Stalin added:

"Ekaterina allowed him (Germanization. - S.K.) even more, and further. Was the court of Alexander I a Russian court? Was the court of Nicholas I a Russian court? No, these were German courts. A remarkable event of Ivan the Terrible was that he was the first to introduce the state monopoly of foreign trade. Ivan the Terrible was the first to introduce it, Lenin was the second ...".

Stalin was, of course, right. In the pre-revolutionary history of the Russian state - after it was declared autocratic in the era of Ivan the Terrible - there were only two great national leaders - the Terrible himself and Peter.

Regarding the "royal army", one should also know that as early as October 3, 1550, Ivan issued the famous decree on the formation of a special category of "landlords of the children of the boyar best servants" "numbering a thousand people" (in fact, there were 1,078 people) who received estates near Moscow. "Boyar children" - the lowest rank in the feudal hierarchy, made up the "kings and the Grand Duke's regiment." It was Ivan's personal guard - something like the predecessors of Peter's Preobrazhensky sergeants, who constituted the reserve of the leadership of both military and

civilian administration. The idea of the appearance of the "tsar's regiment" is sometimes associated with the name of Ivan's second wife, the Kabardian princess Maria, but she appeared in Moscow ten years after the formation of Ivan's personal regiment.

If we return to the oprichnina and have the actual side of the matter, then the beginning of the oprichnina was laid in early January 1565, when the tsar, returning to Moscow after a month's stay in Alexander Sloboda, announced the division of the state into "Zemshchina" and "Oprichnina". And this was preceded by important and turbulent

events ... In 1558, Ivan began the Livonian War, the purpose of which was to enter the Baltic and provide opportunities for a wide and convenient

trade with Europe, which Rus' needed vitally. After the first victories, difficulties began, and why - it will become clear later. The dissatisfied - who had never been few in Rus' - began to grumble, and the dissatisfied were in all layers, which is also understandable. Ordinary people were far from geopolitical problems, and why it was necessary to drag themselves into the Chukhonian and Baltic distances, and at the same time bear hardships, they did not understand. The most dangerous was the opposition of the princes, the boyars - some of them generally fled to

Poland and Lithuania, that is, they directly changed. One of the most sensitive was the betrayal of the Yuryev (Derpt) governor, Prince Andrei Kurbsky. In April 1564, after secret negotiations with the Lithuanian Chancellor Radziwill and King Sigismund II August, he defected to the side of the Poles. Kurbsky betrayed all Livonian supporters of Ivan and Moscow agents at the Polish court, with whom he communicated as a confidant of Ivan, entered the royal council (hence the term "chosen council" in his message to Grozny) and in the same 1564 led one of the Polish armies .

Kurbsky's betrayal was not the only one, and all those who fled had influential relatives in Moscow, connected with the leadership of the state. The clerks at the head of the orders were also dissatisfied. Coming from the service nobility, in the systemic sense they opposed the tribal boyars, but psychologically and worldly they rather gravitated towards it. At the end of 1564, Grozny withdrew to Aleksandrov Sloboda and there announced that he was abdicating the throne, angry at the clergy, boyars, children of boyars and clerks. It was a strong and accurate move, and it was hardly Grozny's personal move. Rather, it can be assumed that everything was thought out, weighed and discussed in advance with that part of the leading secular and church elite that was on the side of the king. On January 3, 1565, two letters

were brought to Moscow. In the letter addressed to the metropolitan, "boyar treachery, and voivodship, and all sorts of clerks" were written, who were accused of "making many losses to the people of his state and draining his sovereign's treasuries, but they didn't add profits to his treasury ..."

The tsar accused the boyars of distributing state lands on the basis of friendship and kinship, collecting "great wealth" for themselves, but not

they wanted to “guard” “about the sovereign and his state and about all Orthodox Christianity”, but instead of defending the country “from the Crimean and from the Lithuanian and from the Germans”, they began

to move away from service. Ivan accused church hierarchs of indulging the boyars, and stated that “not though (not wanting. - S.K.) to endure their many treacherous deeds, he left his state ...”.

For some reason, historians, describing this situation (for example, academician Sigurd Schmidt, data from whose monograph are given here), do not emphasize the obvious thing: **Ivan could not make unfounded accusations ...** Vague accusations would hang in the air, and if the king erected on the faithful servants of the Fatherland in vain, then his "shot" would be blank and could even work against him. And in Moscow, everyone was immediately alarmed, began to discuss the situation and immediately sent a deputation to Alexandrov Sloboda. So, did the cat know whose fat she ate?

Moreover, the second letter was addressed "to the guest and to the merchant and to the entire Orthodox Christian community of the city of Moscow." That is, Ivan turned not only to the hierarchs and feudal lords, but also to the trading "tops" in the person of their most influential part - the "guests", and to the townspeople. And so the king informed them that they “didn’t keep any hesitation to themselves, no anger at them and disgrace No”.

It was both a brilliant and win-win move! Moreover, Ivan specifically ordered “before the guests and before all the people ... read” his letter to the дума clerks Putil Mikhailov and Andrey Vasilyev. By assigning personal responsibility for bringing the letter to all Muscovites on specific individuals, the tsar provided a guarantee that his command would be carried out.

The tsar's messages were discussed, of course, not at the veche, but they were actively discussed, and both the boyars and the merchants asked him "not to leave his state."

But if the feudal lords only recognized that the tsar was free “in the stomach (of life. - S.K.) and death” of “sovereign villains”, then the merchants took an active position, and not only asked that Ivan “did not give them to be plundered by the wolf, especially from the hands of the mighty, he delivered”, but also declared that they themselves were ready to exterminate these “likhodey” (“and who

there will be sovereign villains and traitors, and they themselves do not stand for those and will

themselves consume them. It was decided to send Archbishop Pimen of Novgorod and Archimandrite Levkiy of the Chudov Monastery as delegates to the Tsar. Others joined them. On January 5, 1565, a deputation of the Boyar Duma and church hierarchs arrived in Alexandrov Sloboda, announcing their agreement to grant emergency powers to the tsar. As a result, at the beginning of January 1565, the establishment of a "special" court with a special territory, treasury, governing bodies and a special army was announced.

A completely new state situation arose. Moreover, in the light of the above data, the reasons for the introduction of the "oprichnina" and its social base do not look at all the way liberals have imagined and represent for more than one century. By "oprichnina", they

propose to understand the regime of terror, but in reality it was a system of domestic measures that had matured in society, using a new, effective at that time, state apparatus, ready and able to work for the sovereign, that is, for the state.

The most strategically important regions and trading cities were taken into "Oprichnina": in the center of the country - Mozhaishk, Vyazma, Suzdal, Rostov; in the north - lands along the Northern Dvina, Veliky Ustyug, Vologda, Kargopol, Solvychevodsk; in the south - Kozelsk, Przemysl, Medyn, Belev ... Later, Kostroma, Galich Staritsa, part of Novgorod the Great, Obonezhskaya and Bezhetskaya Pyatina and other territories were taken into the oprichnina. In fact, little developed outskirts remained in the Zemshchina.

Moscow, and then Novgorod, entered the oprichnina in separate areas - settlements were taken into the oprichnina. The

princes and the boyar nobility were evicted from the "oprichnina" territory to Zemshchina, and their possessions were transferred to the oprichnina nobles.

In other words, the direction of the innovation was clearly anti-boyar and strengthened the service and posad element in Rus'. Stalin correctly defined the oprichnina army as the "royal", state army, and the oprichnina troops - their number was gradually increased from 1 thousand people to 5 ... 6 thousand, became the most reliable and combat-ready part of the regular Russian army.

Legally, the two parts of the state were divided, but this was a purely formal measure taken to untie the hands of Ivan. So, after the introduction of the "oprichnina", the Zemsky Sobor of 1566 was convened, and it was, of course, an all-Russian meeting. Of the 374 members of this Council, 205 were nobles, and these deputies, together with the merchant deputies, voted for the continuation of the Livonian War.

The "oprichnina" regime, however, really split the state and society, but it was a split along the line of progress and regression. Moreover, progress was taken to Oprichnina, and regression kept the side of Zemshchina ... In particular, it was in Oprichnina that pre-capitalist relations matured, since undermining the boyars was beneficial for commercial and industrial

circles. Academician Pokrovsky in his reconstructions of Russian history often went too far, explaining everything by economic reasons, but other historians (even Soviet ones) so often do not attach due importance to them that it is not worth ignoring Pokrovsky's approaches - including them in historical analysis helps to reveal the true picture of events. And the role of the merchant capital favored by Pokrovsky in the era of Ivan the Terrible was, apparently, very great. It was not for nothing that Grozny took the lands of the Stroganov merchants into the

"Oprichnina" - at their request. The relationship between the Stroganovs and Ivan IV is a little-known, but very significant page in our history. Already in 1557, the founder of the merchant dynasty Anikey (Anika) Stroganov came to Ivan with plans for the economic and state development of the Urals and Siberia. In 1558, the tsar granted the Stroganovs 20 years of preferential ownership with forest, fishing and hunting grounds on the terms of building fortresses on the Kama. In 1560, the town

of Pyskor appeared, in 1564 - Oryol-Gorodok. Anika's son Semyon was the main initiator and financier of sending Ermak's detachments to Siberia. Yes, the rules in the Stroganov estates were cruel, the natives were deceived and robbed, but the economic activity and efficiency of the Stroganov clan played a huge role in the development of the

development. Ivan supported them in every possible way, because he himself was a man of great deeds and a broad state view.

Historians concentrate on the negative side of the "oprichnina", on the executions of an elite handful, but there is also another side of this period, which can be conditionally called "Stroganov's".

It is unlikely that Anikey, Semyon, Grigory, Maxim, Yakov Stroganovs regretted a lot about the heads of princes, princes, boyars and guilty guardsmen flying in Moscow and Novgorod. The Stroganovs were not sad - Tsar Ivan granted them all the empty lands on both sides of the Ural Range, which they could occupy, hold and develop. He freed them from duties and from the jurisdiction of the royal tiuns and governors, allowed them to have their own army and build their own fortresses. The notorious "Grand Duke of All Rus'" Kasimov Tsarevich Simeon Bekbulatovich, appointed by Ivan at the head of the Zemshchina, was a nominal figure, and the Stroganovs had enormous real power - both because of monetary and land wealth, and having numerous "subjects".

The excesses of the "oprichnina" are exaggerated, and the executions and repressions of opponents of the authorities were then a common practice in Europe as well. Klyuchevsky considered the "oprichnina" to be "the fruit of the tsar's overly fearful imagination," but Klyuchevsky was just a scribe and did not bear the responsibility for the situation that Ivan the Terrible bore. It is difficult for a university professor to understand the logic and motives of the great king, even if he is an academic historian. But was Ivan's

imagination so "shy" if he, without hesitation, of his own free will, authorized the creation in his kingdom of a separate commercial and industrial empire of the Stroganovs, the territory of which by the end of the 17th century amounted to 9 million acres - more than modern Holland, Belgium and Denmark together taken.

Ivan IV Vasilievich boldly went for it because he was absolutely sure not only of the loyalty of the Stroganovs, but also of their readiness to support the royal patron with all their might. In addition, the Stroganovs were no exception, loners, they personified a whole social stratum, moreover, a naturally active, active, enterprising stratum ... And almost all of this stratum was

supporter of Ivan's foreign and domestic policy. The "black people" of urban settlements, and the peasantry, could not help but support Ivan, although the latter, as always in Rus', had a harder time

everyone.

The era of Ivan the Terrible (as well as other periods of Russian history before and after the era of the Terrible) is often tried to be presented as a time when the Tsar-tyrant towered over the obedient and mute crowd of "slaves", who could do whatever he wanted, and did what wishes. However, in reality, then, both earlier and later, Russian society lived and acted, and its interaction with the highest authorities, including the tsar himself, did not at all fit into the "tyrant-slaves" scheme ... Of course, the tsar, as the largest feudal lord, was

not on the side people. But the Russian people at a time when the centralization of power was saving for the country, choosing between the king and the boyars, chose a strong king. And above all, Ivan the Terrible acquired a mass base in the settlements in his struggle with the boyar oppositionists.

Ivan was clearly supported by the bulk of the population of the newly annexed eastern territories of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates. No wonder the Tatar cavalry showed complete loyalty to Rus' and the king during the fighting of the Livonian War ...

Over the centuries of fragmentation, specific self-will, raids of some princes on other princes, and khans on khans, the peoples have learned well that seven nannies have a child without an eye. A single state, a single government, single laws, a single monetary and tax system - for all the peoples of the new Rus', all this was a boon. In any case, a blessing in comparison with the former specific willfulness and princely civil strife, debilitating, first of all, for the masses of the people both in cities and in the countryside. And also in the

former uluses. A typical portrait of an oprichnik is simple black clothes, a black horse, a broom at the saddle, as a symbol of sweeping the "villains", and a dog's head, as a symbol of readiness to cut the "dog heads" of traitors. But even in Novgorod the Great during the years of the oprichnina there were not only guardsmen-administrators, but also guardsmen-merchants. "And from the oprichnina guests ... who live in the sovereign's oprichnina in Novgorod on the Trade Side, ... imitate all duties on this

statutory charter, "the Customs Novgorod charter of 1571 said. This is also -

"oprichnina". Yes, a year after

the beginning of the "oprichnina" - in 1566, Ivan killed his cousin - Vladimir Staritsky, whom he suspected of disloyalty. Vladimir could have fled to Lithuania and Poland, he could have become a banner of an internal conspiracy, but in any case he was dangerous for the stability of the state by the very fact that, by his very existence **and the uncertainty of his position**, he gave the boyars and Poles grounds for intrigues.

There is no exact information about how Vladimir was killed, the existing versions differ fundamentally - from poisoning to drowning, but the very fact of the elimination of Vladimir is obvious, and one can understand Grozny here - the risk of confusion could not be allowed, it would be disastrous not only for

the king, but also for Rus'. In the second message

to Prince Kurbsky, the tsar wrote: *"By God's will, from birth I was destined for the kingdom; and I don't remember how my father blessed me for the state; on the royal throne and grew up. And why should Prince Vladimir be a sovereign? He is the son of the fourth specific prince. What virtues does he have, what hereditary rights to be a sovereign, except for your betrayal and his stupidity? ... "*

As for the "oprichnina" regime, it was abolished in 1572 - when the main tasks of suppressing the ruling opposition were solved. But the administrative experience of the "oprichnina" was then used in national construction.

In the field of the struggle of ideas, the essence of Grozny was clearly manifested in his famous correspondence with his political opponent Andrei

Kurbsky. Prince Kurbsky (he was two years older than the tsar and died a year before the death of Ivan the Terrible) began as a member of the Tsar's "Chosen Rada" and military leader, was appointed governor of Ivan IV in Yuryev (Tartu), annexed to the Russian state. But then, being the ideologist of boyar arbitrariness and privileges, he betrayed Ivan and fled to Poland on April 30, 1564. From there, he turned to the king with a message, which was soon followed by an answer ...

In history, Kurbsky remained known precisely because of his polemical correspondence with the tsar. Grozny himself showed himself in this correspondence as an outstanding publicist, a major political thinker, a great patriot of Russia

and ... And, oddly enough, a humanist who sees the highest humanism in providing strength to earthly Good in its opposition to earthly Evil.

Grozny wrote: *"I don't turn light into darkness and don't call sweet bitter ... I ... diligently try to turn people to truth and light, so that they know the one true god in the Trinity, glorified, and the sovereign given to them by God and renounce internecine wars and criminal life that undermine the state. Is it bitterness to move away from evil and do good? After all, this is sweetness and light! ... What could be worse than snatching for yourself? Without knowing where the sweetness and light, where the bitterness and darkness are, you teach others. Isn't it sweetness and light to move away from goodness and start doing evil?.. It is clear to everyone that*

this is not light, but darkness, not sweetness, but bitterness..."

As you can see, Grozny saw his destiny as a sovereign in serving the state, and not in indulging animal passions and self-interest. And his statement that he is diligently trying to "turn people to truth and light" so that they "renounce internecine strife and a life of crime that undermines states" is an accurate expression of Grozny's political and life credo.

Researchers, studying the correspondence between the tsar and the prince, focus on Grozny's desire to rule autocratically, and present the case as if Ivan believed that the tsar has the right to be an unlimited autocrat, and all the rest are obliged "slavishly" and implicitly do his will.

At the same time, it is somehow forgotten, firstly, that the real tyrants and despots of world history have never cared about the public justification of their right to tyranny. The theologian Tertullian, revealing iron logic, declared: "Credo, quia absurdum!" ("I believe, because it is absurd!"), and he was right - faith does not need a logical justification. But the psychology of a tyrant is such that he has no need to prove something to anyone, he tyrannizes, and that's it!

Ivan the Terrible acted differently - he accepted the challenge of Kurbsky and answered him. So is he a tyrant and a despot? Yes, he answered Kurbsky (and, in fact, to all his accusers):

"Is this really a 'leper conscience' - to keep your kingdom in your hands, and not let your slaves rule? Is it 'against reason' not to want to be under the power of your slaves?.."

But this was not the program of a tyrant who wanted to rule over slaves, for Ivan further explained:

"How could you not understand this, that the ruler should neither be atrocious nor wordlessly humble? ... Shouldn't robbers and thieves be executed? But the crafty plans of these criminals are even more dangerous! Then all the kingdoms will disintegrate from disorder and internecine strife ... You will find many other kings who saved their kingdoms from all kinds of confusion and repelled the atrocities and intentions of evil people. For kings should always be prudent: sometimes meek, sometimes cruel, but for the good - mercy and meekness, for the evil - cruelty and torment ..."

Is it the thoughts and program of a tyrant? Moreover, we have examples of those Zemsky Sobors at which Ivan brought up important questions and at which important decisions were made.

Ivan summarized his reasoning as follows: "...

if this is not the case, then he is not a king. The king is terrible not for good deeds, but for evil. If you want not to be afraid of power, then do good; and if you do evil, be afraid, for the king does not carry a sword in vain - to intimidate the villains and encourage the

virtuous ... " The last words are a direct reference to verses 3 and 4 of chapter 13 of the Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Romans: "For those who are in authority are not afraid of good works, but of evil ones. Do you want to not be afraid of power? Do good and you will receive praise from her; / For the chief is God's servant for your good. But if you do evil, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword...".

Ivan reasonably asked Kurbsky: *"Do you really see pious beauty where the kingdom is in the hands of an ignorant priest (meaning Sylvester. - S.K.) and villainous traitors, and the tsar obeys them? ... And in*

Is it piety not to govern the kingdom, and not to keep the villains in check, and to surrender to the plunder of foreigners?

To understand all the drama and the correctness of the last remark, one must not forget that Grozny wrote this to Kurbsky during a difficult foreign war, and wrote to a former subject who had defected to the enemy camp. And then

Ivan appropriately and correctly remarked:

"You will not find anywhere that the kingdom led by the priests is not ruined. What did you want - what happened to the Greeks, who destroyed the kingdom and surrendered to the Turks? Is this what you recommend to us?" Here Ivan IV

Vasilievich hit the mark - to a large extent due to the fact that in Byzantium church power was placed above secular power, Byzantium fell under the blows of the Ottoman Empire. But for Orthodox Russia, which was fighting against Catholic Poland, the problem was urgent. The entire message of Ivan the Terrible

is imbued with a clear understanding of the need for a strong central government to preserve the Russian state. Revealing both excellent knowledge of history and state maturity, the 34-year-old tsar reminded Kurbsky that the Byzantine *"August-Caesar"* *"possessed the whole universe"*, but after the sons of Constantine Flavius divided power, *"the Greek state began to fragment and impoverish"*, and *"since then, every order in the Greek kingdom has been violated - they only fought for power, honor and wealth perished in internecine struggle ..."*.

This was written in a message to a person who was in a state systemically opposed to Russia of Ivan the Terrible - where "gentry" riot and self-will ruled, where opposition speeches thundered, and the magnates had the official right to raise a rebellion against the king - "rokosh " .

Where, in the words of Ivan the Terrible, "many rebellious desire" reigned...

The Tsar was surprised: *"Where did the fights and quarrels come*

from in you? Is it not from here - not from your desires that rage in your souls? You thirst, but you don't have, you kill and envy, and you cannot get it, you quarrel and quarrel..."

How accurate is

that! And as human in the highest sense of the word ...

It is indicative that Ivan wrote like this:

"This is all about worldly things; in the spiritual and in the church, if there is some small sin, it is only because of your own temptation and betrayal; besides, I am a man: after all, there is no man without sin, only God is sinless; and not like you - you consider yourself above people and equal angels..."

It was written in the 16th century - a hundred years before the appearance in France of the "divine" "Sun King" Louis XIV, to doubt the infallibility and "divine nature" of which publicly was tantamount to a state crime. Tsar Ivan, on the other hand, openly - for the message to Kurbsky was not a confidential letter, but a political manifesto - recognized his human nature and thereby submitted himself to the judgment not only of the highest judge, but also of his mortal contemporaries. To do this, one had to have very large reserves of spiritual stamina and conviction that one was right. In addition to the first message of 1564, Kurbsky sent two more messages to

Grozny in 1579, and academician Sigurd Schmidt, having them in mind, rightly notes that Kurbsky "dreamed not about representative institutions, but above all about ways to limit the autocratic power of the sovereign."

"On the councils of 1564–1565 and 1566," writes S.O. Schmidt - in whose activities merchants also participated and who, it would seem, most of all had to correspond to the ideal of council with "people of the whole people", Kurbsky is silent. Moreover, he characterizes the time when these events took place as "the time of evil"..." Well, there

is nothing to argue with here - the views and actions of the Kurbskys were explained not by their worries and anxieties about the public good, but, in the words of Grozny, by the **desires** raging in their souls .

It is quite natural that Kurbsky called his late anti-Ivanov pamphlet "The Story of the Grand Duke of Moscow", denying not only Ivan the right to be called "the king of all Rus'", but also Rus's right to be not a great principality, but a sovereign kingdom!

The inner world of Ivan the Terrible was, no doubt, rich and tragic. In fact, Ivan was spiritually and humanly lonely almost all his life, and this could not but weigh him down. However, we know about Ivan's human nature mainly from notes

foreign diplomats and adventurers who visited Rus', and their objectivity, to put it mildly, is doubtful. Rather, it is necessary to assume, on the contrary, a deliberate negative distortion of the moral image of Grozny by foreign authors.

So, in 1582 in Europe, G. Hoff's book "Erschreckliche greutiche und unerhörte Tyranney Iwan Wasiljewiec" ("The Terrifying, Vile and Unheard of Tyranny of Ivan Vasilyevich") was published in German. The name spoke for itself - it was not a historical source, but a vivid example of anti-Russian propaganda, which cannot be called Goebbels only because more than three centuries had to pass before the appearance of Goebbels. Russian

annalistic evidence on this matter can also not always be considered reliable - Tsar Ivan made too many enemies for himself during his difficult reign to count on complete objectivity even among compatriots, especially from the church environment where the annals were compiled. One of his descriptions looks like this: "Tsar Ivan in an absurd way, having sulfur eyes, a protracted nose and a gag (crooked. - S.K.), age (growth. - S.K.) is big, having a dry body, having splashing high, breasts are wide, muscles are thick "... In the " Dictionary of the Old Russian

Language "I.I. Sreznevsky, the word "**absurd**" is interpreted as "obscene" - the word "ugly" has the equivalent of "ugly". It is hardly possible to consider the chronicler, who gave **such** a portrait of the king (!), to be very disposed towards him.

Thanks to the reconstruction of M.M. Gerasimov's skull, we can compare the sculptural portrait with the chronicle "verbal portrait", and give our own description: "Tsar Ivan is formidable and stern, his eyes are sharp, his nose is aquiline ...", etc. In general, there is a large, light on lift, athletically built man with a strong (and whole, actually) character. However, the well-known historian A.A. Zimin sees in Gerasimov's portrait only a "squeamishly sensual mouth" and believes that Grozny had a "uniquely repulsive appearance." Well, everyone sees his own ... Ivan

unexpectedly died at the age of 53 - at a non-senile age. At the same time, he did not seem to be particularly painful. The very fact that there were rumors about his poisoning,

proves that Ivan's sufficient health was obvious to those around him. This, by the way, immediately casts doubt on the reliability of all reports about the allegedly riotous and depraved lifestyle of young Ivan - participants in orgies from a young age have, as a rule, upset health from their youth. In addition, it is difficult to

combine in one person a propensity for literacy and drunken obscenity. However, the character of Ivan IV Vasilyevich,

nicknamed the Terrible, could not but be objectively complex due to the circumstances of his personal biography ... His predecessors - father Vasily III, grandfather Ivan III, and almost all the great princes - Moscow, Vladimir Suzdal, Kiev, were brought up by fathers, and in a male environment ... And they were brought up not just like a man, but as future rulers, which meant at that time - and as warriors.

From an early age, the boys who were to take the Grand Duke's table at some point were taken on hunting trips, on long-distance military campaigns, and were attracted - and not for fun, to real state work. The young prince, at the age of eight, could lead, albeit nominally, an expedition to the Russian borders to repel steppe raids. All this formed a very specific type of nature, for which masculinity and personal military courage were as natural as breathing ... Ivan did not know his father, being orphaned at the age of three ... He was raised by his mother Elena

Glinskaya and mother Agrafena Chelyadnina ... He was affectionate - but no more moreover, mother's favorite and brother of Agrafena Ovchin-Obolensky. However, the last two were torn from Ivan after the death of his mother, although the eight-year-old Ivan asked (begged !!) for them ... In the first message to Kurbsky, he wrote : *heavenly, we were left with the deceased in Bose* (in 1563. - S.K.)

brother Georgy (Yuri. - S.K.) complete orphans -

nobody helped us..."

A lively, inquisitive boy, but at the same time the Grand Duke of Moscow, found himself in a kind of psychological "meat grinder", which sometimes took on a physical, physiological appearance - sometimes people objectionable to the boyars were killed right before his eyes!

"I was eight years old at that time; and so our subjects achieved the fulfillment of their desires - they received a kingdom without a ruler, but they did not show any heartfelt concern for us, their sovereigns, - Ivan wrote to Kurbsky, - they themselves rushed to wealth and glory, and at the same time quarreled with each other ... " A very

suitable psychological background for the formation of a harmonious nature, right? Already adult Ivan exclaimed:

"And what have they not done! How many of our boyars, and well-wishers of our father, and the governor were killed! They took the yards and villages, and the property of our uncles and settled in them ... "

Childhood impressions, of course, left a deep imprint on Ivan's nature, and, having cultivated state courage, he did not become what is called "a born warrior and commander." But he knew how to fight, and knew how to show courage. As you know, the French king Henry IV said to himself something like this: "Ah, damned body, are you trembling? Well, let's go into battle so that you don't tremble in vain! Obviously, Ivan could say the same about himself.

After the death of his mother, terrible years began for him. Childhood at the age of eight, in fact, ended, but not in the way it ended for the great princes - his ancestors, but sadly and humiliatingly. As Ivan wrote: "... *princes Vasily and Ivan Shuisky arbitrarily imposed themselves on me as guardians and thus reigned*" ... "They took

care of" the eight-year-old tsar so ugly that even in adulthood he bitterly recalled: *"Nothing to us (with his younger relative brother Yuri. - S.K.) there was no will, but they did everything not of their own free will, and not in the way that children usually do.* Ivan

remembered for the rest of his life how he and Yuri played, and *"Prince Ivan Vasilyevich Shuisky" sat "on a bench, leaning on his elbow" on Ivan's father's bed and, "putting his foot on a chair", did not cast even a fleeting glance at the players - "not as a parent, not as a guardian, and certainly not as a slave to his masters" ...* But Ivan

was then already old enough to feel like not just a boy. Describing the episode that struck him in the soul with the lordly lounging in the bedroom of the late Vasily III Shuisky, the 34-year-old tsar exclaimed: *"How can I calculate*

such countless suffering that I endured in my youth? How many times have I not been allowed to eat on time. What

tell me about my parent's treasury? They plundered everything in an insidious way: they said that the boyar children were on a salary, but they took it for themselves ... "

Not alien to "enlightened liberalism," the authors of the preface to the academic edition of Grozny's correspondence with Kurbsky are truly speaking condescendingly in an academic manner: "The first tsar of all Rus', during whose reign Kazan, Astrakhan and Western Siberia were annexed to the territory of the Russian state, the creator of the oprichnina and the organizer bloody punitive expeditions to his own lands, Ivan IV was not only one of the most terrible tyrants in Russian history. He was quite an educated person for his time ... ". In fact, they usually note not only good education, but Grozny's broad erudition - on the one hand. On the other

hand, not a single person can be more educated than his era allows - education is not a timeless category. Pythagoras, having proved his theorem, joyfully sacrificed a hundred bulls to the gods, and today even a poorly successful schoolboy proves his theorem, bringing home only a triple in his diary.

The academic judges of Grozny, without hesitation, continue further: "The history of mankind knows the most diverse types of tyrants - among them there were pedantic bureaucrats (like Philip II of Spain), and rude practitioners, alien to any mental activity, and, finally, peculiar artistic natures. Ivan the Terrible also obviously belonged to the latter: it was not for nothing that younger contemporaries called him "the husband of wonderful reasoning", and historians (oh, those historians! - S.K.) compared him with Nero - an "artist" on the throne ... ".

So, before us is a particularly perverted tyrant, an enlightened tyrant who finds almost sadistic satisfaction in his tyranny? Well, from the pamphlets of Kurbsky and the writings of the European masters of psychological warfare of the 16th century, precisely such an image of the first Russian tsar, the Russian "Nero", follows.

But it has nothing to do with his true appearance. Yes, Ivan was obviously shy in some situations, he could sometimes show a lack of personal courage (this is not quite the same as cowardice), he could show revenge ... But these defects of his nature were not

natural - his character was deformed by the very boyars with whom he fought. In addition, chronicle sources give many examples, on the contrary, of the king's courage. And if Ivan's

awareness of the objective need to suppress the princes and boyars was mixed with a sense of personal revenge, then only academic historians are able to blame him for this ...

Ivan's personal life, as they say, did not work out. In 1547, when he was married to the kingdom, the English king Henry VIII, who had six wives, died in England. Ivan had either five or seven of them, but this was, as they say, not the case.

By the first marriage, Ivan, just from 1547, was married to Anastasia Romanovna, the daughter of a okolnichiy, and then boyar Roman Koshkin Zakharyev-Yuriev. Of the six children of Anastasia, two survived - the rest died in infancy.

The last born Tsarevich Fedor is the future Tsar Fedor Ioannovich, turned out to be sickly and lived only forty years.

Tsarevich Ivan lived in good health to the age of 27, being married three times, and his first two wives were tonsured nuns while their spouse was still alive. In 1581, Ivan Ioannovich died - according to the generally accepted version, after a conflict with his father, in which he received a mortal blow staff.

There are various testimonies about the cause of the conflict, for example, a story about a fight between a son and a father after Ivan the Terrible began to beat his pregnant daughter-in-law, after which she had a miscarriage - a premature baby boy. But it is unlikely that the tsar, realizing the importance of a possible grandson for the inheritance, would not have restrained

himself like that ... The reliability of information regarding the everyday details of the life of the Russian tsars of the chronicle period, especially when it comes to acute situations, is not great. Therefore, the causes of Ivan Ioannovich's death can hardly be considered established. Actually, the version with a mortal blow to the son's temple with the royal staff is known from the story of Antony Possevino (1533-1613). A Jesuit diplomat, Possevino was sent by Pope Gregory XIII in 1581 to Moscow to participate in negotiations between Russia and Poland. he himself

naturally, he could not be a witness to the conflict, so he transmitted, at best, a rumor.

However, Possevino could have invented it himself - the Jesuits had mastered the technology of lies by that time to such perfection that it became a proverb. True, Lomonosov in his Brief Russian Chronicler also writes that Grozny "killed his prince Ivan in a violent rage," but Lomonosov could well follow Possevino here.

A.A. Zimin, passing on various versions of the causes of death - in fact, the same rumors, admits that Russian sources talk about the death of the prince "in few words", and often - "without talking about its causes." But the reasons are also called different - for example, the Pskov chronicler writes that Ivan Tsarevich "stabbed with an ostium (staff. - S.K.) that he taught him to talk about the rescue of the city of Pskov" ... The German pastor Pavel Oderborn in his pamphlet of 1585 assured that the prince suffered because of his father's suspicions, and the Dutch merchant Isaac Massa "transmitted a rumor" (again a rumor!) that the "noble young man" favored foreigners, and therefore was killed.

In other words, everyone played up the fact of Ivan Ivanovich's death in the way that was to his advantage. At the same time, even if there is a dent or a hole on the prince's skull, they cannot be evidence of a murder - Ivan Jr. could accidentally fall and hit his temple on a sharp ledge. In recent times, the remains of Tsarevich Ivan (as well as Tsar Ivan, by the way) were found to contain a large amount of mercury, but mercury could then be part of both drugs and poison. If we look at the

situation objectively, then we must admit that not only did Tsar Ivan have no reason to kill his own son, but, moreover, it would be a clear political loss for the Tsar. Even if the son began to interfere with his father, it would be easier to forcibly cut his hair - after the first two daughters-in-law of the king. It is curious

to compare the story, for example, of Possevino with the story of another "expert on Russia", Jerome Horsey ... He assures that he himself saw how Ivan was carried on a chair in the last year of his life, since he could not move independently. The sad anecdote of this "evidence" lies in the fact that in the last year of his life, Ivan, through the Moscow nobleman Pisemsky

conducted persistent negotiations with the English Queen Elizabeth I about marrying her niece Mary Hastings. It

is unlikely that Ivan would have risked taking such a step, defeated paralysis.

But, one way or another, two years before his death, Ivan IV was left with the only heir - Fedor, who did not show much promise.

Returning

to the period of the first marriage, it must be said that Anastasia was often sick and died in 1560. For the king, this was a considerable loss, at the funeral he wept and "from great lamentation and from the pity of his heart he could hardly stand on his feet." The search for a bride began, but the European options were not realized, and in 1561 Ivan married the daughter of the Kabardian prince Temir-Guki (Temryuk of Russian chronicles) Kuchenya, who received the name Maria in baptism.

Maria Temryukovna was beautiful, but that was all. Her only son also died in infancy, and she herself died in 1569, and although the Orthodox Church looked askance at the third marriage, Ivan married the young Maria Sobakina, a relative of Malyuta Skuratov-Belsky. Alas, Maria died almost

immediately after the wedding, having fallen ill even before her. The circumstances of Maria's illness and death suggest that she was poisoned by Skuratov's enemies.

Ivan, having gathered the hierarchs, tearfully asked them to allow the fourth marriage, explaining it by the impossibility of raising children himself. The Church allowed, at the same time threatening to curse anyone else who decides to follow the example of the sovereign. However, the new wife, the noble daughter Anna Koltovskaya, behaved hostilely towards her husband's oprichny entourage, in 1575 she was imprisoned in a monastery and forcibly tonsured under the name of Daria. However, there are discrepancies regarding the circumstances of the tonsure - a detail for information about that time is not uncommon. Anna Darya outlived Ivan much and died in 1626.

The fifth short-lived and already unofficial wife of Ivan was a certain Anna Vasilchikova, the sixth unofficial was the widow Vasilisa Melentyeva, with whom relations were short-lived - Lomonosov did not include either Vasilchikov or Melentyeva in his "Brief Chronicler" among Ivan's wives. And the last one too

Since 1581, his unofficial wife was Maria Nagaya, daughter of the boyar Fyodor Nagogo-Fedets. Ivan was inclined to abandon the alliance with Mary in favor of Mary Hastings, but for European brides, marriage to the "Muscovite" was not seductive.

In 1582, Maria Nagaya gave birth to Ivan's son Dmitry, who accidentally died in Uglich in 1591 after the death of his father. Maria, who was tonsured after this, later, under the threat of death, had to recognize as her son False Dmitry I, whom she renounced after his assassination in 1606 ... As for excesses

in the personal fate of Grozny, they certainly took place, but they are incredibly inflated, and inflated quite deliberately - within the framework of anti-Russian propaganda during the Livonian War. In European history, the reign of many both outstanding and insignificant monarchs is marked by much more bloodshed than the reign of Ivan the Terrible (one Bartholomew's night of Charles IX is worth something!), but without those great results, fateful for the state, that Ivan the Terrible provided. About the

vices of the Russian people, foreigners who visited Ivan the Terrible's Moscow piled up a lot of nonsense and outright lies - obvious already due to the lack of logic in it. But, as already noted, if a foreigner praised something in Moscow life, he can be trusted for sure. The Polish gentry of German origin Reinhold Heidenstein, who served as the secretary of the kings Stefan Batory and Sigismund throughout the Livonian War with Russia, wrote about Ivan the Terrible in his Notes on the Moscow War:

"To those who are engaged in the history of his reign, it should seem all the more surprising that ... there could be such a strong love of the people for him, a love that was hardly acquired by other sovereigns (European. - S.K.) only through condescension and affection ... And *it* should

notice that the people not only did not arouse any indignation against him, but even expressed incredible firmness during the war in protecting and guarding fortresses, and there are very few defectors in general ... ". It is useful to compare

this evidence with the fact that the Stoglav Cathedral of Ivan IV legalized the ransom of Russian people,

taken prisoner by the Tatars. Nikolai Kostomarov, who reports this, further writes: "Before, such captives were ransomed by the Greeks, Armenians, and sometimes Turks, and brought to the Muscovite state, offering to ransom, but if there were no hunters, then they were taken back. Now it was set to redeem them from the treasury, and spread out the costs of the ransom on plows for the whole people. No one should be dismissed from such a duty, because this is a common Christian alms...".

The last almost twenty years of the reign of Ivan the Terrible took place against the backdrop of confrontation with several powerful external forces at once. And all these forces acted against the Rus of Ivan IV Vasilievich quite in concert ... In

the south - the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire that stood

behind it. In the north - Sweden, which has strengthened and spread to the continent, has been an old adversary of Rus' since the time of "Mr.

Veliky Novgorod". In the west - Livonia, Poland and Lithuania, behind which stood Rome and the Catholic West. Let me remind you that the Jesuit Possevino, as a representative of Pope Gregory XIII, directly supported Poland

in its negotiations with Russia ... In other words, Ivan had to wage an external war not even on two, but on three fronts, which led to the formal failure of

Russia in the Livonian War. The southern flank of the war passed along the steppe borders. Where centuries ago it was necessary to fight with the Polovtsy, now there were battles with the Krymchaks. Now it was no longer the Polovtsy or the Mongols, but the

Crimean Khan Devlet Giray besieged - unsuccessfully, however, Tula. In the summer of 1555, hostilities took on a reciprocal character. Devlet Giray, at the direction of Turkey, undertook a large campaign against Rus' in order to prevent Astrakhan from joining Russia. In turn, the Russian government decided to launch its own preemptive strike, the first in the history of the fight against Crimea, with a show of power from Moscow. The Russian troops had a strong "outfit" - artillery units, which played a big role in the battles. At first, both troops missed each other - a stro

voevoda Ivan Vasilievich Sheremetev went to the upper reaches of the Kolomak River in the present Kharkov region, and Devlet-Girey - almost to Tula. As a result of mutual reconnaissance, each other's position began to clear up. Sheremetev, having entered the Tatar rear, captured a huge Tatar convoy, and part of his detachment was allocated to accompany the booty. And Devlet-Girey, having learned about the defeat of the convoy, turned back, and a bloody battle took place near the village of Sudbishchi in the present Oryol region, where the Russians, ten times inferior to the Tatars, held out to the last.

The main Russian forces led by Ivan IV were near Tula when news came that Sheremetev had been defeated ... Many boyars advised Ivan to follow the Oka, but he nevertheless went to Tula, relying on its fortress walls and garrison. In reality, although Sheremetev simply could not win, the stamina of his soldiers so frightened Devlet-Girey that the khan, knowing about the performance of a large Russian army, fled to the Crimea. The wounded Ivan Vasilyevich Sheremetev, brought to Tula, was received by Ivan with honor and awarded, like his other associates.

The Battle of Judgment is a forgotten but glorious and important episode in Russian history. Its results for a good ten years held back the aggressiveness of Devlet Giray. But problems arose in the North and West - with Sweden, Livonia, Poland and Lithuania.

The theme of Livonia and the Livonian War has previously appeared on the pages of this book more than once, and the time has come for a chronologically sequential story about it. Until 1561, Livonia was called the confederation of five spiritual principalities - the Livonian Order, the Bishopric of Riga, and the bishoprics of Courland, Derpt and Ezel-Vik, occupying the territory of modern Latvia and Estonia. Relations with the knights

and Baltic bishops in Rus' have never been good - they were regulated by fragile peace treaties such as the treaty of 1534. At the same time, the Livonian Order from the beginning of the 16th century was constantly blocked with Lithuania, and in 1557 concluded the Pazvolsky Treaty with it, directed against Russia. Russian maritime trade in the Baltic was also blocked. Since 1540, Russia had only one Baltic port - Narva. There secretly

English, Dutch and French ships came with goods. But soon Narva was also lost.

In 1555, the trading "Moscow Company" was established in England. Trade through the White Sea began, but this was an inconvenient option. In 1556, when the Swedes once again unleashed a war, Russian troops defeated the Swedes at Vyborg. This contributed to the revival of the so-called "Vyborg voyage", that is, Russian trade through Vyborg. However, the time has come to solve the problem radically.

This is how Karl Marx assessed the situation much later: "He (Ivan IV. - S.K.) was persistent in his attempts against Livonia; their conscious goal was to give Russia access to the Baltic Sea and to open communication lines with Europe. That is the reason why Peter I admired him so much!".

That's right, and Peter the Great solved the problem that Ivan the Terrible set before Russia.

Sometimes one historical detail can contain a lot. The young gunner Andrei Chokhov, the future glory of Russian cannon business, took part in the Livonian War. The war lasted a long time, from some point it already used cannons cast by Chokhov, who became a cannon maker. And some of Chokhov's heavy guns, having begun to fight for the Russian Baltic in the Livonian War of Ivan the Terrible, a century and a half later took part in the Northern War of Peter the Great, waged with the same goal. It is rare when historical continuity, carried through the centuries, receives such a weighty (in the literal sense) and exciting material personification. Once upon a time, the Russian trading cities of Kolyvan (Revel,

Tallinn), Rugodiv (Narva), Yuryev (Derpt) were set up in the Baltic. Their return provided Russia with a new round of development through direct and fast ties with Western Europe.

Ivan's advisers, and among them Sylvester, tried to orient him towards the war with the Crimea, but the tsar understood that this was now a dead end direction - you would not go out to Europe through the Ottomans. And in January 1558, the war of the Muscovite state with Livonia began.

However, before talking about the Livonian War, it makes sense to once again take a look at the general situation of that time, from the "Livonian" topic, however, without deviating ...

Today, the falsification of Russian history at the official level has become almost total. And only in such an atmosphere it becomes possible to publish such an article by Andrei Danilov, professor of the North Caucasian Academy of Public Administration, Doctor of "Historical" "Sciences", "The Experience of Sole Power in Russia in the 16th–20th Centuries", published in No. 1 of the academic journal "Questions of History" for 2009. Perhaps, on this article - as a representative example, it is worth stopping. The very title of the article is systematically incorrect... Only a primitive native king

in the wilds of the jungle can have "one-man" power in real life, and in a fairly developed state, even a strong authoritarian leader cannot but be a "moderator" - to use the language accessible to the current "liberals". ". But this is by the way...

The article is, of course, about three "tyrants" - Grozny, Peter and Stalin ... And it all begins, of course, with "terror". Danilov writes: "As a result of terror (Grozny. - S.K.) , thousands and thousands of Russians died - princes, boyars, nobles, merchants, artisans, peasants, clergy, the vast majority of whom did not plot any conspiracies against the tsar ... ". The "democratic" combination in the same enumeration of

the Gediminids with artisans and peasants is in itself anti-historical, or rather, provocative. The essence of the situation is immediately transferred from the sphere of historical analysis to the plane of deceitful and noisy "journalism". And then Danilov complains about the rejection of "democracy", and declares: "An important

consequence of the refusal to govern the country together with the leaders of the Chosen One, the refusal to take into account their experience and knowledge was the erroneous decision to make the struggle for the Baltic states the main direction of foreign policy activity" ... At the same time Danilov, refers to "an analysis of the foreign policy alternatives that Russia faced in the 16th century," conducted by a certain A.L. Yanov.

Following Yanov, Danilov argues that "the current geopolitical situation favored the national revival of Russia and its transformation into a major European state." Here, alas, lie and truth are mixed. The truth is that

the conditions for the transformation of Russia into a major European state by the second half of the 16th century were there, but these were purely *internal* conditions. And the "current *geopolitical* situation", on the contrary, in every possible way prevented the national revival of Russia and its transformation into a European state. Europe was **terribly** afraid of the transformation of Russia into a powerful and developed state, so here Danilov-Yanov simply cast a shadow on a clear day.

Danilov states that since the Golden Horde collapsed, but the Ottoman Empire was gaining strength, threatening de Europe, the historical choice of Russia was allegedly as follows: "either to achieve its national goals as an ally of Europe, or to achieve them, opposing itself to Europe, speaking in her eyes, only a deputy of the disappeared Golden Horde (!? - S.K.) ...".

"Concretely historically in the middle of the XVI century. before Moscow, - writes Danilov, - two directions in foreign policy were opened: after the defeat of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates in the 1550s, to continue the offensive against its eternal (? - S.K.) enemy - the Crimean Khan and Turkey, which stood *behind* him (thus joining the de facto European, anti-Turkish coalition) or start the fight for Livonia, "turn to the Germans", speaking the language of Ivan IV (and in this case become a de facto member of the anti-European coalition") ... "

According to Danilov-Yanov, "it seemed logical to complete the defeat of the remnants of the Golden Horde in the person of the Crimean Khanate," and Ivan, contrary to the opinion of "the leaders of the Chosen Rada, who advocated the continuation of the anti-Tatar strategy," chose "the opposite strategy, which led to a 25-year Livonian War.

Here you can see that the fact that the "leaders" of the "Chosen Rada" pushed the tsar to the Crimea and dissuaded him from the "Baltic" option gives reason to assume that these "leaders" were directly bribed by agents of Livonia ...

And, at least, from this fact follows the complete state failure of the "elected" "leaders" by the end of the 50s. Not without reason, apparently, in the second message to Kurbsky, Ivan wrote: *"... you are corrupted, who not only did not want to obey me and obey me, but they themselves owned me, seized my power and ruled as they wanted, and removed me from power; in words I was a sovereign, but in fact I did not own anything ... "* The most relevant in real time, and even more so in

the historical perspective, was the Western threat. Danilov-Yanov argue that "no one threatened Russia from the West, while leaving the southern border open was mortally dangerous" ... However, the concept of threat is ambiguous - there can be active threats, and maybe passive ones. In the Baltic, Russia has long faced both types of threats, and from Livonia at that moment the threats were rather passive - Russia was not allowed to trade in the Baltic, on the one hand, and on the other hand, Livonia blocked all contacts between Russia and Europe. But passivity could quickly be replaced by activity. As for the threats on the southern border, Ivan, of course, saw them, and worked hard to strengthen the southern borders - we will see that. Danilov-Yanov assert - completely falsely and

provocatively - that "...turning to the Germans", Ivan IV, how easy it was to foresee, in fact, invited (!? - S.K.) the Tatars to attack Moscow; in 1571 it was

burnt...". Firstly, the same Europeans invited - literally invited - the Tatars to Rus', supposedly refusing an alliance with whom Danilov-Yanov blames Ivan. Secondly, incited by the Europeans, Devlet Giray ventured to go to Moscow only in 1571 - thirteen (!) Years after

the start of the Livonian War! Could Ivan, starting the overdue struggle for Baltic trade, assume that the war would drag on so long? After all, it turned out to be so

long for quite definite, and not very guessable reasons in advance - as we will see a few

Later.

Thirdly, one had to be a complete fool, unworthy to lead even the Rostov North Caucasus Academy

"state" "management", in order to get involved in a hopeless adventure with the "defeat" of the Crimea, behind which the powerful Ottoman Empire really stood, in the concrete historical conditions of the middle of the 16th century.

Peter I, starting with

the Azov campaigns - which was necessary to ensure security from the South, almost immediately transferred all the efforts of the state to the same Baltic - because it was there that the pressing problems of Russia were solved. And it became possible to effectively neutralize the Crimea only for Catherine's Russia - when Russia became very strong, and the Ottomans had already begun to weaken. Moreover, even then it cost Russia enormous efforts, which became possible only because Peter had previously resolved the "Baltic" issue in favor of Russia.

And even if Ivan the Terrible had defeated the Crimea, it would not have given Russia absolutely nothing in geopolitical, civilizational and economic terms in those conditions. The Black Sea trade could not then be active - the Ottomans controlled the entire coast, and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits blocked access to the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic ... Really, in order not to understand this or deny it, one

must necessarily be a professor at Putin's "academy" of the "state" "management"?

Ivan IV Vasilyevich the Terrible was not Putin's professor... He not only understood, but also knew - he knew from the real politics of Europeans that just like that, kindly, he would not receive the necessary access to convenient routes linking Russia and the West from this same West. Willy-nilly, I had to fight. The

Livonian War was the first major foreign war in Russian history, initiated by Russia itself, and at the same time - a war, in fact, a national one, a war for access to the natural northwestern borders. The Russian nobility was also interested in acquiring developed lands in Livonia, and the Russian merchants were also interested in gaining access to the Baltic Sea through Riga, Revel (Tallinn) and Narva. So the king was supported.

Ivan the Terrible's war for the Russian Baltic, which lasted more than 25 years, divided into three periods.

In January 1558, the Russian army under the command of Prince Vasily Glinsky and the Moscow vassal, the Kasimov prince Sheikh-Ali (Shig-Alia, Shigalei) entered the territory of Livonia. And already in the first weeks of the war, success was ensured, including due to the intimidating actions of the equestrian Tatars, Cheremis, Mordovians as part of the Russian troops. Yes, prosperous

Livonia was then horrified, but such was the era. Referring to fiction, one can recall the following lines: "Already that very night, when the Tatars passed the border post, the sky turned purple from the glow, terrible cries and cries of people were heard, along which the iron foot of the war was going ..., all German towns, colonies, villages, the towns were turned into a river of fire, hordes of Tatars spilled over this calm and still not known grief land ...".

And these are not lines from a novel about the invasion of civilized Europe by "Muscovite" barbarians... This is a description of the actions of Pan Andrzej Kmiecic, given in the novel "The Flood" by the singer of the chivalry of the gentry Henryk Sienkiewicz. Assessing the actions of Pan Andrzej, another noble Pan, Michal Volodyevsky, stated: "The whole division followed your work with great respect. Nothing, just firebrands and cadavera (*lat.* "corpses." - S.K.)". Comments required? However, the war was successful for

Russian weapons not

because of intimidation, but, above all, because of Russian military strength. At the beginning of the summer of 1558, the Russian troops, led by P.I. Shuisky, O.I. Troekurov and A.I. Shein, laid siege to the city of Neuhausen. Master of the Livonian Order V. Furstenberg surrendered with a 2,000-strong order army. The Russians took 20 fortresses, including Narva Rugodiv, a convenient trading harbor, and Derpt (Tartu, Yuryev). In autumn, Shuisky's army returned to Russia, leaving small garrisons in the fortresses. Ivan the Terrible said: "I conquered Narva and will

enjoy your happiness.

At the mouth of the Narova, below Ivan-gorod, to expand the "Narva voyage", the envoys of Grozny Dmitry Shastunov, Pyotr Golovin and Ivan Vyrodkov set about building a new port with a harbor, and in the summer of 1558 he could already receive the first ships.

In the spring of 1559, the Danish ambassadors reported to their king that the Russians had begun laying down large naval ships. The latter, alas, did not correspond to reality - Grozny tried in vain to send shipbuilders to Russia, Europe refused him this. Later, European authors painted in every way the suspicion of Russians, their desire for isolation, but in fact, Western Europe, which was ahead of Russia in development, blocked the opportunity for Russians to adopt European experience.

Nevertheless, Europe was alarmed ... The Polish king Sigismund II Augustus wrote to the English Queen Elizabeth: "The Moscow sovereign daily increases his power ... he acquires the means to defeat everyone." The Danish king, as well as the Austrian emperor Ferdinand I, issued decrees prohibiting ships from entering Narva. In 1559, as a result of the second campaign in Livonia, Russian troops took 11 cities. In January

1560, the Russian army under the command of P.I. Shuisky, V.S. Serebryany and I.D. Mstislavsky began hostilities with the siege and capture of the first-class fortress Marienburg (Aluksne).

In August, Russian troops defeated the order army near Ermes (Ergems), laid siege to Fellin (Viljandi) and forced the enemy, who had about 470 guns in the fortress, to surrender. The successful actions of the Russian troops were facilitated by the uprisings of local peasants that broke out in Livonia against the German feudal lords. There was an actual collapse of the Livonian Order. Thus, during the two years of the war, Russian troops captured the most important fortresses (Derpt, Narva, Fellin, etc.) and decided the fate of the order.

Despite constant successes, the 29-year-old Ivan, at the insistence of Adashev, agreed to a truce, which resulted in the deft move of the Livonian feudal lords - according to the Vilna Treaty of November 28, 1561, they transferred the order lands and possessions of the Archbishop of Riga under the protectorate of the Polish king. The old master Fürstenberg was removed, and the new (and last) master of the order was Gotthard Ketler, who adhered to the Polish orientation. In fact, Adashev - voluntarily or involuntarily - tore off a confident

development of events in favor of Russia.

In 1562, the secular duchy of Courland was formed, headed by Ketler, who received Courland and Semigallia into hereditary possession with the title of duke as a vassal of Poland. Riga, by agreement, remained independent until 1581. Part of Livonia - with Revel, Northern Estonia, the islands of Haryumaa, Virumaa and Jerva - went to Sweden, and these lands began to be called Estonia and Livonia. Since 1561, the Livonian War entered a new phase - it was no longer

necessary to fight with the collapsed Livonia, but with Poland, as well as with Sweden ... In 1561, the Swedes took a number of Russian-owned cities in Livonia, including Weissenstein (now Paide) on the Pärnu River. In 1573, this important - then - strategic point was taken by the Russians again, and one of the associates of Grozny, the Duma nobleman Grigory Skuratov-Belsky, better known in history as Malyuta Skuratov, died under its walls. This last name of his became a household name for a cruel executioner, but Belsky died as a hero, the first to climb the walls of Weissenstein-Paide. Executioners do not usually end up like this, calmly executing in safety. Until December 1562, hostilities were limited to minor clashes. In December, an 80,000-strong army under the command of Ivan the Terrible marched from Mozhaisk to Lithuania, in January 1563 besieged the

strategically important fortress city and base of Polish troops in Lithuania - Polotsk, and in February took it, having previously destroyed the fortifications with artillery fire. However, rather it was necessary to talk about the liberation of Polotsk - the ancient Russian city of Kievan Rus.

As has been emphasized more than once, the strength of Lithuania was determined by the weakness of the "Mongolian" and post-Mongolian Rus'. It was precisely on this weakness that Lithuania grew, having the opportunity to seize and subjugate White Rus', the Kiev region, the Smolensk region ... And now Rus' began to return and went further than before - the way was opened to the capital of Lithuania, Vilna and Riga.

However, the reactionary boyars became more active in Moscow, and in April 1564 Kurbsky fled to Poland, who knew a lot and became a valuable asset for the Poles. In January 1564, Russian troops were defeated on the Ulla River, on July 2, 1564 - under

Orsha. In the fall, Devlet Giray struck in the direction of Ryazan. The moment was chosen by him for this convenient, and actions for sure

agreed with the Poles.

Successes inspire everyone, defeats immediately discourage the unstable. And the traditions of betrayal, *reshuffling*, among that part of the Russian elite, which was guided in life by personal desires, were old. The situation demanded unity and internal mobilization, but instead, Grozny again faced growing boyar opposition. The introduction of the "oprichnina" regime since 1565 became one of the ways to strengthen the interests and strength of the Russian state. In June 1566, the Polish-Lithuanian embassy arrived in Moscow with a proposal to divide Livonia on the basis of the situation that had developed at that time. It was, in fact, a tactical move in order to win time, and the Zemsky Sobor of 1566 supported the intention of the Grozny government to wage war until the capture of Riga. Russian successes frightened Europe, frightened Poland, and it was they who accelerated (if not caused) the process of

concluding the Union of Lublin in 1569 by Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The united Commonwealth was created as a state hostile to Russia ***from the moment of its formation*** ! Russian historians usually do not emphasize this circumstance, but in vain ...

The Russian tsar soon made an unexpected move! In 1570, he issued a "complaint" to the Dane Carsten Rode for privateering in the Baltic Sea. Today, almost no one remembers the privateer

flotilla of Ivan the Terrible! And she quite successfully operated in the Baltic during the Livonian War. The flotilla was created in July 1570 and consisted of 6 pennants. Russian guns were installed on the ships, and the crews were hired from Danish corsairs. Commander - Carsten Rode, was also a professional corsair. Having received from Ivan the Terrible a "complaint" - in fact, a letter of marque, he opened actions against Polish trade.

The privateer flotilla was based on the island of Bornholm. Starting to operate in June 1570, by September Rode captured 22 ships, some of which were transferred to Russia, and a small ship appeared in Narva.

Russian fleet. But not for long. The appearance in the Baltic of just a small flotilla under the Russian flag caused in Poland and Sweden, and in general in Western Europe, a commotion, sharp protests rained down ... "It

is necessary to prevent the domination (? - S.K.) of Muscovites at sea, *while* this evil is not yet managed to take too deep roots," wrote the burgomasters of Danzig to Lübeck and other Hanseatic cities. The Danish king Frederick II in October of the same 1570 ordered the arrest of Karsten Rode and imprisoned him in one of the royal castles. The ships were confiscated.

A small detail of a big story. But the detail is revealing, and remember Russian about it does not interfere even now.

However, not "even", but **especially** now, when various kinds of Danilov-Yanovs assure us that only the "tyranny" of Grozny allegedly was an obstacle to the medieval integration of Russia into Europe ... Another

"Danish" project of Ivan dates back to the time of the Livonian War. Hostile to Sweden, Denmark then had strong positions in Livonia; in 1561, it took possession of the strategically important island of Ezel (Saremaa). And in 1570 Ivan made an agreement with Prince Magnus, brother of the Danish King Frederick II. Having invited Magnus to Moscow, Ivan solemnly declared him the king of Livonia. Magnus was offered the hand of Ivan's cousin Evfemia, the daughter of the executed Vladimir Staritsky, but Evfemia died unexpectedly, and in 1573 Magnus married another daughter of Staritsky, Maria. Grozny wrote in his first letter to Kurbsky: "*But*

we do not exterminate you by all sorts, but reprisals and disgrace await traitors everywhere." The fate of the daughters of the conspirator Staritsky (and not only them) clearly confirms that this was the case. The vassal kingdom of Magnus under the hand

of Moscow had a chance to survive - the ordinary inhabitants of Livonia treated him positively. Even such a hostile Livonian chronicler as Baltazar Russov, in his Chronicle of Livonia, did not hide the fact that "almost all Livonians" were supporters of the Russian protectorate - the Latvians and Estonians were so fed up with the power of the knights and

bishops.

However, even here the greed of the Russian elite, who demanded land grants in Livonia, let down, which alienated the local peasantry from the Russians. Magnus himself turned out to be unreliable - at first he played a secret double game, and in 1578 he swore allegiance to the Polish king Stefan Batory. However, the Poles did not need a separate Livonia - even as a "buffer". As a result, Magnus lost his possessions and died in poverty in 1583.

The continuation of the protracted Livonian War and the problems of Russia revived the hopes of Devlet Giray. An alliance with the newly formed Commonwealth seemed to him a convenient opportunity to deal with Russia. Sultan Selim the Magnificent also pushed the Crimea to this, counting on the deposition of Kazan and Astrakhan from Moscow. Ivan, through his ambassadors Dyutkin-Novosiltsev and Kuzminsky, tried to keep Selim, but to no avail.

Every cloud has a silver lining - the need to ensure the security of the southern borders of Russia led to a number of effective measures to strengthen and improve the guard service and to involve the Don Cossacks in it more widely. The Russian southern

Cossacks arose at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries, when the strengthening of feudal oppression on the one hand and the weakening of the steppes on the other hand caused the masses of the Russian and Ukrainian peasantry to flee to the southern steppes - to the Don, Seversky Donets, Khoper and Medveditsa. Gradually settled settlements were formed, and the Cossacks became a natural outpost of Rus' in the South. The

connections of the Don with Moscow grew and strengthened, the Cossacks took part in the capture of Kazan ... In 1556, Ataman Cherkashenin supported the actions of the Russian governor Rzhevsky-Dyak against the Turkish fortress of Ochakov and the Crimean Tatars, in 1570 Cherkashenin's Cossacks accompanied the tsarist ambassador Novosiltsev from Rylysk to Azov. The Cossacks received for the service "the sovereign's salary: money, and cloth, and saltpeter, and lead ...".

In 1571, Ivan instructed the voivode Vorotynsky to reorganize the guard service, and in the same year, the first Russian military charter, the Code of Stanitsa Service, entered the life of Russia. Guard service was carried out by state mobile detachments - "villages",

up to 100 people. Detachments were sent from the border fortresses - Putivl, Rylsk and others, at a distance of up to 100 miles and conducted reconnaissance, also destroying small Tatar patrols and capturing "languages". 73 "watchmen" were formed, united in 12 categories by districts.

Broader functions were performed by the Don Cossacks. In fact, Ivan gave the Don to the Cossacks, and this once again proves that he did not seek to rule where it was not really possible, and where absolute obedience to him was not required in the essence of the situation.

The Cossacks were replenished with runaway serfs, but Ivan could not control this process. So why try to destroy the Cossacks, if you can use them for good? Within the boundaries of the Russian state, a kind of military-feudal Cossack republics were formed with their own special internal social life, special orders. And the central government of Grozny not only did not suppress these republics, but encouraged them.

There was and could not be anything like this in the absolutist states of Europe, but in Russia, with its long and distant borders, the Cossacks began to play an important state function, performing not only the tasks of guarding and advanced defense of the borders. The approach of Ivan the

Terrible became traditional for the Moscow sovereigns and, in fact, was of strategic importance. Without significant expenses - only recognizing the liberties of the Cossacks, the Russian state received both reliable border guards, and a military reserve, and advanced forces for a gradual advance towards the natural borders of Russia. In a similar way, relations between Moscow and the emerging Ural Cossacks were built, which will be discussed later. Measures to strengthen

the guard service turned out to be more than timely: in 1571, Devlet Giray with a huge army (sources say the figure is 120,000 people) marched on Moscow. Ivan, as his predecessors had done more than once in similar situations, hid in the north, entrusting the defense of Moscow to the governors. What explained the campaign against

Moscow of the Crimean Khan? Is it only with the desire to get prey and is "full", or also with other

considerations? A systematic analysis of the situation immediately points to Western Europe as a source of "Russian" activity in Crimea...

Alas, historians believe dubious documents more than common sense. So, Karamzin widely used the "information" of Taube and Krause, based much of his description of the era of Grozny on Schlichting and did not doubt the reliability of what he reported. And Schlichting, of course, did not link together the Catholic Pope and the Crimean Muslim Khan. However, common sense often allows you to see the era deeper than is possible using even contemporary sources.

For example, there is not a single document linking the Moscow campaign of Devlet Giray with the eastern policy of the popes, and common sense tells us that such a connection was not only possible, but was practically inevitable.

And here's

why... From the beginning of 1570, Sultan Selim II was preparing to seize Cyprus, which belongs to the Venetian Republic. These plans both indirectly and directly affected the interests of the Vatican, and Pope Pius V began to put together an anti-Turkish coalition, which included Rome, Venice and Spain. At the same time, the Pope and the Doge of Venice found it tempting and attractive to attach Russia to the coalition as v

There was no need for Russia - Turkey did not directly threaten it, and the more Turkey got stuck in the West, the less opportunities it had to prevent Russia from strengthening its positions in the Volga region - from Kazan to Astrakhan.

However, the pope, it seems, held Grozny for a simpleton, and turned to him with a letter, where he frightened Ivan with the fact that the "insatiable Turks" would not calm down until they "destroyed or suppressed all kingdoms and states with cruel slavery" ... It is significant when This is that although the pope asked the Russian Tsar for support, he addressed Ivan not as "Majesty", but as just "Lord", not recognizing Ivan as a full-fledged sovereign, equal to European kings.

The letter of Pius V had no practical results, but it is quite possible to assume that the pope decided to reinforce his arguments with a clear example, and in a roundabout manner provoked Devlet Giray to a military demonstration, which was supposed to convince Ivan that not fighting should be Russia's paramount task. behind

Polotsk and Narva, and the forceful neutralization of the Crimea and Turkey. And that the union of Russia with Catholic Europe can very successfully contribute to the solution of this last task.

Moreover, the pope could push the Crimean Khan to practical actions in the simplest way - by financing the "Moscow" campaign of the Krymchaks. We do not have

a single document confirming this version of the reasons that prompted Devlet Giray to go to Moscow, and the secret archives of the Vatican are even less accessible than the secret archives of Britain. However, the logical analysis of such a version does not contradict, and on the contrary, leads to it. One way or

another, the Tatars of Devlet Giray approached the capital, where masses of refugees had accumulated, and, failing to take the city, set fire to it with fiery arrows - once again, most of the wooden Moscow burned down. Devlet Giray left, capturing a large "full". Ivan was forced to agree to the payment of tribute to the Crimea, but the khan demanded Kazan and Astrakhan, and the next year he undertook a new campaign against Rus', backed up by Polish gold and Turkish artillery. But here everything turned out differently for the Khan. By May 1572,

about 12 thousand nobles, 2 thousand archers and about 4 thousand Cossacks were gathered on the southern border. On the side of the Tatars there was a triple advantage, but the Russian governors, led by Prince Mikhail Vorotynsky, were determined. The forward detachments entered the battle on July 28. And from July 30 to August 2, the main forces converged in a fierce battle near the village of Molod on the Rozhai River, a tributary of the Lopasna, 50 miles south of Moscow.

The battle ended with a decisive victory for the Russians - Devlet-Girey left with only a third of the troops, the son and grandson of the khan died in the battle. The southern front of the Livonian War was reliably eliminated, and now military efforts could again be concentrated in the west and north.

As mentioned earlier, in January 1573, troops under the command of Ivan IV stormed the stronghold of the Swedes in the Baltic States - the Weissenstein (Paide) fortress. In the campaign of 1574, the successful defensive actions of the Russians broke the siege of the Wesenberg and Tollsburg fortresses by the Swedes. In 1574-75, the Russians took a number of cities, including the fortress of Pernov (Pärnu). Well done and

campaign of 1576: with the exception of Riga and Reval, the entire southeastern coast passed into Russian hands.

It would seem that the moment favored the success of the Russian cause - King Sigismund II Augustus died in Warsaw, and an interregnum - "royallessness" began in the Commonwealth. The election of the French prince Heinrich de Valois to the Polish throne did not change much - a struggle of parties unfolded in Poland. In 1575, the Russians took the city of Pernov (now Pärnu) on the left bank of the Pernava River - during the Livonian War, it changed hands several times. And on July 13, 1577, a large army led by Ivan moved from Pskov to South Livonia, occupied by the Poles. One after another, the cities of Marienhausen (Vlekh), Lutsen (Puddle), Rezhitsa (Rezekne), Nevgin (Daugavpils) surrendered ... In the second message to

Kurbsky, Ivan wrote: "You said: "There are no people in Russia, *No; who is now conquering the firm German fortresses? ..*». But gradually, in the Livonian epic of Russia, an unfavorable turning point

occurred for it: in 1576, the strong king Stefan Batory was elected to the Polish throne, and we will return to this figure. In the summer of 1577, a 100,000-strong Russian army under the command of Ivan IV captured the fortresses

of Lutsin, Kreutzburg, Laudon (Levdun), Zeswegen (Chestwin), Berzon (Barzoy), Kolyuzenau, Wenden (Cesis) and others ... Stefan Batory was forced to conclude a temporary truce, however, in 1579 he went on the offensive,

occupied Polotsk, Velikiye Luki, and in 1581 laid siege to Pskov, hoping to go to Moscow after his capture. The Swedes, in turn, occupied Rugodiv (Narva) and Korela.

The heroic defense of Pskov thwarted Batory's plans and forced him to start peace negotiations. In 1582, a truce was established with Poland. It ended with a peace treaty concluded in the Yama Zapolsky. More precisely, it was a truce for ten years, according to which Russia abandoned Livonia and Polotsk, and Poland liberated the occupied Russian territories.

In 1583, the Plyussa truce was also concluded with Sweden on the Plyussa River. According to it, Russia retained the mouth of the Neva, but in fact the Baltic "window" for the Russians closed again. In 1584, the northern port of Arkhangelsk was founded, at first called New Kholmogory. Already after the death of Ivan - in 1585, followed by a decree on the transfer of all northern trade to Arkhangelsk. Liberal

historiography blames the unfavorable change in the situation on Grozny, who allegedly exhausted Russia and deprived it of "the best command personnel" as a result of repressions ...

But Russia then for the first time had to face a widely organized pan-European conspiracy against it.

Livonia, Poland, Lithuania and Sweden were directly involved in the conflict, but the Livonian issue was constantly discussed at meetings of representatives of the states that were part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German people. Emperor Maximilian II announced a trade blockade to Moscow. Russia's activity did not suit France and even Spain, which had their own "Baltic" plans. Transylvania was afraid of the growing influence of Ivan IV on the Moldavians and Vlachs, and the position of Turkey in relation to the Russian state can not be mentioned.

It has long been believed that Ivan the Terrible fought in Livonia for access to the shores of the Baltic Sea. But this is not all! The Livonian War was for Russia a war not only for the Baltic, for access to sea trade routes. It was also a war for the opportunity to establish reliable civilizational ties with Europe, to get free access to European science, technology, culture, to get the opportunity to get European specialists to Rus'.

And this was resisted by Europe itself, more precisely, by its rulers, its power elites... The following fact is little known, but indicative... At the end of 1568, Ivan's ally, King Eric XIV, was deposed in Stockholm, and his brother Johan, the enemy of Russia, came to power. Johan insulted the Russian ambassadors, which finally spoiled relations between Russia and Sweden. But Johan waged war with Denmark, and, not being able to be distracted by Russia, sent Bishop Paul of Abos and Tone Olson (Onton Alaveev or Oloveev in Russian sources) to Ivan.

Ivan delayed the ambassadors, and did so twice more, only in the autumn of 1571 he sent a letter to Johan motivating the delays. In January 1572, the new Swedish ambassadors, having arrived in Novgorod, announced that Johan would accept the conditions of the tsar, pay for the "disgrace" of the Russian ambassadors in Sweden, help organize the development of silver ore discovered in the Urals, and ensure free passage of foreigners to Russia through **Sweden and the part of Livonia belonging**

to Sweden ... The Italian Giovanni Tedaldi visited Russia in the 50s-60s and obviously met personally with the tsar. Tedaldi reports that when he asked Ivan why he did not allow foreigners to leave the country, Grozny replied that he was doing so, because otherwise they would not return, since "King Sigismund would prevent their return." "That is why, since Narva belongs to Muscovites," concluded Tedaldi, "it is easier for him to allow the departure of Italians and foreigners in general." This is what, among other things,

Ivan IV the Terrible fought in Livonia - for the possibility of free communication with that Europe, with which, according to the Danilov-Yanovs, the tsar allegedly did not want to be friends.

In other words, the Livonian War had as its civilizational goal the introduction of Russia to modern world achievements. Ivan the Terrible intended to "cut through" that "window" to Europe, which Peter cut through more than a hundred years later. Moreover, to cut through in the most convenient place, in the already economically developed territories with ready-made ports and cities.

And if this happened, then Russia is already in the upcoming XVII century could make an impressive civilizational breakthrough.

This is what Europe feared. More precisely, it was, of course, not Erasmus of Rotterdam and Galileo Galilei who were afraid of this, but crowned selfish and uncrowned financial "kings", who already then - like, for example, the German banker Jakob Fugger, had such power that they could influence the election of certain European crowned. In Russia,

progressive people - and there were enough of them, after all, not all of them slurped cabbage soup - were acutely aware that Russia had lagged behind, and that Europe, which had gone into the lead, had to be caught up. And just under Ivan IV, desires began to coincide with opportunities - young Ivan was dynamic in both domestic and foreign policy, showing himself as an inno

boldly went to the nomination of the "thin-born" to government posts, and if anything prevented this process from acquiring the mass character that it acquired under Peter, it was the arrogance and inertia of the tribal boyars. Even during wars, it was more concerned with who could claim what place according to the antiquity of the family, and not with how to more effectively defeat the enemy.

Ivan the Terrible is portrayed as a tyrant, but in fact he was more often a hostage to that stupid situation in which the princely-boyar opposition put him over and over again. Another thing is that Ivan, as a great sovereign, as an outstanding statesman and reformer, resolutely suppressed this narcissistic opposition - sometimes by political maneuver, and sometimes, in accordance with the customs of the era, with an

ax. But he was ready to exchange the ax for a pen and even for a place at a desk... The way to this "desk", so necessary for the future of Russia, was closed by Livonia, whose ports and lands turned out to be not a "door" for Russia, and not even a "window" "to Europe, but **a slingshot**, a barrier blocking Russia's convenient, reliable trade and cultural routes and blocking the development of ties with Europe.

Objectively, the expansion of Russia's contacts with Europe was more than possible under Ivan, and it would be mutually beneficial. After all, not only Heinrichs No. so-and-so lived in Europe, Fredericks No. so-and-so, and Maximilians with the popes of Rome - there, too, not everyone was guided by selfish desires, not everyone looked at Russia with hostility ... In 1553,

the English navigator Richard Chancellor discovered the northeast route to Russia, and Ivan immediately seized the opportunity. Chancellor was treated kindly, the English "Moscow Company" was formed. In 1555, Chancellor arrived in Moscow for the second time - already as the official English ambassador, and was received by the 25-year-old tsar with unprecedented honor. Chancellor was seated at the royal table opposite Ivan, which was the highest honor. English merchants were granted special benefits. Chancellor set off on his way

back in the winter of 1556 on 4 ships richly loaded with goods, together with the tsarist ambassador, Vologda clerk Osip Nepeya. In a storm off the Shetland Islands Chancellor

drowned, and Nepea safely reached London, where he was also greeted with great honor.

The Russian ambassador stayed in England until May 1557, negotiated for Russian merchants the same benefits that were given to the British in Russia and hired "many craftsmen, dokhturs, and gold and silver seekers and workers and many other craftsmen" to work in Russia. It was the same line that Peter later took. And no wonder - the advanced Russia of Ivan the Terrible and the tsar himself fully understood the importance for the needs of Russia's development of inviting qualified European specialists in

all areas. It was possible to cut through the "window to Europe" only through Livonia. Moreover, the Livonian Germans more than others bothered to ensure that European knowledge did not penetrate into Russia. The Catholic rulers of Livonia knew how to see possible strategic prospects, and if they were not very far-sighted, they would have been corrected by Rome, where they had long since learned to see ahead for

By itself, Livonia was weak and would not have been able to resist Russia's access to the convenient shores of the middle Baltic and the establishment of broad ties with the West. **In addition, at first Ivan IV intended to limit himself to only the necessary minimum.** Even his grandfather Ivan III, after the war of 1500-1503 with the Livonian Order, got him to pay tribute for Dorpat (Yuriev). The treaty expired in 1553, and Ivan the Terrible insisted on extending it on terms that would place Yuryev-Derpt and its region in the position of a Russian protectorate.

Only having received a refusal, Ivan IV began preparations for war. But, even having already begun hostilities, he was inclined to confine himself to a peace treaty necessary for Russia. However, provocative shelling of the Russian Ivan-gorod from the Livonian Narva disrupted the emerging peace process, and the first successes inspired Ivan, who had plans not only to go to the sea, but also to return the original Russian lands seized by Lithuania to Russia.

This, of course, in itself programmed the conflict with Lithuania, with Poland, led to the creation of the Commonwealth. Polish Warsaw then took advantage of the fear of Lithuanian Vilna to lose Russian possessions ... But there could not have been no guidelines for the same Sigismund II Augustus **from Rome.**

After the death of Sigismund, little has changed in the general situation. Initially, the Catholic Prince Henry de Valois was elected to the Polish throne. However, the death in Paris of his brother, King Charles IX, left the French throne vacant, and the short-lived Polish king Henry fled Poland in June 1574 to become King Henry III of France. After that,

the dual Polish-Lithuanian throne occupied, as it was already said earlier, Stefan Batory.

A Hungarian by birth, Bathory (1533-1586) was three years younger than Ivan ... The son of the Transylvanian (Semigrad) Prince Stephen IV, he was born in 1533, studied at the University of Padua in Italy, whose rector was the Polish magnate Jan Zamoyski. A fact, no doubt, deserving the closest attention - much in the "Russian" policy of Poland in the 16th and 17th centuries must be viewed through the "Vatican" prism... Zamoyski, by the way, oversaw the activities of his pupil even after he became the king of Poland. In 1571-1576 Stefan was Prince of

Semigrad, but in 1576 the Poles elected him King of Poland. Actually, at first the parties were divided, and the Senate elected Maximilian Habsburg, but in the end the throne remained with Batory - it is believed that he was supported by the middle and small gentry. However, the corrupt and petty gentry always followed the magnates in everything, so it was very likely that a clever performance was simply played out - the Vatican needed a strong conductor of its policy, and the ardent Catholic Batory turned out to be quite a suitable candidate. The fact that the new Polish king was a protege of the popes of Rome is confirmed not only by his active anti-Russian policy, but also by the fact that Jesuits became Batory's advisers. It is also indicative that among those who recommended the Hungarian Batory to the Poles were the ambassadors of the Turkish Sultan Amurat.

Upon accession to the throne, Batory announced his intention to win back the lands from Russia, which were returned to its composition by Ivan III Vasilyevich, his son Vasily III Ivanovich and his grandson Ivan IV Vasilyevich. A program that suited both Rome, and Istanbul, and Vienna, and Stockholm ... Pope Gregory XIII sent Bathory

a precious sword and a blessing for the fight against the "enemies of Christianity" - the Russians.

Batory faithfully carried out this order and through his efforts all the Livonian successes of Ivan were devalued. Although, was Batory the only one who thwarted the emerging Baltic

potentials of Russia? The same Pope gave the anti-Russian act the appearance of a pan-European crusade; troops from all over Catholic Europe were gathered into the army of Batory. It included German, Hungarian, Polish, Lithuanian, Danish and Scottish mercenaries. In 1578, the total number of troops of the Commonwealth grew to 150 thousand people. Jan Zamoyski became the commander of the army. There were about 300 thousand people in the Russian army, but they were scattered across Livonia and in the border cities: in Novgorod - 40 thousand, in Rzhev - 15 thousand, on the banks of the Oka against the Crimean Tatars -

about 65 thousand, etc. In this situation it was decided to wage a defensive war, exhausting the enemy in various ways, including forcing him to besiege fortresses. In August 1579, the united army of the Commonwealth took Polotsk, then Chashniki, Nevel, Velikie Luki, Pskov ... The

Swedes captured Narva, Korela and other fortresses.

Polotsk, once again Russian by that time for 17 years, defended courageously, like Velikie Luki and Pskov. The 16,000-strong garrison of Pskov and the population withstood the siege of the 50,000-strong royal army and forced Batory to withdraw from the city.

As a result, the war subsided, and on January 15, 1582, a ten-year truce with the Commonwealth was concluded in Yam Zampolsky.

And in 1584 Ivan the Terrible died.

After the death of Grozny, Batory was preparing a grandiose war against Russia with the active assistance of the Vatican. For this purpose, the new Pope Sixtus V, despite his well-known stinginess, allocated 250,000 skudos through the Jesuit Possevino, who was at Batory.

However, only the Catholic God and the Pope knows how many of these, not very scarce, were meagerly extracted from the Vatican treasury, and how much was transferred to Bathory through the pope

European bankers and merchants interested in weakening the Russian tsar and the Russian state. However, Batory also

died in 1586. Perhaps he was poisoned by the opponents of the new war - the gentry was tired of the last one, and the Polish appetites were directly satisfied in the Pit Zapolsky.

I emphasize once again: the whole of Catholic Europe stood behind Batory, and his opposition to the Livonian efforts of Russia had not only geopolitical, but also civilizational meaning.

As already mentioned, the success of the "Livonian" project of Ivan the Terrible brought not only Russia to Europe, but also Europe to Russia ... Contrary to the image created in the West by political enemies of Russia, Ivan IV Vasilyevich did not suffer from xenophobia, that is, rejection of someone else. On the other hand, representatives of scientific and applied knowledge, which began to spread widely in the West, could well move to Russia ... People of thought and deed are always attracted by the new, opening up new horizons, and discovering Russia after America would be tempting for many ...

Actually, the examples of Fioravanti and Fryazin, who built the Moscow Kremlin in the Russia of Ivan III, just show that active Europeans could find a second home in Ivan IV's Russia. And if it weren't for the protracted Livonian War, if it weren't for the vile policy of the "tops" of Europe and the narrow-minded princely-boyar opposition, we could have had a completely different late Russia of Ivan IV ...

In 1550, the German metallurgist and mineralogist Georg Bauer (Agricola) from the Bohemian city of Jachymov completed an extensive work "On Mining", which for two centuries served as a practical guide to mining and metallurgy techniques, moreover, Agricola was also aware of some Russian technological methods. . Bauer died in 1555, but he had students, followers, and not all of them were in demand at home - like, in fact, Bauer-Agricola himself ... But they could turn around in Russia - if she, having received direct communication with Europe, got the opportunity to focus on peaceful development. In 1568, the Flemish cartographer Mercator first used

the conformal cylindrical projection of the world map. In the same years

when the Livonian War was going on, Giordano Bruno was working in Europe ... The Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe in 1576 opened an observatory on the island of Ven. In the year of Ivan the Terrible's death, Galileo Galilei was twenty years old... Their thoughts, their discoveries, their names came to Russia much later, or could have come in real time. And how many intelligent masters

of their craft vegetated in Europe - the same guild framework did not encourage the initiative of apprentices, and Russia could provide them with a field of wide independent activity - the Russian Tsar was ready for this. Even at the beginning of his reign, Ivan instructed his ambassador in England, Nepeya, to hire various kinds of specialists there, which Nepeya did. At the end of Ivan's reign, Andrey Shchelkalov, a duma clerk, negotiated with the English ambassador Bowes about inviting "craftsmen" to Russia. And if European knowledge had united in the era of Grozny with the state capabilities of the

Russian tsar, with the energy and means of merchants and industrialists like the Stroganovs, with the sharpness of the cannon maker Andrei Chokhov and the readiness to work of ordinary Russian Ivanov, then ...

Then Rus' could reach a level of development and power that would radically change the course of world history. But then it would change in a direction undesirable for popes Gregory No. such and such and Sixtus No. such and such, Austrian Habsburgs and Livonian bishops, German and Italian bankers, Hanseatic merchants and Polish magnates.

Could they have let human history take that path? They didn't allow it. Some of them acted

consciously, some instinctively, but they all acted in the same direction and with the same goal - not to let Russia into Europe, but to leave it in that ignorance that became Russian payment for European knowledge and culture. This is what we need to understand when analyzing the

course and results of the Livonian War of Ivan the Terrible. The Livonian War was not ultimately successful for him personally, but its geopolitical necessity for Russia was beyond doubt.

In direct connection with the above, there is another aspect of that era, and also almost never evaluated in Russia by its significance. It has already been said about him earlier, but in passing, but he deserves to dwell on him additionally. This is about the psychological war that the West organized against Russia with the beginning of the Livonian War. The modern author of

a study on Ivan the Terrible, professor at the University of Münster, Frank Kaempfer, writes that the "horror of ruin" caused a "wave of proclamations" in Livonia and the German Empire, in which the "atrocities of the Muscovites" were depicted in the same colors as the "atrocities of the Turks". In Europe, pamphlets, illustrated brochures, leaflets - "flying sheets" were published, where the Russian tsar and Russian politics received the blackest assessments, which was understandable - the Livonian War was successful for Russia at first, and it was necessary to rally European public opinion around the idea fencing "civilization" from the invasion of the "Bolshevik ..." - sorry, "Muscovite hordes." Propaganda was to be

followed by action. With the introduction of the "oprichnina", the anti-Ivanovo propaganda campaign intensified, and above all in Germany. The Livonian Order was a department of the German Order, and the German or Germanized Livonian elite felt themselves at the forefront of the confrontation with Moscow, and so it was. If we look at European sources of information about the era of Ivan the Terrible, we will find colorful German names: Staden, Schlichting, Herberstein, Taube, Krause, Bussov ... And all of them are densely interspersed with factual data with fiction, deliberate lies or constructed situations.

So, for example, the previously mentioned Pomeranian nobleman Schlichting, who fled from the troops of Ivan IV to Lithuania, in his first essay "News from Muscovy, reported by the nobleman A.Sh. about the life and tyranny of Sovereign Ivan" conveys Ivan's conversation with the deacon Viskovaty in the following

expressions ... At first, Viskovaty allegedly asked Ivan not to shed so much blood, and especially "not to exterminate his boyars," and then he suggested that the tsar "think about who he will continue to not only fight, but also live with, if he executed so many brave of people"...

Grozny allegedly replied: "I haven't exterminated you yet, but as soon as I start, I'll try to eradicate all of you so that your memory doesn't remain" ... on suspicion, like fathers). Then, in Schlichting's broadcast, Ivan declared: "I hope that I can do this, but if things go to the extreme, and God will punish

me, and I will be forced to prostrate before my enemy, then I would rather give in to him in something great, just not to become a laughing stock for you, my lackeys "...

The last statement also could not have belonged to Ivan - psychologically, he thought and acted in exactly the opposite way. Ruslan

Skrynnikov, citing these passages, with the innocence of a true historian who believes only in the "document" (and how not to believe Schlichting if his notes are contemporary with the era of Grozny!), comments on them as follows: degree of reliability than the "Tales" written later. The speech of the king very accurately expressed exorbitant pride. From a stylistic point of view, it is very close to the original works and letters of Ivan the Terrible.

It seems that Skrynnikov did not even bother to think - could Schlichting be a witness to such a dialogue and why are Grozny's speeches in Schlichting stylistically so close to the original writings and letters of Grozny? But here there is simply a distorted use by Schlichting, as the predecessor of Goebbels, of the Terrible's message to Kurbsky.

The full title of the "Tales" mentioned by Skrynnikov is "A Brief Tale of the Character and Cruel Rule of the Moscow Tyrant Vasilievich." And the name itself indicates the true essence of Schlichting's creation - this is not a historical chronicle, but a topical political libel, from which, if it is possible to extract grains of historical truth, then only by the method of the Rooster from Krylov's fable, who was looking for a pearl grain in a dunghill.

Yaroslavl historian Ilya Gorshkov, who chose the person of Schlichting as the topic of his dissertation, argues that there are no grounds for the assumption that foreigners in general, and Schlichting in particular,

deliberately distorted historical reality. At the same time, Gorshkov himself reports that Schlichting, while in Moscow, "collaborated with the intelligence service of the Polish-Lithuanian state, informing the" ambassadors and messengers "of the Polish king" true information about the affairs of the enemy "...". Intelligence data Schlichting supplied to his bosses, presumably reliable. But Schlichting's public writings had a different task - to misinform European public opinion about the situation in Russia. And was Schlichting alone doing this? We believe without

a doubt that Ivan the Terrible killed

his son - after all, even the great Repin captured this moment in Russian history in his outstanding canvas ... Is it history? As already mentioned, the circumstances

of the death

of Ivan Ivanovich are known only from the story of the Jesuit Possevino, who at best could use rumors, moreover, rumors, most likely malicious. A direct provocation by Possevino is not ruled out. In fact, we are dealing with only two facts: the death of the prince and the miscarriage of his wife Elena, nee Sheremeteva. Or maybe Elena's miscarriage occurred as a reaction to the death of her husband, who simply died from a serious illness? The ill-wishers spread a rumor, Possevino wrote it down, and for more than four centuries historians have been feeding on his lie, elevating it to the rank of historical fact... Could it be so? But what is certain is that the libelous writings of foreigners about

Russia, in addition to the task of discrediting the tsar, also had one more goal - to scare away those European specialists from Russia who could enrich Russian specialists with their knowledge and professional skills. After all, they were in Rus' at that time, and sometimes they were outstanding. So, for example, the architect Fyodor Savelyevich

Kon came from Smolensk peasants. Merchant and built - according to their own architectural plans. Two years after the death of Ivan IV, Kon began the construction of a ten-kilometer third fortress belt around Moscow ... Along the line of the modern Boulevard Ring, the stone walls of the White (Tsarev) city with 28 huge

towers. The horse also built the Smolensk City Fortress. His designs were distinguished by simplicity, clarity, thoughtfulness of forms. And what if under these outstanding works of architecture the European building theory was also summed up, if the work of Kon and other Russian masters were woven into the pan-European cause of the technological development of

society? Such an assumption is not idle fantasy, under it is the state line of the entire reign of Ivan the Terrible. Here are the sizings that undermined it. Reporting in his notes about the conspiracy of the equestrian boyar Ivan Fedorov-Chelyadnin, Schlichting claimed that in Kolomna "more than three hundred foreign citizens" were allegedly executed in

connection with him. The purpose and meaning of such "information" is clear - after reading about such horrors, not a single sane person would even think about

seeking happiness in Russia. Curious, however, is the figure indicated by Schlichting. If it has real grounds - not in terms of the number of those executed, of course, but in essence, then this means that a foreigner in Rus' was not a curiosity at that time - it turns out that many came to us. To reduce the number of visitors, not to allow Rus' to feed itself on the achievements of Europe, was one of the tasks of agents of the West and political saboteurs.

In order to sum up some intermediate result in the topic of the degree of reliability of the reports of foreigners who visited Russia in the 16th and 17th centuries, I will turn to the opinion of the competent historian of religion Georgy Georgievich Proshin. Critically evaluating the statements of the Jesuit Possevino, the Swedish diplomat Petreius de Yerlezund, Herberstein, the German traveler Adam Olearius (Elschleger) that the Russian clergy are allegedly ignorant, Proshin explains that the Russian monks did not answer the questions of the guests and did not maintain a conversation with them, not because that they had nothing to say, but because worldly contacts through the head of the ruling brethren were

simply considered sinful. Thus, Olearius wrote that out of ten Russian monks, only one knew the Jesus Prayer. "Poll of Olearius," Proshin ironically, "gave an error by exactly an order of magnitude: not one of

ten knew the prayer, and nine out of ten refused to discuss these issues with a visiting foreigner," and further: "Ignorance of the Jesus Prayer is an absolutely incredible thing. This prayer accompanies the whole day of the monk, her ignorance is simply excluded.

Proshin is certainly right! The Jesus Prayer consists of one phrase: "Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me a sinner!" Not a single monk, of course, could not know this prayer. However, Olearius, instead of giving himself the trouble to think - what's the matter? proceeding from the unequivocal confidence that all the monks know the Jesus Prayer, he simply attributed everything to the ignorance of the Russian monks. This collision shows that European visitors treated Russians condescendingly, arrogantly, without a desire to understand someone else's life, unusual for a European. Therefore, the reliability of observations of Russian life by foreigners is low - even if we do not take into account the "black" anti-Russian "PR" in the framework of the then anti-Russian propaganda.

To complete the picture of the era, it is necessary, however, to know that Tsar Ivan, perfectly understanding the importance of both propaganda and counter-propaganda, did not remain in debt and distributed "mocking letters" in German against the Polish king Sigismund Augustus

in Europe. But Polish historians do not reconstruct the historical image of Sigismund on the basis of Grozny's propaganda leaflets, unlike Russian historians who write about Grozny using the products of medieval Polish-Livonian propaganda.

A prominent researcher of the Grozny era, Igor Yakovlevich Froyanov, published in 2007 a major monograph "The Drama of Russian History: On the Way to the Oprichnina". This huge work, completely objective, and therefore loyal to the activities of the first Russian tsar, illuminates only one of the aspects of the era - the prerequisites for the "oprichnina".

The thesis of I.Ya. Froyanov, concerning only the anti-Russian activities of the West. AND I. Froyanov states that "The West and the anti-Orthodox forces concentrated there were very alarmed by the emergence of the Russian united state, but they could not take Russia by military force, and therefore they imposed on it a more sophisticated form of war - an ideological war." AND I.

Froyanov also recalls that first in Novgorod, and then in Moscow - back in the days before Grozny - "the seeds of the" heresy of the Judaizers "... were thrown, and states that "the heresy threatened not only the emerging autocratic statehood, but also the integrity of the young united state" because it encouraged centrifugal tendencies.

This assessment is absolutely correct, but it is, nevertheless, only an assessment that liberals can dispute.

However, I.Ya. Froyanov dwells in detail on the very specific, with calculations, plan of Heinrich Staden known to us. Since 1577, in the Alsatian estate of Lutselstein in the Vosges, owned by the Count Palatine Georg Hans, Staden developed a detailed plan for European intervention in Russia - the "Project for the Conquest of the Russian Land", a sort of medieval version of the Barbarossa plan. The Count Palatine at meetings of the Reichstag

sought appropriate appropriations and tried to draw Prussia, Poland, Livonia, Sweden and the Holy Roman Empire into the coalition. And so, after analyzing the specific data of the plan, I.Ya. Froyanov draws a documented conclusion: "Thus, the plan for the conquest of the Russian land, developed by Heinrich Staden, included, in addition to the conquest itself, three main tasks: 1) the elimination of tsarist power and the establishment of occupying power; 2) replacement of Orthodoxy by the Catholic faith; 3) dismemberment of the Russian state".

AND I. Froyanov himself asks the question - how real was this plan then? And he cites the opinion of A.A. Zimin, who believed that it was a "fantastic project for the occupation of Russia" ...

Of course, specifically Staden's plan was then a gamble. But it is by no means a fantasy - contrary to the opinion of many - that **immediately** after the appearance of a united and vast Russia in the political reality of the world, the West, century after century, began to make plans for the weakening and even destruction of Russia ... And today these plans are being implemented - so far successfully.

If the same Alexander Zimin (1920–1980), a **narrow** specialist who truly period of Russian history, knows factography very well, of a certain had been informed in 1980 that

The West has and will soon be implementing a plan for the destruction of the USSR and the systemic conquest of the Russian land, then Zimin would probably also say that this is a

“fantastic project”. Alas, there have been, and there are in Rus', "outstanding" "historians" whose historical outlook is limited only by the subject of their special studies ... "Historians" who are not capable of a truly historical broad view of the history of Russia and the world.

The great Soviet writer Alexei Nikolaevich Tolstoy wrote the famous novel about Peter I, but it is less known that from the late 1930s Tolstoy worked on the dramatic novel Ivan the Terrible, which he completed in 1943. Tolstoy reasonably believed that Peter had its origins in Ivan, and stated that “... in the personality of Ivan the Terrible and the people around him, all the originality, the whole scope of the Russian character was reflected with particular brightness. Terrible is a man of great passions, a man of a huge, inquisitive, ironic mind, a practical mind and at the same time capable of an exorbitant flight of fancy ”...

Aleksey Nikolaevich treated the source base very thoroughly - his novel about Peter is, in many respects, a talented fictionalized presentation of the capital history of Peter, recreated according to documents by a prominent historian M.M. Bogoslovsky (1867–1929). In five volumes of the work “Peter I. Materials for a biography”, Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR Bogoslovsky, a student and successor of Klyuchevsky at the Department of Russian History of Moscow University, was so thorough that he managed to bring his scrupulous story only up to the time of the first

embassy of Ukraintsev to Turkey. While working on the drama about Grozny, Tolstoy also mastered all the documentary material relating to that time, including German sources ... Formally, not being a historian, the mature Tolstoy each time got used to the era he described in such a way that he reproduced it almost photographically accurately. Tolstoy began direct work on the theme of Grozny in October 1941, living near Gorky in Zimenki on the banks of the Volga. And it is significant how the writer expressed the essence of his idea for a drama about Ivan the Terrible: “It was my response to the humiliation to which the Germans

summoned from oblivion to life a great passionate soul - Ivan the Terrible, in order to arm his "furious conscience" ... ".

Terrible Alexei Tolstoy is great and attractive, but was such an artistic interpretation historically correct? A.L. Sokolskaya - compiler of comments to the 9th volume of the ten-volume collected works of A.N. Tolstoy in 1960, writes: "The playwright widely used those documents that confirmed the image of the patriot tsar that had developed in his mind and disregarded evidence of the senseless cruelty of the ruler, the painful suspiciousness of Grozny ...".

However, Tolstoy therefore left such "evidence" without attention, because he understood their falsifying nature. After all, if we trace the entire chain of "evidence" of Grozny's "senseless cruelty" and his "morbid suspiciousness", then we will run into the original source, if not Staden, then Possevino, not Possevino - then Taube with Krause, but at best - in Jerome Horsey, who intrepidly reported that Ivan allegedly boasted to him that he "deprived a thousand virgins of innocence" ...

Having the capabilities of Grozny, it was perhaps possible to deprive a thousand girls of innocence, but it is unlikely that an Orthodox and sincerely God-fearing tsar would boast of "fornication" that was unambiguous at that time in front of a stranger. Horsey clearly confused the royal

tower with the Sultan's harem. Referring to this "evidence", the modern German professor-historian Kaempfer also cites the "message" of Horsey that Ivan allegedly also boasted that he "deprived a thousand children of the opportunity to reproduce offspring." Then Kaempfer summarizes: "From Horsey's remark ... one can conclude that Ivan IV was probably bisexual," and then reflects: "It is difficult to determine whether Ivan IV suffered from paranoia, as some American scientists believe, or delusional states with inherent aggression ...". What!?

According to Kaempfer, the only question is whether the Russian tsar was paranoid, or simply suffered from a manic-depressive psychosis ... And this despite the fact that Kaempfer himself, referring to the anti-Ivanovo European "black PR", writes (my bold italics):

"These proclamations created the image of the Moscow tyrant in German public opinion, but they did not achieve their **true** goal - the political effect expressed in military assistance (Livonia. - S.K.)." However, homegrown slanderers petty

slander on Grozny... The already mentioned "historian" Daniil Al - the victim of "oprichno...", sorry, "Stalin's terror", successfully lived until the 21st century... Having reported in 2005 that Ivan loved to play chess, Al further writes that "the game of chess, or as it was then called in Russia - in grain, was considered a sinful occupation", but "Tsar Ivan freed himself from this ban."

The game of grain was indeed considered a sinful occupation and was forbidden, but because, as follows from the "Dictionary of the Old Russian Language" by I.I. Sreznevsky, "grain = grain" is "a game of dice or grains". Sreznevsky also cites examples - from Stoglav: "The hawks play with granules and drink away", and from the Statutory Vazhsky letter of 1552: "Either the boners will start stealing, playing with granules, or some other dashing thing will start repairing." Chess in Rus' from time immemorial was called chess, which is evidenced by

the same Sreznevsky. The game of chess for church officials at one time was really not welcomed, which is recorded, for example, in the "apostolic commandments" of the Paisiev collection, but this document dates back to the turn of the XIV-XV centuries, that is, to the time almost two centuries before the era of Ivan IV. In the time of Ivan IV, chess was loved not only by the tsar, but also by the boyars, and in general by many.

Other "liberal" "historians" did not go far from Daniil Al ... They habitually label the image of Grozny as a "tyrant", although they should know that the West wanted to see the Russian Tsar as such for their political purposes, and that the Viennese diplomat Herberstein defined as the "tyrant" of Ivan's father, Vasily III Ivanovich, whom the West also had nothing to love for ...

Tsar Ivan's alleged predilection for sorcerers, fortune-tellers, astrologers, etc., is already described, but Karamzin, summing up the results of the reign of Ivan the Terrible, noted, for example, that the "church legislation introduced under Ivan belongs to the tsar more than to the clergy: he thought and advised; it just followed it

instructions." "The syllable," wrote Karamzin, "is worthy of astonishment with its purity and clarity.

Karamzin cites the chapters of the church statutes of the Council of 1551, and the 12th chapter reads: "The clergy are obliged to eradicate pagan and all sorts of vile customs. For example, when the plaintiff and the defendant are preparing for a battle in court, then the sorcerers appear, look at the stars, tell fortunes through some *Aristotelian gates* and in *Rafli* ... The gullible keep books ... astrologers, zodiacs, almanacs, full of heretical wisdom ...".

After all, these are estimates and the king! And if Ivan was not superstitious in his youth, then the circumstances of a difficult life that pushed him into the abyss of human cynicism hardly pushed him to what he himself condemned ...

Strange as it may seem, a strong impetus for a positive reassessment of Grozny was given not by a professional historian, but by the now middle-aged writer from Gorky, Valentin Kostylev (1884-1950). Having started writing at the beginning of the 20th century, he then fell silent for a long time, and from the 1930s he became interested in the theme of Russian history. On March 19, 1941, Kostylev published Literary Notes about Grozny in the Izvestia newspaper, where he criticized historians who "did not hesitate to "hang dogs" on Ivan IV," and noted that "you don't have to be a very big connoisseur of history" to doubt that Ivan could be "half-crazy, a beast, a petty tyrant", if the state under him "has grown and strengthened so much that subsequently neither the "distemper", nor the Polish intervention, nor the impostors could shake and belittle his power. Kostylev was somewhat carried away, but at the core of his thought was not only simple and logical, but also historical.

Neither Kostylev nor Aleksey Tolstoy, who had become interested in the figure of Grozny before the war, were prompted to do so by Stalin's "social order" - just both writers, independently of each other and without any influence from Stalin, caught the correspondence of the essence of Grozny to grandiose sovereign tasks. At the same time, the allegations that Ivan the Terrible allegedly turned out to be Stalin's favorite historical figure are completely unfounded ... Stalin had the only favorite historical figure - Lenin, and Stalin emphasized this over and over again and year after year. Stalin just looked at

Grozny objectively, and an objective look at him reveals the constructive essence of Grozny.

The liberal literary critic Dmitry Likhachev (1906–1999), also a “victim of the Stalinist oprichnina”, argued in 1986 that “there could be no other views next to Grozny”, that “during his reign, no one dared to express other opinions ...”.

This statement does not stand up to any criticism already from the standpoint of logic - where everyone is silent and everyone agrees, there to repress being refined. But Likhachev, is no one and there is no need an "intellectual", far from the practice of management, was not right in essence either - in a powerful state **that stretches over vast distances, there** simply cannot be "silence".

If the state apparatus and various social strata, including commercial, industrial and agrarian, do not have the right to business initiative, then such a state will inevitably and quickly degrade. And Rus' of the times of Ivan the Terrible was constantly developing and expanding, conducting both large-scale military operations on vast territories - defensive and liberation, and impressive economic activity. For example, in the Russia of Ivan the Terrible, dozens of new cities and frontier fortresses arose ... Did he personally lay and equip every city and every fortress?

In the system of state and military positions that was formed in the Russia of Ivan the Terrible, an important place was occupied by the position of the “head” - on the career ladder they stood below the governor and obeyed, some - to the governors, some - according to their affiliation, to one order or another: Pushkarsky, Streletsky or Discharge . As a rule, nobles were appointed to the positions of "heads", although there were exceptions.

Streletsky head commanded 500 archers; Pushkar's head - city artillery; the siege head was in charge of preparing the city for a possible siege; serif head - protection and maintenance of serif features; the stanitsa or guard head commanded the border detachments on the southern border, the Cossack - the city Cossacks ...

There were "heads" - administrators: the salt head supervised the state-owned salt mining; granary heads led the sovereign's granaries; the bypassing head performed police functions; written -

clerical ... However, in those dynamic and stormy times, the clerk could quickly turn into a pioneer. Thus, the Siberian "capital" of the 16th century, Tobolsk, was founded in 1587 by the writing head Danil Chulkov ... Customs and tavern "heads" were elected for a year from among the "good",

that is, the prosperous, the people of the posad world.

Would this system be able to function if it was based not on the reality of life, the initiative and common sense of the performers, but on the stern royal gaze, which could not reach even Suzdal from Alexandrova Sloboda even through the best telescope? Indeed, only figures such as Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Likhachev can not understand this.

The irony of academician-historian S.B. Veselovsky (1876–1952), who in the 40s of the 20th century quipped about the "rehabilitation of the personality and state activity of Ivan IV", that, they say, it turns out that "historians of the most diverse trends ... for 200 years only did what they were mistaken and distorted the past of their homeland"... Veselovsky was indignant at the fact that historians "have been taken to guide the path of truth... writers...".

But, firstly, far from all historians, starting with Lomonosov, assessed Grozny's personality and state activity exclusively negatively - both before and after 1917.

Secondly, Veselovsky himself, in an article written in 1944-45, but which was published only in the "slushy" "Khrushchev" 1963, admitted that attempts to apologia for Grozny had been repeatedly made in historical science before - which completely corresponded to reality.

Third, smart writers are sometimes able to think more logically and historically than formalist historians. Fourthly, yes - many historians were mistaken, and distorted, and distorted until now ...

But now they are less likely to be mistaken, distorting the past of their homeland quite deliberately.

Why do the West and Russian liberals still hate Grozny so much and slander him? Yes, it is clear why - he, like Peter, and Lenin, and Stalin, cannot be forgiven by a strong Russia that does not agree with

imposed on it by the political hegemony of the West. Grozny accepted Rus' torn apart by princely turmoil and left it - after all his repressions - on the eve of new turmoil. But he left it three times larger than he received. Yes, and

the base for the future laid not rotten!

The Time of Troubles was not the result of the reign of Grozny and his repressions, but rather the result of the fact that Grozny, as the largest noble feudal lord, was not consistent to the end and did not destroy a dozen of the most ancient boyar feudal families, as they say, "under the root".

Terrible got a hard time ... As "witnesses" like Herberstein describe the suspicion and distrust of foreigners, not only the Russian Tsar - who actually put the Englishman Chancellor who arrived with goodness at his table, but also the suspicion of Russian people in general. But the era of Ivan the Terrible is the era of almost continuous external wars, and wars with the very world from where all these Herbersteins came to Rus'. Since they should have been treated - especially after they, having returned home, spread all sorts of vile things about Rus' and the Russian Tsar? In essence, the era of Ivan is not the

execution of a handful, but the struggle of the people for the future of Russia, the struggle for some is conscious, for some it is instinctive ... But all efforts - both conscious and outwardly simply everyday, merged into one powerful historical trend, where anti Ivanovo conspiracies and opposition were seen as islands in the middle of a powerful river. These "islands" were not able to stop the "river" of history, but only accelerated the flow, while complicating it with whirlpools.

From monograph to monograph, the same series of dozens of names of princes, boyars and nobles executed in the era of Ivan the Terrible wanders ... But then in Russia there lived, served Russia and the Russian Tsar, hundreds of only those who made up a wide circle of Ivan directly and were not repressed, but actively worked ... The noble

family of the Karpovs - a branch of the princes of Fomino-Berezuisky, who had lost their princely title even before Ivan, gave Russia boyars, governors, solicitors, gunsmiths, roundabouts ... Faithfully served t

Ivan Dmitrovsky butler of the governor Dolmat Karpov and his sons governors Ivan and Mikhail Dolmatovich, roundabout and governor Ivan Fedorovich Karpov-Minshoy - like Dolmat, the son of the most educated Fyodor Ivanovich Karpov, a prominent diplomat of Vasily III ...

The family of the princes Tatev, a branch of the specific princes of Starodub, ceased already after Ivan IV - in the 17th century. But before that, the Tatevs served Russia well, including under Ivan IV. Brothers Andrey and Peter Ivanovich Tatev, Boris Petrovich Tatev, governor of Putivl Fyodor Tatev - the younger brother of Andrey and Peter Tatev, they were all commanders and administrators of Ivan the Terrible, repelled the Crimean raids, fought in Livonia, did not run across to anyone, did not participate in conspiracies, and did not get into either the Synodik of the disgraced, or the monographic lists of famous Russian names ...

Tsar Ivan ordered a list of the 1,000 best surnames of the state, and after the division of Russia into "Zemshchina" and "Oprichnina", many of this **thousand** were disgraced and executed. But even out of this thousand, not everyone fell into disgrace - if there was nothing to execute for.

At the same time, under the hand of the nobles Tatev, Karpov, Trubetskoy, who were at the hand of Ivan, **ten million** Rus lived and worked. And she lived by no means a plant life - life itself forced her to be active. And many millions of Russian people in the era of Grozny turned out to be by no means historical extras, but with the creators of history. Against the

background of these active millions of self-serving repression "Thousands" didn't look like a national tragedy, and it wasn't.

In real time, it might seem that almost twenty years of Russian efforts in the Livonian War were wasted - the country's situation in the west and north even worsened somewhat. But in the future, this first "European" pancake for Russia turned out not only lumpy, starting with the fact that the theater of military operations was mastered, in which Russia still had to successfully operate in the future. And the direction of Rus's movement for the coming decades was

determined ... In the West and North, we had to win back our ancestral lands with a powerfully armed hand, in the South we had to

to contain the Crimea, and it was possible to advance to the East using not so much military as civilizational and economic levers.

The end of the 70s of the 16th century is marked for Russia by the development of Western Siberia, associated with the names of Ivan the Terrible, the merchants Stroganovs and the Cossack ataman

Ermak Timofeevich. In 1579, the Stroganovs received an order from the tsar to create outposts put forward in the Siberian Khanate of Khan Kuchum. Kuchum's raids annoyed the Stroganovs, but they could no longer be tolerated also from general state considerations. On September 1,

1581, about a thousand of Yermak's Cossacks and Stroganov's "hunters" set out on boats along the Chusovaya River to the Siberian Route ... Yermak's campaigns in the 80s doubled the territory of Russia, although at first it was more of an increment of land on the map - the resistance of Kuchum and the Siberian tribes came to naught immediately. Yermak himself died in one of the skirmishes, while Yermak's associates also died in Siberia: Ivan Koltso - at the hands of the local king of Karachi, Matvey Meshcheryak - in the battle during the capture of another king, Seyid khan.

However, Russian Siberia was a matter of timing - statehood existed on soon the Russians were moving deep into vast, stable territories, and Siberia without significant hostilities. In the mid-80s of the 16th century, voivode Ivan Mansurov set up the Ob city at the confluence of the Irtysh with the Ob, and in 1587, shortly after the death of Ivan the Terrible, a detachment of Cossacks, headed by the written head of the boyar son Danil Chulkov, founded Tobolsk, which quickly turned into the main military the administrative center of Russian Siberia.

Trade routes went through Tobolsk to Bukhara and China.

It was precisely the movement of the nation ... The West sent predatory adventurers to overseas possessions, then missionaries, and then administrators, colonists. And the Russian Ivan, the son of Ivan and Marya, went to the new lands of Western, Central, Eastern Siberia immediately as an exponent of the general Russian will - due to the breadth of character. And

even if he was going, it seems, for yasak and "soft junk", then - in the end - he followed the fate of the Russian land ... American colonists and US government troops later simply cleared the territories America needed from Indians, destroying the Indians themselves

tribes and their culture. The Russians, on the other hand, gradually *seeped* into Siberia, filling it, and at the same time not denying the right to their ancestral lands to the scattered Siberian peoples.

A good person, in general, the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen, looked at the history of the issue as follows: "The conquest of Siberia began purely by chance - due to the fact that the robber ataman Yermak, who was outlawed under Ivan the Terrible and fled to the Urals, took it into his head (?! - S.K.) to conquer the Russian Tsar the kingdom and thereby bought himself a pardon - this continued more or less by chance, with the help of various adventurers ...".

The "adventurers" were given to the Europeans ... Europe completely refuses the Russian masses in the state view of the problem. But if the Russian "leaders" did not look at their actions, including as "sovereign", they would not have achieved anything in Siberia, they would not have done anything. Nansen's view is quite typical - if we

keep in mind both his superficiality and his lack of understanding of the essence of a truly Russian character. And so Nansen did not understand that it was not by chance, by no means by chance that the "conquest", but in fact - the development, of Siberia by the Russian people began. We naturally mastered

it and... And in a natural and unconstrained way we entered the Eastern Ocean. And after that, the movement to Russian America became a national affair. It was not interrupted even in such an anti-national reign as the reign of Anna Ioannovna, in the time of Bironism.

However, at the end of the 16th century, it was far from both the time of Anna Ioannovna and the shores of the Pacific Ocean. In Rus', a dual process took place. On the one hand, as a phenomenon, as a fact of state **and economic** life, free Cossacks arose and with the encouragement of Ivan IV, the Don, Ural, Siberian Cossacks developed ... On the other hand, already under Ivan IV, the attachment of peasants to the land, that is, to a specific feudal lord, began.

In the 16th century, the peasants were divided into three large groups. *Chernososhnye* lived on state lands - later they were called state peasants, and carried state duties. The *Chernososhnye* were less dependent than *the monastic* peasants, and especially *the privately owned*,

living in the private estates of the feudal lords. Previously, a peasant, after the end of the cycle of agricultural work - in terms of St. George's Day - could bring business calculations with a boyar or nobleman and move on to another. Now, 1581 was declared the first "reserved" year - with the prohibition of the transition of peasants as a temporary measure. But only after Ivan the Terrible - already under his son, will the

the final enslavement of the peasants.

Ivan IV Vasilyevich the Terrible died on March 18, 1584. And this, in fact, is the only authentically known detail of that historic day. Jerome Bowes, an envoy of the English Queen Elizabeth I, was then at the Russian court ... Bowes's information can not always be trusted, but his message that Ivan either died or lost consciousness during a chess game with his close associate Bogdan Belsky, after how they both went to the bath. Even if things were different that day, the fact is that Tsar Ivan loved chess, and how many of the European monarchs played this game? A lot has already been said about the era of Ivan, but, completing the story about this era, you can add something ... Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov - himself a sovereign mind, in his "Brief Russian Chronicler" concisely, but very fully and accurately described the reign of Ivan the Terrible in a tone quite loyal to Ivan.

Lomonosov also wrote the following: "This peppy, witty and brave sovereign was of an extremely cool temper... This sovereign executed the restless

Novgorodians with a fierce punishment... Tsar Ivan Vasilyevich the Terrible was named for such severity"... Lomonosov called Grozny the "witty" tsar rightly - from those texts belong to the tsar himself, one can see the sharp mind of a brilliant polemist who knows how to prove his case by purely logical constructions. Moreover, Ivan was not just a polemicist and theorist of statehood - he was a practitioner of state building, and he built the state as an outstanding manager.

So, Karamzin, who worked a lot with chronicles, reports that at the end of each year, Ivan "usually rode out of town on horseback to see the action of a firearm ... Among the vast, snowy

plains, on a high platform, 200 fathoms long or more, there were cannons and soldiers, shooting at a target, breaking fortifications, wooden, sprinkled with earth, and ice ... ".

A refined humanist, Karamzin cited this example as evidence of the tsar's penchant for pomp and amusements, not realizing that this was an annual review of the combat skills of Russian artillerymen ... Compared with Ivan, they look no better than medieval Papuans, greedy for trinkets. A lot of problems fell on the king every day, and they were solved. In itself, the fact that from year to year the problems of neutralizing the Crimea and Turkey, waging

the Livonian War and conducting diplomatic negotiations, recruiting and training troops, production and purchase of weapons, tax collection, urban and fortress construction, food production and supply of cities, maintaining internal and foreign trade **were resolved**, which means that Ivan IV's Russia was a completely viable, fundamentally strong state. This could not but be the outstanding merit of the king personally. At the same time, it was also his merit that, despite repeated betrayals and conspiracies, he was able to select and nominate competent subordinate cadres. It has long been said that "the

environment plays the king", but the environment plays the weak sovereign, and the strong sovereign creates such an environment that plays the state roles necessary for the sovereign. From the very beginning, Ivan was like that and was a strong sovereign with a strong and active "team". Ivan's refusal from some point to cooperate with Sylvester, Adashev, etc. was caused not by whims, but by the fact that these "neighbors", like a number of others, wished not to play at the hand of

the king, but to play as the king. Ivan, as can be assumed, was a simple-minded person, but since he discovered someone else's impure plans, he no longer gave faith to the disgraced. However, sometimes he believed them again, sometimes at the same time fatally mistaken.

Really reigning in 1547, young Ivan immediately proved capable not only of a meaningful policy, but of a promising one.

politics. His behavior was such that the boyars were already afraid of the young Ivan, for he immediately discovered his strong temper. Nevertheless, Ivan was capable of real collective work to lead the state, to expand it, to develop it all-round and strengthen it. This is the mark of a competent manager.

Many subsequent problems of Rus' in his era arose precisely as a result of his activity and sovereign competence. Moreover, his actions were systematically accurate. For example, if he had not annexed Kazan and Astrakhan, but maintained the status quo, he still would not have ensured the peace of Rus'. On the contrary, both khanates, in alliance with the Crimea and with the support of the Ottoman Empire, would simply block the possibility of peaceful development of Russia within its 1547 borders. By annexing the eastern khanates, Ivan not only expanded the territory, but also eliminated the strategic threat both to his personal reign and, more importantly, to future Russia in general. Eliminated it forever! Ivan could not

help but start - for the

previously indicated reasons - the Livonian War. And he led it on the whole quite competently, and it was not his fault that in that war very powerful external forces rallied against him, which, moreover, received the support of the traitorous part of the Russian elite. Grozny's domestic reforms were also

impressive and progressive, including its support for the commercial and industrial strata. And

not without reason, after all, Lomonosov noted in his "Brief Chronicler": "His (Ivan IV. - S.K.) command began printing in Moscow book "...

With a tough sovereign hand (and by no means as tyrannically and bloody as liberals of all times and all peoples have served it) Ivan the Terrible so effectively and firmly strengthened the regime of centralization and territorial consolidation in the Russian state that even the subsequent Time of Troubles could not break it with his "Seven Boyars", which called the Polish prince Vladislav to the Russian throne and let the Polish army into Moscow ...

In the late period of Ivan's reign, there is an episode, often overlooked - in January 1580, he convened, as reported

Karamzin, "the most famous clergy to the capital: Archbishop Alexander of Novgorod, Jeremiah of Kazan, David of Rostov, all bishops, archimandrites, abbots, monks most glorious in mind or piety" to the next Church Council. Having vividly described the military dangers that approached Russia from all sides, Ivan demanded sacrifices from the clergy in order to replenish the treasury and state revenues.

Even before the general Council, Ivan called to himself separately forty hierarchs and attacked them with a statement that "the nobility and the people cry out" to him with complaints that the church appropriated all the wealth of the country, did not pay duties and military expenses, seized a third of the cities, towns and villages, that the clergy lead the "most idle" life, drown "in pleasures and pleasures", etc. The Orthodox

Church honors exactly forty Sevastian martyrs for the faith, and the tsar limits the number of called hierarchs by this "sign" figure turned out to be a hint, very effective due to its transparency. As a result, the hierarchs – already at the Council – trembled, but, nevertheless, not completely. The martyrdom in the life of the Russian church during the Batu invasion remained in the distant past, and greed overcame fear of the tsar. The decision was half-hearted: the church transferred to the ownership of the state the lands previously granted to it by the princes, as well as those pledged ... Nevertheless, Ivan ensured a solid increase in state revenues at the expense of church wealth, which was extremely timely due to the huge military spending. However, it is not difficult to guess that the attitude of church hierarchs towards Grozny - and before that, to put it mildly, ambiguous - did not become better after the 1580 Council.

Both in the world and in the domestic liberal historiography, Grozny was slandered more than once precisely because his figure is in fact majestic.

Karamzin was not an adherent of Ivan, however, summing up the results of the reign of Ivan the Terrible in their real part, he gave impressive examples of the results of this reign ... He wrote that "the construction of many new cities for the security of our borders belongs to the meritorious deeds of this reign.

In addition to Laishev, Cheboksary, Kozmodemyansk, Bolkhov, Orel and other fortresses ... John founded Donkov, Epifan, Venev, Chern, Kokshazhsk, Tetyushi, Alatyr, Arzamas ...

". To be precise, Arzamas was not founded by Grozny. Arzamas in the era of Ivan only received a new, but decisive for its future, development, like many other cities. Karamzin also emphasizes that the "multiplication of cities" stimulated the development of trade and multiplied the revenues of the treasury. The trade duties introduced by Ivan were, in some respects, equivalent to a monopoly of foreign trade, as Stalin had said. At the same time, a duty was imposed on imported precious metals, and their export was, as before, prohibited! Karamzin

Painted an impressive picture of Russia's trade with the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, France, Denmark, Sweden, Central Asia and the East ... He wrote about the power of the troops, about Ivan's huge artillery arsenal, about the wealth of the treasury. According to Karamzin, the revenues of the treasury in 1588 "stretched up to six million current silver rubles" - a huge amount!

However, the same Karamzin, an apologist for autocracy, did not understand Ivan. Karamzin called him both a "tyrant" and a "torturer king", wrote that "if the yoke of Batyev humiliates the spirit of Russia, then, without a doubt, the reign of John did not exalt it", and argued that "some foreign historians wrote in vain about conspiracies, ... these conspiracies existed only in the vague mind of the

Tsar ... ". It is strange that the orthodox monarchist Karamzin did not so devoutly believe in the possibility of a conspiracy against the tsar after Emperor Paul - about which in his place - fell victim to a palace conspiracy. But, one way or another, tsarist Russia seemed to be ashamed of the era of Grozny - as supposedly exclusively bloody and tyrannical. The influence of the old cliché was so great that autocratic tsarist Russia never ventured to erect a monument to Ivan the Terrible, the first Russian autocrat. He did not find a place among the founders of the Russian state and on the monument "1000th Anniversary of Russia", installed in Novgorod, although members of the "chosen council" Adashev and

Sylvester are depicted there. Unbelievable but true!

Although, if you think about it, Tsar Ivan smashed the self-serving princely-boyar elite in a way that Ivan Bolotnikov, Stepan Razin and Emelyan Pugachev together did not dream of. Why, one might ask, was Tsar Ivan honored in princely Russia at the end of the 19th century - in its anti-state essence, the successor of boyar Rus' at the end of the 16th century?

But from a single and indivisible Russia, Ivan IV Vasilyevich the Terrible deserved a monument to himself a hundredfold: it was he who was able to defend that statehood, the foundations of which were not laid by him, but which could - if not

for him - collapse. An eternal reminder of such an opportunity for Rus' should be the Polish "gentry republic" that collapsed under the weight of elitist arbitrariness.

In 2011, a thorough monograph by S.N. Bukharin and N.M. Rakityansky "Russia and Poland. An Experience in the Political and Psychological Study of the Phenomenon of Limitrophication" with the ironic subtitle "A Handbook for the Ruling Elites of Limitrophic States". Let me remind you that in the interwar period, Poland, Finland and the "countries" of the "Baltic" were called limitrophes, which played the role of the "cordon sanitaire" of the West against Soviet Russia. This monograph is an excellent

tool for studying and comprehending Polish-Russian relations, but below is only one integral conclusion of this work, directly related to the above: "In the XVI-XVII centuries. in the Commonwealth, the processes of self-destruction continue to gain momentum. Centralized power in the person of kings is degrading, the gentry is fiercely defending their "golden freedoms". And the first is a consequence of the second. That is certainly the case with respect to Poland. And exactly and certainly so - but

with even more catastrophic consequences - it

would have been with Russia, if not for the personal activities of Ivan the Terrible.

Karamzin, contradicting himself, concluded his story about Ivan with the words: "... the good glory of Ioannov survived his bad glory *in the people's memory*: ... the name of Ioannov shone on the Sudebnik and resembled the acquisition of the three Mughal kingdoms ..., the people honored in it

famous culprit of our state power, our civic education.... History is more vindictive than the people! But it would be

more accurate to say that the Russian people turned out to be smarter and more memory than Russian liberal historians.

The Prussian official Baron August Haxthausen (1792-1866) made a trip to Russia in 1843, studying land relations ... From that time, the era of Ivan the Terrible was separated by two and a half centuries, but the German, who was familiar with the figure of Ivan from the old "works" of his compatriots, was surprised : "Yes, he was a man of a somewhat strange and unpleasant disposition. But it is surprising that in the memoirs of the Russian people, according to the surviving legends, Grozny was a pious, good-natured man, easily deceived, and not at all persistent (that is, not stubborn. - S.K.) ... " .

Such a popular assessment is indeed surprisingly accurate - after all, the people learned about the life and deeds of Ivan not from the notes of Schlichting and the works of Tatishchev, but from oral traditions passed down from generation to generation.

Popular ideas about Grozny were refracted in a peculiar and psychologically authentic way in Lermontov's "Song about Tsar Ivan Vasilievich, a young guardsman and a daring merchant Kalashnikov", where the tsar acts as a person not only formidable, but also noble and fair. Let me remind you of the plot of "Songs ..." At the oprichnina feast, Ivan is angry with

Malyuta Skuratov's relative, Kiribeevich's favorite oprichnik, because he abhors "royal joy" and does not drink when "everyone drank, they praised the king" ... Kiribeevich explains that he is hopelessly in love, and then Ivan gives him his "yakhont ring" and "pearl necklace", offering to woo the chosen one and concludes: "If you fall in love - celebrate the wedding, if you don't fall in love - don't get angry" ... However, Kiribeevich concealed from the king, "did not tell the true truth", that "the beauty is remarried, ... remarried with a young merchant" - a handsome young man Stepan Paramonovich "nicknamed Kalashnikov" ...

Further in the "Song ..." there is a story of the merchant's wife "Alena Dmitrievna" to her husband about how Kiribeevich tried to captivate her in the street in the evening, how they saw it "in the neighbor's gate", how she escaped

from the guardsman, leaving in his hands a husband's gift - "patterned handkerchief"...

And the merchant Kalashnikov, when during the holiday in the presence of the king a single fist fight is arranged, calls Kiribeevich and kills him with a blow "right on the left temple from the whole shoulder" ...

Ivan demands an answer from Kalashnikov: "Whether of free will or reluctantly," did he kill his "faithful servant," "Kiribeyevich's best fighter"? Kalashnikov replies that he killed the oprichnik on purpose, but, respecting his wife's honor, does not name the reason and declares to the tsar:

"And for what about what - I won't tell you,
I'll only tell God alone. Order me to
be executed - and on the chopping block to carry Me
a guilty head; Do not leave only
little children, Do not leave a young widow
Yes, two of my brothers with your
grace ... ".

And Ivan replies:

"It's good for you, kid, Daring
fighter, son of a merchant, That you
kept the answer in good conscience. I will
spare your young wife and your
orphans From my treasury, I will
order your brothers from this very day
Throughout the wide Russian kingdom To trade
without datum, duty-free ... ".

Kalashnikov himself is publicly executed... Lermontov
shows the clash of two strong characters, each of which has its own truth, and each is
noble in its own way "Lermontov is not a historical monograph, but the human and
historical essence of Tsar Ivan, the poet Lermontov - as

great connoisseur of human souls, caught more accurately than the authors of many

academic works. On a real scale of historical time - at the beginning of the 17th century, Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Katyrev-Rostovsky (? - died in 1641) left an interesting assessment of Ivan ... The only son of the "Ivanovo" boyar and governor, Prince Mikhail Petrovich Katyrev-Rostovsky (? - mind . in 1606), he was also the great-nephew of another "Ivanovo" boyar and governor, Prince Andrei Ivanovich Katyrev-Rostovsky, who was executed by Grozny in 1567 on suspicion of conspiracy.

Ivan Katyrev-Rostovsky, if he caught the era of Ivan IV, then - a boy, but he, of course, had heard a lot about her and the tsar from his father. Senior Katyrev-Rostov Tsar, I must say, disliked for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the younger Katyrev of Rostov appreciated his royal namesake already behind the coffin:

"A man of wonderful reasoning, in the science of book veneration, is pleased and eloquent. Zealous to the militia and daring for his fatherland, to the slaves, from God, given to him, hard-hearted, to shed blood is impudent and implacable, he destroyed many people from small to large in his kingdom, captured many of his cities ... But the same Tsar Ivan He did a lot of good things, loved his army very much and generously gave it from his treasury for its needs ... Such was

Tsar Ivan. This assessment is attributed, however, to Prince Semyon Shakhovsky (Shakhovskaya-Kharya) (? - d. 1654 or 1655). But Shakhovskoy was a writer, he did not find the era of Grozny and clearly used earlier memories - most likely, the same Katyrev of Rostovsky.

Regarding the "shedding of blood", enough has already been said above, but regarding the "capture" of "many" cities, the princes clearly exaggerated, since there were a good hundred cities in Rus' at that time, and the oprichny repressions affected only a few of them, and - through the fault of

the willful "tops" . In general, from the assessment of the younger Katyrev-Rostovsky, in which his father's assessment is indirectly felt, one can see not a tyrant, but a great statesman, whose huge historical scale

more or less objective of his contemporaries could not deny and hush up even in the absence of love for him.

And could a tyrant care so much about the power, expansion and development of the state? Tyrants are usually concerned only with themselves and the satisfaction of their lusts. Strong, with great prospects, states from tyrants do not remain.

Chapter 7. XVII century. Through the Russian Troubles to the stability of Alexei the Quietest

Ivan IV Vasilievich died, and he was succeeded by his son from his first and beloved wife Anastasia (Nastasia) Romanovna - Fedor Ivanovich. In the characterization of Fedor, the word "feeble-minded" is often present, but it is unlikely that the second Russian tsar was so impassibly stupid and frankly degenerate. Giles Fletcher, the English ambassador to Fedor from 1588 to 1589, argued that Fedor, by his physical constitution, could not have children. However, in 1592 the tsar had a daughter, Theodosia, who died, however, at the age of two. Fedor himself died at the age of 41, but at that time not everyone lived to old age.

There is no doubt, however, that the son of Grozny did not really differ in his strong character and special abilities - otherwise he would have acted differently as a king. Nevertheless, Fedor reigned for fourteen years - from 1584 to 1598, and it was not the worst time in Rus'.

Fedor, by the way, for the first time officially took the title of not only "king", but also "autocrat of all Rus'." Academician M.M. Bogoslovsky, a historian of the Petrine era, reports that a major Russian diplomat of Peter, the Duma clerk Yemelyan Ukraintsev, in his disputes about the name and titles of Peter at the negotiations in Constantinople, "resorted to the arguments that were put forward by Moscow diplomacy of the times of

Ivan the Terrible." Bogoslovsky noticed that by that time it was not worth paying attention to such trifles, and that the new Petrine diplomats, like Peter himself, did just that. But at a time when Ivan IV Vasilievich had just descended into the coffin, the strengthening of the title of the Moscow Tsar to "autocrat" was, of course, a "significant" step. Moreover, Grozny himself and his diplomats had to be attentive to such "trifles". So, in 1556, the ambassadors of Sigismund II Augustus once again refused to recognize the royal title of Ivan the Terrible and write him "king". In response, the ambassadors were shown letters of

Maximilian I, the Spanish King Philip II, the kings of Denmark and Sweden with the corresponding title.

And so, a new tsar took over the Russian throne.

One of the anti-historical cliches is the assertion that Ivan the Terrible left the country in desolation and ruin, which led Rus' to the Time of Troubles. But this is nothing more than another anti-Ivanovo myth. Fyodor Ivanovich inherited from his father a full treasury, and by no means an exhausted state - this will become clear from a further story. The Russian turmoil at the beginning of the 17th century turned out not to be the aftereffect of the era of Ivan, but the result of the irresponsibility and self-interest of the boyars.

The beginning of Fedor's reign turned out to be, however, turbulent, and the reason for this was the Duma nobleman of Ivan IV, his close associate Bogdan Yakovlevich Belsky, the nephew of Grigory Lukyanovich Skuratov-Belsky (Malyuta Skuratov), who died in Livonia. It was during a game of chess with Bogdan Belsky that Tsar Ivan lost consciousness.

Bogdan Belsky, close to the young Tsarevich Dmitry, the son of the Terrible from Maria Nagoya, was subordinate to the palace guards, and he set out to become something of a regent, either under Fedor, or under Dmitry. Belsky's opponents immediately raised an uprising - Lomonosov in his "Brief Russian Chronicle" described the then situation in two phrases: "Fyodor Ivanovich had just ascended the throne, the people of Moscow were agitated and proceeded to the Kremlin, demanding Bogdan Belsky, allegedly he wanted to exterminate the sovereign. The rebellion was pacified by Belsky's exile.

Belsky was sent as governor to Nizhny Novgorod, while the palace quarrels only flared up. The tsar did not claim real power, and the zemsky boyar Nikita Romanovich Yuryev-Zakharyin and the дума clerk Andrei Yakovlevich Shchelkalov came to the fore.

Prince Ivan Fyodorovich Mstislavsky, a childhood friend of Ivan IV, had a formal championship among dignitaries. During the Livonian War, Mstislavsky was at one time under Grozny's strong suspicion, the tsar even accused him publicly of the fact that "the old dog is still fully saturated with the Lithuanian spirit." Nevertheless, in 1584 Ivan appointed the prince as senior boyar in the Duma, and he was to head the Regency Council after the death of the tsar.

But Mstislavsky was immediately pushed aside. The English ambassador Bowes, in a report dated August 12, 1584, reported: "... I announce that when I left Moscow, Nikita Romanov and Andrei Shchelkalov considered themselves kings and therefore were called even the smartest and most important advisers. The son of the late tsar, Theodore, and those advisers who would be worthy to rule and govern, have no power, and do not dare

trying to dominate...

Under the latter - worthy to rule, but not having power, Bowes also meant Boris Godunov - Fyodor's brother-in-law. Godunov, who appeared at the court of Ivan from a young age, at the age of 18 married the daughter of Malyuta Skuratov Maria, and Tsarevich Fyodor was married to Godunov's sister Irina.

Godunov favored the British, while Shchelkalov was cool towards them, leaning towards the support of the Dutch, the rivals of the British on the Russian market. That is why Bowes refused the deacon's ability to manage, but Shchelkalov was, without a doubt, an outstanding personality, although not without an adventurous streak.

The uncle of Fyodor Ioannovich, the boyar Nikita Romanovich Yuryev Zakharyin, the brother of the long-dead Nastasya Romanovna, was a personal stabilization factor, both by virtue of his position at court and by virtue of state abilities.

But he died a year

later. By 1585 (and no later than 1587) the actual power in Moscow had passed to Boris Godunov, or rather, to the party headed by Godunov. He received the title of "ruler", "yard governor" and "viceroy of the kingdoms of Kazan and Astrakhan" ...

In the first years after the death of Grozny, the situation was not simple, but by no means a dead end or a crisis. To begin with, as already mentioned, four years after Ivan's death, the treasury's revenues were stable and impressive, and there were good reasons for this. To understand this, let us evaluate the then position of the Russian state...

Six main trade routes began from Moscow - Belomorsky (Vologda), Novgorod, Volga, Siberian, Smolensky and Stepnoy ...

The White Sea route went through Vologda to the White Sea and ended in Europe. Previously, northern trade went through Kholmogory (Kolmogory), but literally on the eve of his death - on March 4, 1584, Ivan approved a plan to build a new port at the mouth of the Northern Dvina, which at first was called New Kholmogory, the New Port, and soon became known as Arkhangelsk. The need for a new port was due to the loss of Narva.

Russian merchants who traded on the northern route, including those from Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Veliky Ustyug, Totma, Yarensk, Ust Sysola (now Syktyvkar), Solvychegodsk, firmly settled in England, had several buildings in London for their needs, importing furs into Europe, flax, hemp, lard, yuft, blubber, resin, tar, and taking out fabrics, sugar, paper, luxury goods from there.

The Novgorod (Baltic) water-carriage route led from Moscow through Tver, Torzhok, Vyshny Volochek, Valdai, Pskov to the Baltic and to Germany. The Volga route

along the Moscow, Oka and Volga rivers through Astrakhan and the Caspian Sea led to Persia, Khiva and Bukhara. The main Russian business center on this path was Nizhny Novgorod with the Makariev Fair, but Kazan, Samara, Saratov, Cheboksary (now Cheboksary) had their own significance ... The Siberian path at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries

was only emerging, but developed rapidly, including through the efforts of the Stroganovs.

The Smolensk (Lithuanian) route was then, for obvious reasons, poorly developed, moreover, Polish and Polish-Jewish merchants enjoyed an unimportant reputation in Moscow. However, trade also went along this path, linking Rus' with the lands of the former Kievan Rus.

The Southern Steppe (Little Russian, Crimean) route ran through Ryazan, Voronezh to the Don and to the Crimea, and Putivl, Yelets, Belgorod gravitated towards this route ... These

are only the main internal and external trade routes tied to Moscow, but there were internal Russian economic ties, of course, much more ramified.

In a normal economy, they trade when they produce something, and Russia had something to trade. And although its exports were mainly of a raw material nature, there were also products of processing of raw materials.

Bread was also exported.

The state infrastructure was developed. In 1586-89, Voronezh, Samara, Tyumen, Saratov, Ufa, Tobolsk were founded, and in general, the construction of new outposts, prisons, churchyards began both on the southern borders and in the newly developed East ...

The Moscow "leaders" in Siberia had to deal with hostility and even uprisings of local tribes, but it was already clear that Russia would move further and further to the East without any problems, one way or another including the natives in its civilizational orbit.

In 1589, a new "Sudebnik" of Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich was adopted, and in the same year a separate patriarchate was established in the Russian state - Job was elected the first patriarch.

In 1590, Godunov resumed the war with Sweden, and it was a success for Russian weapons. In 1595, Tyavzinsky "eternal" peace was concluded with Sweden. According to it, Russia regained part of the coast of the Gulf of Finland, Korela, Oreshek, Koporye, Ivan-gorod, the Nyenschanz fortress, Yam. However, the lands to the west of Narva-Rugodiva remained with Sweden, the Swedes still controlled the Baltic Sea.

An important event of the reign of Fedor was the arrival of the Crimean army of Khan Kazy-Girey to Moscow in 1591. According to estimates, the khan had up to 100 or more thousand people, and at first he defeated the governor, Prince Vladimir Bakhteyarov-Rostovsky. It was not the fault of the prince - he was an experienced and courageous warrior, he fought with the Krymchaks, the Livonians, and the Swedes, and his life

could well become the basis for an exciting series. Kazy-Girey approached Moscow, and on July 5, a fierce slaughter began in front of the Kremlin near the Danilov Monastery. Russian troops under the command of Prince Fyodor Mstislavsky and horseman Boris Godunov utterly defeated the Tatars, and Kazy-Girey fled to the Oka, leaving a rich convoy with booty. Many Tatars were captured. After that, Kazy-Giray preferred to have peaceful relations with Moscow, being content with generous handouts, which in any

case were cheaper than the Tatar raids. In all these successes of Rus', there was no merits of the tsar personally, but the fact that he was removed f

predominantly representative functions, does Fedor credit. He did not interfere, and by this he already helped the cause of the development of the Russian state and his lands.

In fact, post-Ivanovo Rus' could no longer help but develop in an ascending direction. The potential for bifurcation accumulates gradually - sometimes over the course of centuries, as it happened inside the "Mongolian" Russia, sometimes for decades - as was the case with the Russia of Vasily III and the initial period of the reign of his son Ivan IV Vasilyevich ... By the beginning of the second half of the 16th century, such a potential in Russia once again accumulated and was supposed to lead to a bifurcation point and a crisis that could be resolved either in a negative direction or in a positive one. The era of Ivan the Terrible

resolved the crisis in a positive way, and thus determined the path of Russia for more than a century. From now on, only temporary recessions could threaten Russia, since the most important point of bifurcation was passed by Russia in the era of Ivan the Terrible in a historically correct and promising direction - towards a centralized state.

Under the sign of this fact, post-Ivanovo Russia lived. And it makes sense to return to this fact again. Ivan the Terrible

early realized his historical tasks. Of course, he himself did not look at his role in this way, and then the concept of such a "historical task" did not exist. But Ivan wanted to be a strong independent sovereign at the head of a strong independent state.

How could he achieve this?

The algorithm was quite obvious - if you can see, and Ivan could. Moreover, he was not the only one who looked at the actual problems and tasks of Rus' correctly - a loner, even on the throne, will never do anything. Grozny had both like-minded people and associates, although few of them were able to stay at the height of tasks as the tsar himself could. Strong Rus' already arose before

Ivan IV, but under Ivan IV it could only be preserved and developed as a single centralized state, and this was hindered by external enemies from the East and South, as well as the internal opposition of the princes and large feudal princely boyar families.

So it was necessary to eliminate both interference as much as possible. As a result, the Kazan and

Astrakhan khanates adjacent to the Russian lands and objectively included in the Russian geopolitical space were conquered and annexed, and the Crimean khanate was relatively neutralized. Relatively insofar as the Krymchaks were then a problem that could not be completely resolved. On the one hand, they, like the Mongols, did not have civilizational prospects, they lived by raids, and therefore they were a purely military destructive force. On the other hand, they could only annoy, no longer threatening Rus' with death.

Ivan and his like-minded people could defeat the internal ruling opposition only by relying on the **non-** dominating part of **the unborn** feudal lords - the children of the boyar and service nobles. But they needed land, and on the land - peasants who cultivate the land. Land, on the other hand, could only be obtained through confiscations from large feudal lords, and also from the church. The elimination of the power of the ancient ruling families was

beneficial for the king and society in two ways. Firstly, "selfhood", fragmentation, self-will were destroyed ... Secondly, after the boyars moved to other lands with smaller allotments, large land areas and estates were vacated, which could be divided among petty feudal lords supporting the tsar. The transfer of the boyars from their ancestral lands to new ones - "shuffling" them, deprived them of the support of their former peasants and "subjects", who, on occasion, could

make up a significant army. In other words, the political traditions of the patrimony, a structure essentially separatist, were undermined. The new internal situation of the state also required a new state apparatus - uniform and manageable at all levels, from central to local. He was supposed to replace the former motley and fragmented

patrimonial administration.

The elimination of fragmentation was beneficial to commercial circles, and a strong tsar was also beneficial to industrial circles as a guarantee against the arbitrariness of princes and boyars.

In addition, as the state strengthened, the task naturally arose of returning the Russian lands occupied by Lithuania and Poland to Russia - both to strengthen Rus' and for new land "dachas", as well as the task of providing convenient and short routes through the Baltic for trade and communication with Europe. That's what Ivan the

Terrible had to do. He did this, and the oprichnina and executions were only ways to solve urgent problems - ways, in accordance with the mores and circumstances of the era, really cruel. And do liberals have the right to blame Ivan for this, if today supposedly civilized presidents and prime ministers calmly allow the mass beating of civilians in various regions of the planet, including the Donbass, where more innocent people were killed in 2014 alone than during the entire reign of Ivan the Terrible .

Moreover, Ivan did not want to cut off heads for the sake of cruel fun or an extra billion dollars in his pocket - he wanted to build and create. And to the extent that he could do it, he did it. And if all the powerful large feudal lords thought about the power, strength and development of Rus' under the hand of a mighty tsar, and did not try to compete with the tsar, then there would be no felled heads.

For example, during the time of Ivan the Terrible, the governor, Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Vorotynsky, was considered a significant and well-deserved figure. Under his leadership, the first Russian military charter was developed, he was the hero of the Molodin battle in 1572 near Lopasnya. Nevertheless, in 1573, the prince was arrested on a denunciation and, after torture, was exiled to the Kirillo-Belozersky monastery, where he died. Other disgraced nobles also lived in Belozerye, and they built a luxurious tomb over Vorotynsky, painted on the plots of the terrible torment of the Apocalypse. It was a kind of opposition action, "thorns," according to G.G. Proshina - a thorn in the royal crown. In the well-known message of Ivan the Terrible to the brethren of this famous monastery, founded in 1397 by the Monk Cyril of Belozersky, the tsar noted, not without causticity, that, they say, "a church was erected over Vorotynskoye, but not over the miracle worker; Vorotynsky in the church, and the miracle worker behind the church "...

The monks really welcomed rich princes and boyars, including those exiled to Belozerye. In the same message of 1573, in response to the request of hegumen Kozma and the brethren to settle down the disgraced boyars, living freely and drunkenly in the monastery, the tsar reasonably asked: "Is it another way of salvation that the boyars of the boyars will not cut their hair in the blacks, and the serf will not get rid of servility?" Ivan wrote to the monks: "... And now Sheremetev is sitting in your cell like a tsar, and Khabarov comes to him ...", and concluded: "You yourself know: if piety is not necessary, but wickedness is welcome ... Do it better, do it yourself, you yourself know, as you want with him, but I don't care about anything: don't bother about it in the future.

Let us return, however, to Mikhail Vorotynsky, or rather, to his son. Ivan Vorotynsky was not repressed after the death of his father, he served as governor in Murom, in April 1582 Ivan the Terrible sent him as the 1st governor to Tula ... Under Fedor, as a supporter of the Shuiskys, Ivan was exiled at one time to Nizhny Novgorod, in the last years of Fedor's reign he served as the 1st governor in Kazan. And in the Time of Troubles, Prince Ivan Vorotynsky became one of the

"bags", running from one camp to another and receiving awards for this. In 1605 he reached the boyar rank, in 1610 he participated in the deposition of Tsar Vasily Shuisky, after which he became a member of the "Seven Boyars" ... And again we have a historical - alas, insoluble - mystery ... Did Ivan Vorotynsky inherit a

penchant for "flights" and intrigues from his father, or was it his personal and not hereditary trait? If the latter is true, then the repression of Mikhail

Vorotynsky Ivan the Terrible may very well be unfounded.

What if the first one is

true? Mikhail Ivanovich Vorotynsky was not a nature related to Andrei Kurbsky, if we keep in mind his attitude to the interests of Rus'. But he was related to Kurbsky by nature as the largest feudal lord, having, moreover, significant personal troops. After he became popular, he could start playing his game as well; precedents in world history - a dime a dozen! Looks like he slipped on that. Nevertheless, historians fearlessly and categorically record Vorotynsky among the innocent victims of the "tyrant" Grozny.

During the reign of Tsar Fyodor, such figures all the more played prominent roles, and it was their self-serving interests that prepared the time for the Time of Troubles, which was not a distant result of the reign of Ivan the Terrible, but a belch of patrimonial separatism not completely digested by Russia.

But since the previous point of bifurcation, which fell on the era of Ivan the Terrible, was passed by the Terrible and Russia correctly, the Time of Troubles could no longer destroy Rus', it could only temporarily spoil it, which happened. However, before the onset of the Time of Troubles, Boris Godunov still had to reign - after in 1598, with the death of Fyodor Ivanovich, the Rurik dynasty was cut short.

Boris Godunov, even during the life of Fedor, was not only the largest figure of his reign, but already then became the de facto ruler of Russia. The external and internal achievements of the reign of Fyodor Ivanovich - and they are undoubted, are, in many respects, the merit of Godunov. Thus, it was he who sought and obtained from the Patriarch of Constantinople, who was being bullied by the Turks, consent to the establishment of the Russian Patriarchate. This immediately raised the authority of the "governor"

- as foreigners called him - Godunov among the clergy. Under the ruler Godunov, Voronezh, Valuiki, Belgorod began to be upset, Kursk was restored, and Godunov constantly paid much attention to strengthening the

southern borders of Rus' both in the reign of Fedor and in his own. In 1591, in Uglich, either as a result of an accident or malicious intent, the son of Ivan the Terrible, Tsarevich Dmitry, died. Rumors immediately blamed Godunov for the death of the prince, since the death of Dmitry Ivanovich was beneficial to him both

in real time and, even more so, in the future. When Tsar Fyodor was alive, Godunov was the de facto regent, but the presence of Dmitry was always fraught with the use of the prince (as a banner, of course, or

rather, as a doll) by the boyar opposition. In the event of Fedor's death while Dmitry was alive, Godunov's chances of becoming a full-fledged tsar dropped almost to zero, and he claimed the throne in the future. In addition, the wife (in the future - the widow) of Fedor Ioannovich was Tsa

Boris's chances - in the absence of a legitimate heir to the throne - increased.

It must be said that the death of Tsarevich Dmitry, whether accidental or malicious, turned out to be a boon for the state, since Dmitry had no special inclinations and, in the event of accession to the throne, would have become a toy in the hands of self-serving anti-Godunov-minded boyars. So Boris Godunov's option for Russia's sustainable future was by far the best. After the death of the childless

Tsar Fyodor, the energetic Godunov secured his election to the royal throne at the Zemsky Sobor. He provided, as Lomonosov writes, "gifts, flattery, promises and threats." The moment was acute, since the late Fyodor Ioannovich bequeathed the throne to his cousin Fyodor Nikitich Romanov, but Godunov was supported by the noble majority of the Zemsky Sobor. Descended from the clan of the Kostroma untitled boyars Saburov-Godunov, Tsar Boris was the natural leader not of the boyars, but of the nobility - as well as townsmen and clerks, who came from merchant people.

The Zemsky Sobor of 1598 was not convened after the election of its deputies by the entire population, but consisted of the previously elected leadership of the estates or appointed persons ... All of them, one way or another, were close to the "ruler" Godunov or depended on him. For them, Godunov was a no-alternative candidate, but he was objectively a reasonable option. After the

election, Godunov announced that he would do everything for his people and would be ready to "share his last shirt" ... And indeed, later the cellar of the Trinity-Sergius Monastery Avraamy Palitsyn (? - 1626), the author of The Tale of the Time of Troubles, wrote that "for the sake of his nationwide buildings, Boris is kind to everyone." With the election of Boris Godunov, the hopes

that a strong and successful sovereign would sit on the Russian throne became quite reasonable. Boris was smart, educated, strong, ambitious, relatively young - in 1598 he was forty-six years old. He always personally conducted diplomatic negotiations, had military experience. The social base of his reign was quite wide - like Ivan the Terrible, who elevated him, Godunov relied on

the fight against the princes and boyars, who had perked up in spirit, against the serving nobility and the tops of the urban settlement who had nominated him to the tsars.

Even under Fyodor, Godunov carried out the so-called "township building" - the return to the townships of "fugitive taxpayers" and the postscript to the townships of the owner's peasants engaged in trade and crafts. This measure revived urban communities, but was neither universal nor consistent, but was controversial. However, economic, political and social development in a divided, and even more so - in a feudal

society, could not but lead to an increase in social contradictions. So it was in Europe of the early Middle Ages, so it was in the post-Mongolian Rus' of the late Middle Ages - the delayed shift in time was the very two or three centuries that slowed down Rus' two or three "Mongol Tatar" centuries. The contradictions both in the city and in the countryside were intensified by the fact that at the same time the enslavement of the peasants took place. First, in 1592, the population census started by Grozny was completed, then a decree was issued on the final

prohibition of the peasant "exit".

Today, to learn about it, just look at the textbook. But for centuries, from the act of Godunov, only a folk saying has been preserved in history: "Here you are, grandmother, and St. George's day!". And the name of the one who gave rise to this saying remained unknown. Only in Soviet times, references to the decree of Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich, issued at the initiative of Boris Godunov, were found in the Central State Archive of Ancient Acts, on the abolition of the right of peasants to leave on St. George's Day. In other words, the array of historical **data**, and not pseudo-historical **legends** that we have today, was not collected immediately,

and sometimes replenished bit by bit! There are few authentic documents of the 16th century, and, moreover, documents of earlier ones, at our disposal - something burned down during the "current" fires, something was destroyed during the stay of the Polish interventionists in the Kremlin, which will be discussed later ... A very large array documents perished in the Moscow fire of 1626, when state archives burned down. But today we know that era, and it is captured not only in written papers - burned or surviving, but also in the names

the cities founded in that era, in the temples built in those years, in the folk legends and songs created then.

Boris Godunov lived and ruled the country at a time when the next bifurcation point was successfully passed, although positive trends still needed to be developed and developed.

Godunov did this. To those fortified cities on the southern and southeastern borders that existed under Ivan and were founded by Boris under Fyodor Ioannovich, Tsar Godunov added Livny, Kromy, Oskol, Tsaritsyn ... In 1598, Verkhoturys was founded, in 1601 - famous in the future trading Mangazeya, in 1604 - Tomsk. Boris destroyed many privately owned privileges of the so-called "white settlements" - monastic and boyar ones ... Continuing the work of Grozny, Godunov

successively curtailed the power of the boyars, starting with the Shuisky princes ... Godunov's competitor in terms of claims to the throne - Fyodor Nikitich Romanov - the son of Nikita Romanovich Yuryev-Zakharyin, in 1600 he was forcibly tonsured a monk under the name Filaret. As a monarch not hereditary, but elected, moreover, elected in a very tough struggle, and at the same time an energetic nature, Godunov could not help but be an active and enterprising manager. He had to justify his right to be king not by the antiquity of the family - which Boris did not

have, but by his own great deeds. And with a favorable development of the situation - for him and for Rus' - Godunov could become something like a systemic analogue of Peter I, but - a hundred years earlier. Russia, on the other hand, needed a powerful and intelligent reformer more and more urgently. A new, 17th century began, and in this, just beginning, 17th century, Western Europe - represented by England, Spain, Portugal, Holland and France, went widely into the oceans, expanding the limits of the European ecumene to the planetary level. The English East India Company was founded in 1600, the Dutch East India Company was

founded in 1602... The Spaniards seized the Philippine Islands in the 16th century, and a bourgeois revolution took place in the Netherlands, and in 1579 the Utrecht Union of the northern provinces of the Netherlands was concluded.

In 1599, Oliver Cromwell was born in England - the future leader of the "iron-sided" Puritans, who led King Charles I to the chopping block ... The flame of European knowledge burned more and more powerfully in the 17th century ... At the beginning of the new century, the mature Galileo Galilei worked with might and main in Italy, in Italy Tommaso Campanella was reflecting on the social problems of the distant future...

Russia, locked within its continental boundaries and deprived of a wide sea outlet to the outside world, was in danger of becoming a hopeless provincial. And by the 17th century, this was not just insulting and embarrassing - in a tough, globalizing world, it was simply dangerous. And even deadly.

Godunov, no doubt, understood this, as did those who supported him. Moreover, smart people in Rus' did not suffer from an inferiority complex - foreigners looked down on Rus' and Russians, but Russians looked at foreigners not without irony ... A humorous composition went around from hand to hand - "A medical book issued from Russian people, how to treat foreigners and their lands of people: very decent medicines for various things. Recipes there were, for example, the following:

"When the heart aches and the womb weighs down, and decent articles for that: take a white pavement knock 16 spools, a small spring top 13 spools, a light cart creak 16 spools, and then take it all for 3 days without eating, on the fourth day take it at noon, sweat naked for three days in the cold...", etc.

A mixture was recommended for diarrhea: *"take 3 drops of girl's milk, 16 thick bear roars, 4 arshins of thick eagle flying, 6 spools of large cat grunts ..."*, etc.

From constipation: *"owl laughter 3 lumps, dry Epiphany frost 3 spool, mix everything together in straw smoked beer ..."*, etc.

Healthy laughter and the ability to joke smartly and subtly ("girl's milk"!) Is a sign of the moral health of the nation and its ability to do great things. At the same time, the Russians, like no other people, perhaps, turned out to be capable of self-irony. The most valuable civilizational quality! Accustomed in the school of Ivan the Terrible

to look at the Motherland as the only place where you can live and die, moreover,

necessity - to die in battle, but at the same time knowing how to laugh, Russia could do a lot of things necessary and useful for itself led by Boris Godunov. In the East and

Northeast, the shores of two oceans beckoned to themselves, and progress towards them was no longer complicated by insurmountable obstacles. In the South-East, new prospects arose - up to the Caucasus ... The South was protected from the Tatar threat by a belt of new fortified cities. In the West and North, it is true, a hard struggle lay ahead with Poland, Lithuania and Sweden, but even this long-standing struggle had every chance of success.

But in the South-West, things could have gone easier - the Ukrainian and Belarusian branches of the Russian people, cut off from Rus', now and then rebelled against the Poles, at the end of the past XVI century, the uprising of Nalivaiko and Loboda thundered on the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands ...

Of course, these uprisings had an anti-feudal character, and it was difficult for Tsar Boris, the largest feudal lord, and even more so for the boyars, to see strategic allies in the Ukrainian-Belarusian masses oppressed by the Poles. However, the conflict in the South-West and North-West had, in addition to social, also religious overtones - the poor Orthodox "Embassy" and the wealthy Catholic gentry opposed each other. And this brought the interests of ordinary people of Kiev, Lvov, Podillya, Volhynia closer to the interests of Moscow.

Moreover, an alliance with the rebellious native Russian lands, neutralizing the Commonwealth, would help solve the Baltic problem. True, the

enslavement of the peasants posed a threat of discontent among the peasant masses, and more and more often it manifested itself in the form of intensified local pogroms of landowners' estates, the murder of landlords and even organized uprisings - such as unrest in the estates of the "Josephites" stronghold - the Joseph-Volokolamsk monastery in 1594-1595. However, the new feudal gentry had not yet acquired the lordly landlord fat, and if they wanted to secure not only the land, but also those who cultivate it, they had to look for ways to compromise.

The outside world - Europe, and Asia as well, has already felt both the potential of the Russian market and Russia's raw material opportunities, and this ensured the growth of foreign trade. Godunov's European policy

was active, especially he was looking for opportunities through the marriage of his daughter Xenia to intermarry with one or another - Swedish, Danish -

royal house. It was, however, a double-edged sword - such a marriage would be welcomed in Rus', weaned from family ties with Europe, not everyone. But the fact that Godunov and circles close to him sought to develop and diversify relations with Europe is a fact. Some in Europe, in turn, were also inclined to include Russia in their plans. So, a strong Russia - the terrible Commonwealth, would be desirable for, for example, Vienna, which is afraid of Turkey. And in the latter case, the interest was mutual - subject to the smart behavior of Russia.

But Godunov was not

stupid! In short, the general historical situation for Russia at the beginning of the 17th century was quite rich, providing it with tempting opportunities. And although the situation in Rus' was again beginning to be determined by sovereign quarrels, the state legacy of Grozny was strong and provided the basis for the rapid and effective modernization of Russia.

Godunov was capable of this, but in the end he became another unrealized alternative to Russian history. Instead of a brilliant creative reign, already seven years after the accession of Godunov, Russia received the Time of Troubles, on the eve of which Tsar Boris, having experienced a three-year streak of almost continuous failures, suddenly died on April 13, 1605.

The reign of Boris Godunov in Russian historical consciousness was somehow briefly noted ... Let's say, such a normative source as Karamzin's "History of the Russian State" allots about 90 pages to the 14-year reign of Fyodor Ioannovich - Godunov's predecessor, almost 100 pages to the 4-year reign of Vasily Shuisky - Godunov's successor, and 70 pages for the 7-year reign of Godunov himself. Here, of course, it must be taken into account that many of

Godunov's actions fall on the time of Fyodor, and the reign of Shuisky is the time of the Russian Troubles, but, nevertheless, Godunov could attract more attention of historians - after all, in his reign it is important and interesting not so much that

what has been done and what has been achieved, how much **has not** been done and achieved .

Of particular interest is the question - why did the reign of the personally competent and energetic Boris not strengthen the Russian state and the power of Russia, but became the threshold of the most dangerous Troubles? ..

There were no objective (that is, historical and material) conditions for the Time of Troubles, despite the fact that the strengthening of feudal oppression increased social tension, primarily among the peasantry. Soviet historiography

mentions the "uprising" of the serfs under the leadership of a certain Khlopka (Khlopká), but it was, although it seems to be dangerous, but purely local performance of a rather small (several hundred people) detachment of peasants and declassed nobles. Such petty excesses - in part it was just robbery - were regularly suppressed by the governors of Fyodor Ioannovich, and later by the governors of Godunov.

So why did the reign of Boris Godunov end in 1605 with his personal collapse and opened a seven-year series of the Troubled Years? We can immediately say that there were three powerful counteracting factors against Boris. **The first** factor turned out to

be for Russia, alas, the traditional one - the anti-state behavior of the ruling elite. For the most part, princes and boyars were only interested in their own prosperity and power, but they were always ready to neglect common interests in favor of private, personal interests. Boris, as a tsar not hereditary, and even not very well-born - not Rurikovich, not Gediminovich, had especially many enemies among the ruling nobility. An illustrative example is the ambitious Bogdan Belsky, who, by the way, is also an unborn ruler. After the death of Ivan the Terrible in 1584, Belsky tried to become regent for the young Tsarevich Dmitry, Ivan the Terrible's son from Maria Nagoya, and was exiled. After the death of Fyodor Ioannovich in 1598, Belsky arrived with a strong detachment of adherents in Moscow and made claims already to the royal throne. And when nothing came of it, he intrigued against the election of Boris Godunov in favor of Simeon Bekbulatovich, clearly counting on the role of an all-powerful regent ...

As a state figure, Belsky was weak, but he was strong as a self-serving intriguer and politician. Elected by the tsar, Godunov granted Belsky a roundabout and sent him away from the capital - to the Seversky Donets, to build a new frontier fortress, the city of Tsarev Borisov. Shortly

before this, the former Yelets head Fyodor Chulkov and the nobleman Istoma Mikhnev chose a place for laying the city near the confluence of the Oskol with the Seversky Donets, removed the plan and

submitted it to Moscow. On June 30, 1599, a royal decree was issued on the founding of the "city of Borisov on the Donets", and by autumn the city was already ready for settlement. However, Belsky tried here for himself, since he said: "Let Boris Fedorovich reign in Moscow, and now I am the tsar in Tsarevo Borisov" ...

Belsky had about three thousand children of boyars, archers and Cossacks under his command, and he again had ambitious plans. As a result, however, he was arrested, publicly punished and, as in 1584, exiled to Nizhny Novgorod. At the

same time, the problem was not limited to Belsky - Belsky, with his obvious claims, turned out to be only the surface part of the sovereign "iceberg" that threatened Godunov.

The "Boyar" factor played a negative role in the sense that it gradually provoked the suspicion of Tsar Boris. Basically, it was quite justified - Godunov had enough strong and treacherous enemies ... Conspiracies were also arranged against him - they simply could not have been in that situation. As always in such cases, denunciation and slander developed. Godunov's repressions against the boyars, on the one hand, turned out to be inevitable, but on the other hand, they undermined stability and created the basis for new conspiracies and repressions. **The**

second powerful negative factor for Russia and the tsar was the broad subversive and provocative policy of the Commonwealth in relation to Godunov, as the successor to the state affairs of Ivan the Terrible. And as the head of Russia, and as a person, Godunov turned out to be an unequivocal enemy for the Polish-Lithuanian "tops".

The fact that the Polish magnates had no idea about true honor and nobility initially (as it happened historically) would be half the trouble - unlike personal relations, in interstate relations, unconditional chivalry does not seem to be the most correct line of conduct. The trouble was that the Polish magnates among the ancient Moscow nobility had a lot of those who were related to the gentry "republicans" in spirit and interests, and at the same time were ready to act in Russian society, playing the role of agents of influence of the Commonwealth ...

Plus - the intrigues of the Vatican, for which a strong Rus' was unacceptable insofar as this weakened Poland, in which the influence of the papacy was then, perhaps, stronger than anywhere else. Unlike the Russian liberals of

the 21st century, Ivan the Terrible understood the role and importance of internal agents of influence well. Boris Godunov also understood the situation. However, "moles" are "moles" for that, in order to act secretly, in the dark... nobility and township.

It was also possible to cope with external enemies, as well as with performances in the countryside - if they did not exceed in number and scope the "usual", so to speak, norm. However, the new, just emerging Godunov dynasty also faced a third negative problem, which could not but give rise to powerful popular unrest - for three years in a row, Russia suffered from a terrible crop failure that caused severe famine ... The third negative factor - random,

natural, and finally **finished** off both Godunov and stability in Russia. But the joint, synergetic action of external, internal and spontaneous negative factors turned out to be fatal. For example, by themselves, the "independent" inclinations and

ambitions of the elite, as well as elite betrayals, as well as the subversive work of internal Russian "moles", etc., could not destroy either the Russian state of the times of Boris Godunov, or the Soviet state of the times of Boris Yeltsin ... For for the "moles" to crawl out of

underground and occupied commanding heights in Moscow, and in the 20th century, and in the 17th century, quite certain conditions were needed. But in the USSR, they took decades to develop - not without the work of "agents of influence", and the medieval "moles" and external enemies of Russia were lucky: a series of natural disasters - terrible droughts - created suitable conditions for them. Two and a half centuries later - in 1868, Alexei Konstantinovich

Tolstoy - one of the "parents" of the immortal Kozma Prutkov, endowed Russian literature with an almost playful "History of the Russian State from Gostomysl to Timashev" ... Novgorod posadnik Gostomysl invited Rurik to Russia, and the cavalry general Timashev, since 1868 - Minister of the Interior, was previously the head of the III Department, that is, a gendarme. Accordingly, Tolstoy's "History ..." belonged to the category of "free", uncensored poetry, and interpreted Russian history before the "time of Timashev" sharply, ending the description of each period with the refrain: "But there is no order," and making an exception only for the eras of Grozny and Peter ... About the reign of Godunov, the ironic Tolstoy, who knew history and understood brilliantly, wrote the following:

Boris, the tsar's brother-in-law,
Was seriously smart,
Brunet, not bad-looking, And
sat on the tsar's throne.

With him everything went
smoothly, The old evils were
gone, There was a little bit of
order In the earth, he did not start ...

In every joke there is a share of a joke, but it is by no means a joke that Tolstoy found it possible to write about Godunov: "He didn't start order in the land a little bit" ... Godunov, after all, really didn't have enough "just a little" for success - two - three fruitful years.

When the famine began, the actions of the king were quite competent. Already in 1601, and then in 1602, he partially allowed the peasant transition ... He used state reserves to help the starving, allocated sums from huge personal funds, distributed bread ... But he could not prevent an explosion of mass discontent ... In addition, that circumstance did not improve the situation that free distributions of bread attracted masses of parasites to the capital who wanted to feed themselves on a darovshchina.

It is very likely that the famine itself was not so total and critical. Chronicles note that 120,000 people died in Moscow alone in two years, but, firstly, chroniclers are always inclined to exaggerate figures, and, secondly, a mass pestilence from hunger and, especially, from epidemics, was then quite frequent and familiar thing. However, against the

background of hunger and growing discontent because of it, external and internal Polish agents became more active and effectively acted ... In 1601, passions suddenly flared up long ago, seemingly subsided around the allegedly "killed" by Boris, Tsarevich Dmitry of Uglich ... They began to say more and more loudly that God sends punishment to Russia because it tolerates a child-killing tsar on the throne.

At the same time, the figure of the first False Dmitry began to grow in Poland - the first "imposter" and protege of the most aggressive and most anti-Russian part of the Polish elite. Not without a trace of the papal shoe... The Polish king was

then Sigismund III Vasa (1566-1632) from the Swedish royal house of Vasa. The son of Johan III Vasa and Catherine Jagiellonka, he was born in Gripsholm, Sweden, and after the death of Stefan Batory was elected to the Polish throne. A person of little talent, but arrogant, Sigismund III was under the complete influence of the papacy and the Jesuits. The Vatican

was a reactionary and provocative force in relation to Europe, for it sought to keep the all-European power that was eluding the popes ... And in relation to Rus', the Vatican was a completely sinister force. Arising on the edge of Europe - in "Muscovy", a new powerful, promising and absolutely independent

from the Vatican, neither politically nor confessionally, the Russian state turned out to be a natural enemy of the papacy. For some reason, this

moment is not emphasized in Russian historiography - they focus more on Sigismund III and the Vishnevetsky magnates with Mnishki and Sapieha. But for all their appetites for Russian lands and riches, the Polish kings and magnates were mere tools in the hands of the popes, who over the centuries had become sophisticated in manipulating domineering puppets...

The popes monitored the situation in Rus' very carefully, and Possevino, known in history, was clearly not alone in carrying out both the task of collecting information and the task of planting agents and bribing the most unstable part of the Russian "tops". And it may very well be that it was in the Vatican that the "fruitful debut" idea was born to instill in the public consciousness of Russia the name of Tsarevich Dmitry, the supposedly miraculously saved son of Ivan the Terrible and Maria Nagoya.

One way or another, in August 1604, the first False Dmitry (it is believed that he was a runaway monk, defrocked Grishka Otrepyev), at the head of a Polish-Lithuanian detachment of more than 2,000 horsemen, set out from Lvov on a campaign against Moscow. Among them were Russian renegades. The forces of the impostor

increased rapidly - dissatisfaction with the Godunovs was skillfully fomented, while the mass of the people looked at the man going to Moscow not as the impostor of False Dmitry, but as the legitimate heir to the Terrible Tsarevich Dmitry Ioannovich ... Novgorod-Seversky surrendered to the army of the "tsarevich" without resistance and the people shouted : "Long live our sovereign, Dmitry!".

By the way, the fact that the son of Tsar Ivan, allegedly claiming the Russian throne, was recognized by the Russian masses as a "legitimate" tsar, indirectly testifies to the love of the people for Ivan the Terrible, to the high authority of his memory. Well, in fact, would the son of a hated

tyrant, about whom the common people have the darkest memories, gain popularity?

This means that the people remembered Tsar Ivan as a formidable but just sovereign, as a defender of the people against the willfulness of the boyars. Necessary

after all, to understand that in the era of Ivan the Terrible, the head of a disgraced boyar on a stake looked differently in the eyes of a peasant or townsman than in the eyes of modern Russian liberals such as the "academician" - "historian" Pivovarov. Of course, it also mattered that

a considerable part of the Russian boyars recognized and supported False Dmitry ... But these "recognized" "Dmitry" for, of course, selfish and businesslike purposes. Moscow and Rus' were worried, but it would be more accurate to say that they were worried and troubled. However, they muddled using the name

Ivan. As noted already in the twentieth century in one of the "loyal" publications, the impostor "managed to acquire the Moscow throne ... only thanks to the charm of the name taken upon himself!" But the name of the young Tsarevich Dmitry could not enjoy a special "charm" among the people. It turns out that it was the name of the Terrible Tsar that possessed both attractiveness and charm for the then Russian masses ...

Boris did everything possible - the army was strengthened, large forces gathered for the spring campaign against the new, almost instantly emerging Polish-"false Dmitry" threat.

And then suddenly "unexpectedly" - on April 13 (!?) 1605, after a solemn dinner given to foreign ambassadors - the king felt ill and died a few hours later - allegedly from throat bleeding. Before his death, he managed to bless his son Fyodor to the kingdom and take the monastic rank.

The deceased tsar was buried in monastic clothes as the monk Blagolep, and "well-wishers" immediately started a rumor that the tsar allegedly poisoned himself, unable to withstand the load of "sins".

Of course, this was a classic case, described by the Russian proverb "The cap is on fire on the thief." Given the situation, there is no doubt that Boris was simply poisoned. "Notebook" historians write about this presumably, but one can only guess about who poisoned the king? On the eve of the crisis, he could be eliminated both by purely internal opponents, and by Polish "agents of influence" or one of the foreigners.

It seemed that the fate of Russia again hung in the balance. However, this was not the fault of either the people of Russia or Boris Godunov - both of them were simply unlucky. Boris, among other things, was let down by an unfavorable

coincidence, and the people were deceived and betrayed by their own elite.

The father was to be succeeded by his son, Fyodor Borisovich Godunov... And I will cite the further development of events according to Lomonosov's Brief Russian

Chronicler: "After the death of his father, Fyodor Borisovich Godunov was appointed to the kingdom from all the ranks of the Moscow people, who swore him an oath. However, in the army, most of the boyars became agitated and indulged in Rasstriga with almost all the regiments .. "As a concrete illustration, I will inform you that Basmanov, who was appointed by the young new tsar at the head of the army moved towards "Dmitry", weighed all the chances, consulted with another governor - the prince Golitsyn, and went over to the side of the "tsarevich".

As a second specific illustration, I will additionally inform you that Roman Yakovlevich Belsky, known to us, also actively supported False Dmitry I and received the boyar rank from him.

As a result of boyar betrayals and "flights", the army of the false prince in June 1605 triumphantly entered the Russian capital ...

Lomonosov's "Chronicler" reports: "The rasstriga ordered in Moscow to eradicate the Godunovs, and the messengers of Tsar Fyodor killed their mother, and gave their sister to rasstriga, whom he cursed, tonsured, and came to Moscow, married a Pole ..." "Polka" is daughter of the magnate Marina Mnishek, who later became one of the characters in Pushkin's tragedy "Boris Godunov"... By the way,

Godunov's short reign fell on doubly Shakespearean times... On the one hand, this reign was marked by passions of truly Shakespearean intensity and scope... On the other hand, Godunov was a contemporary of Shakespeare, who outlived Boris by only 11 years.

So, Tsar Boris was poisoned, Tsar Fyodor Borisovich and his mother Marya were killed, and his sister Xenia was forcibly tonsured a nun. The widow of Ivan the Terrible, Maria Naguya, was forced to recognize her son as her son, and on July 20, 1605, the false Dmitry was solemnly married to the kingdom in the Assumption Cathedral of the

Moscow Kremlin. All the originality of that historical moment was expressed by one detail, capacious and juicy at the same time. In 1605 Andrei Chokhov a

foundry master Pronya Fedorov cast the largest mortar made in Russia - caliber 534 mm with a barrel length of 131 centimeters and a weight of 1913 kilograms. On the sides of the mortar there was an intricate cast inscription: "By the grace of God, by the command of the sovereign tsar, Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich of All Great Russia, autocrat, in the first summer of his state, this cannon was made in the reigning city of Moscow in the summer of September 7114, on the 26th day, master Ondrey Chokhov." Later, this two-ton mortar was given the name "Mortar of the Pretender" by

artillery historians, but Chokhov and Pronya Fedorov cast it not for a Polish protege, but for, as they were sure, the legitimate tsar-sovereign Dmitry, son of Ivanov ...

The sobering up of the people came, however, quickly, and since I do not intend to dwell on the events of the Time of Troubles much, I will once again use the telegraphic style of Lomonosov's Chronicler:

"Destriga... brought with him the Poles and Catholic priests, giving them a great will. But through the efforts of Prince Vasily Ivanovich Shuisky, he was killed by a shameful death, the dead was burned and his ashes were scattered.

Indeed, on May 17, 1606, an uprising broke out in Moscow, during which the first False Dmitry was torn to pieces, and on May 19, 1606, the prince, boyar and voivode Vasily Shuisky was elected the new tsar - a petty, double-minded person and in Russian history absolutely passing ...

The French say that every nation is worthy of the government it has. But this is in France. In Russia, it often happened that **the rulers** turned out to be unworthy of the people they ruled. And the events from the summer of 1606 to the autumn of 1612 once again proved this.

It was said above that the people of Russia, like Boris Godunov, were simply unlucky at the beginning of the 17th century. You can clarify - both were unlucky not only with the weather, but also with the elite.

If the princely-boyar elite had shown at least a tenth of the concern for the state and the future of Rus', which was characteristic of Grozny and Godunov, then a strong tsar would have been elected to the royal throne, the basis of whose election would have been his promise and readiness to continue the centralization autocratic

politicians.

And if it was so desirable to see the ancient surname of the Shuiskys on the throne, then there was a young, energetic and talented nephew of Vasily Shuisky - the boyar Mikhail Vasilyevich Skopin-Shuisky (1587–1610), about whom more will be said. The boyars, on the other hand, ensured the election of a nonentity, who swore an oath and gave a "cross-kissing record" that he would rule, following the will of the Boyars.

thoughts. Shuisky, proclaimed by Vasily IV, was elected because he was the complete opposite of Grozny and Godunov in everything - from personal qualities to state policy, which would rather be called anti-state.

With the accession of Shuisky, the boyars broke loose from the chain - they demanded and received generous donations of money and land from the tsar, the treasury was empty, the situation of the peasants began to tighten, and already in the fall of 1606, the first Peasant War broke out in Russia under the leadership of Ivan

Bolotnikov. It was no longer a local speech by Khlopok, but a full-fledged Russian edition of the Jacquerie and the Peasant War in Germany ... But if the French peasants rebelled in 1358, the English at the hand of Wat Tyler in 1381, and the German ones at the hand of Thomas Müntzer in 1524, and after the defeat, the European peasant mass subsided, then the mass uprising of the Russian peasantry at the beginning of the 17th century was continued in the wars with the elite of Stepan Razin and Emelyan Pugachev. In Europe, the peasants were worried, of course, even after the grandiose defeats, but more, so to speak, "civilized."

And the struggle there was no longer so much for personal freedom as for economic rights.

In Russia it turned out differently. On the acquired "Mongolian" individualism ("my hut is on the edge, I don't know anything"), ancient, thousand-year-old veche memories were superimposed ("it's red in the world and death", "it's easier to beat the father with a

herd") ... On the one hand, Russian peasants turned out to be more easy-going, but on the other hand, the Russian elite turned out to be dumber and more short-sighted than the European one, from century to century not making concessions to the peasantry. Godunov softened the serf regime with the onset of droughts - he cared about the fate of the state. Shuisky, lik

the owner, the spokesman for the ~~interests~~ interests of the owners, tightened the serfdom. In March 1607, by the "Code" of Tsar Vasily IV, the term for detecting fugitive peasants was increased from 5 to 15 years - the fire was extinguished with gasoline. Shuisky's

struggle with the insurgent people dragged on for a year ... In addition, it was tempting to use the Bolotnikov factor for a certain part of the boyars, including those grouped around False Dmitry. At first, Bolotnikov laid

siege to Moscow, but in the fall of 1607, the troops of Vasily Shuisky laid siege to Tula, which was occupied by the rebels. At first, Bolotnikov intended to stand to the last, but Shuisky kissed the cross, that all participants in the defense of Tula would be saved, and Tula surrendered. On October 10, 1607, Bolotnikov laid his saber at the feet of the tsar, was immediately shackled, and then sent to Kargopol and killed there. But even

before the suppression of the Bolotnikov uprising - in July 1607, a new impostor appeared in the border Starodub, who became known in history as False Dmitry II or "Tushinsky Thief" ... Like the first False Dmitry, the second was a pawn in the hands of the Poles and the Vatican.

Unlike the first, this "pawn" could no longer get into the crowned "queens", but the Russian Time of Troubles entered its most vile and stupid phase - vile and stupid, if we mean the behavior of the main part of the Moscow elite ... On May 1, 1608, the army False Dmitry II defeated the royal governors Dm. Shuisky and you. Golitsyn and then laid siege to Moscow. It was not possible to enter

Moscow, so the new impostor camped in the village of Tushino, by which he received his historical nickname. Part of the boyars immediately defected to "Dmitry", the concept of "Tushino flights" arose - that was the name of those who "fled" either from Shuisky to Tushino, or from Tushino to Shuisky. Peripheral Russia was less

affected by the "migratory" process, and the gathering of resistance forces began in Kargopol, Vologda, Yaroslavl, Kostroma. At this time, Mikhail Skopin-Shuisky advanced. In March 1608, on behalf of his uncle-tsar, he negotiated with Sweden for help against the Poles in Novgorod. After

the concessions by the Russians of the city of Korela (Kexholm) with the county, the Swedes in April 1609 sent a 5,000-strong expeditionary force led by Delagardie to

Rus'. Skopin-Shuisky also recruited a 3,000-strong detachment and, together with the Swedes, began hostilities. In July 1609, Tver was liberated, and then Skopin-Shuisky marched to Yaroslavl and fortified near Kalyazin, waiting for reinforcements from the North, from the Volga region and Nizhny Novgorod, and gradually taking over the Zamoskovskiy region.

At the beginning of 1610, the army of Skopin-Shuisky marched towards Moscow. Along the way, the siege by the Poles of the Trinity-Sergius Monastery, which lasted 16 months, was lifted - the so-called Trinity seat. A garrison of more than 2,000 archers, nobles, monastery peasants and servants under the leadership of Prince Dolgorukov and Golokhvastov heroically defended the Lavra from September 23, 1608 to January 12, 1610 from the 15,000-strong corps of Jan Sapieha and Colonel Lisovsky (some sources write about even 30 thousand troops). Having lost up to two-thirds of the garrison, the besieged repulsed all the numerous assaults.

Thanks to the novel by Henryk Sienkiewicz, every schoolchild in Poland knows about the defense of the Jasnogorsk Monastery in CzŹystochowa during the Swedish "Flood" in the second half of the 17th century. In Russia, perhaps not every history teacher knows about the Trinity Defense n

Let's return, however, to the 17th

century ... On March 12, 1610, Skopin's troops and the Swedes entered Moscow. Panic began in the Tushino camp, and Skopin-Shuisky was preparing to go to the aid of Smolensk, also besieged by the Poles.

The victories and patriotic position made the tsar's nephew popular, and against the background of the mediocre tsar, a natural idea arose to replace him on the throne with Mikhail - the Duma nobleman Prokopi Lyapunov especially tried here, although the Moscow masses looked at Mikhail as the future tsar.

By nature, Lyapunov was an undoubted adventurer and careerist: in 1605 he labored with False Dmitry I, checked himself with Bolotnikov, then defected to Vasily Shuisky. After the overthrow of Shuisky, Lyapunov supported the candidacy of the Polish prince Vladislav on the Russian throne, but, having learned about the occupation of Moscow by the Polish garrison, he began organizing the first militia of 1611, was a member of

Zemstvo government, brutally suppressed robberies, and was hacked to death in a Cossack circle. In the spring of 1610, Lyapunov bet on the completely advantageous and, more importantly, the figure of Mikhail, which was quite necessary for the situation. So in this case, Prokopy Lyapunov worked not only for himself, but also for the Russian cause.

Mikhail I Vasilyevich Skopin-Shuisky on the Russian throne would not only be able to quickly stabilize the situation and unite a divided society, but, most likely, would continue the work of developing and exalting the Russian state.

However, on April 25, 1610, Michael "unexpectedly" died - only 23 years old! The agents of the Poles could remove him, the adherents of the "Tushinsky Thief" or his own royal uncle, or rather, envious relatives, could. Vasily IV was childless, but his brother, the mediocre Demetrius, himself claimed the throne and envied his nephew. At the baptismal feast at the Prince Vorotynsky godfather Mikhail - the wife of Dimitri Shuisky, brought a goblet of wine to the young hero. A few minutes later, Mikhail became ill, he was taken home, where he, having been ill for several days, died. The grief of the people was great and, at the general request, Mikhail was buried next to the kings in the Archangel Cathedral of the Kremlin. Potentially new - and potentially great! - Tsar Michael died, alas, not by his own death,

and one can only regret him, as an alternative to Russian history that has not been realized. However, Vasily Shuisky did not have long to be on the throne. On July 17, 1610, he was deposed by the

"Tushino" group with the participation of Zakhary Lyapunov, the brother of Prokopy Lyapunov. Vasily IV was forcibly tonsured and in August 1611 was taken to Warsaw, where he soon died. False Dmitry II fled to Kaluga, where he was killed at the end of 1610.

After the overthrow of Tsar Vasily Shuisky, a government of "seven boyars" was established in Rus' - the so-called "Seven Boyars". It included members of the Boyar Duma: princes F.I. Mstislavsky, I.M. Vorotynsky, A.V. Trubetskoy, A.V. Golitsyn, B.M. Lykov, as well as I.N. Romanov and F.I. Sheremetev. I don't know when and for what reason the proverb "At seven

nannies for a child without an eye", but there can be no more precise and concise definition of the "Seven Boyars".

The prince, boyar, groom and voivode Fyodor Mstislavsky, who led this boyar "ensemble", friendly and sensible no more than a quartet from Krylov's fable, proved himself in the Time of Troubles as a servant of all masters. Gediminovich, after the death of Fyodor Ioannovich, he was among the contenders for the throne, but, having yielded to Godunov, he led government troops. Then he served False Dmitry, etc., and in 1622 - already under the first Romanov - he died, as before, the most important dignitary and largest landowner. On August 17, 1610, the "seven

boyars" concluded an agreement with Sigismund III on the election of the Polish prince Vladislav to the Russian throne, and on September 21, 1610, these boyars secretly let the Polish army into Moscow. Nominally, the "government" of Mstislavsky functioned until the liberation of Moscow by detachments of the Second Home Guard in October 1612, but in fact, from the autumn of 1610, a regime of Polish intervention was established in the central regions of the Russian state. The Swedes were content with the occupation of Novgorod, intending to annex it as a Swedish province.

Along with the Trinity seat, the central encouraging event of the Time of Troubles was the 20-month defense of Smolensk, besieged by the troops of Sigismund III. Heroic Smolensk fell only in June 1611, when the First Militia - Ryazan - collapsed. The first militia arose at the beginning of

1611 at the initiative of the Ryazan people, headed by the voivode Prokopy Lyapunov, known to us. The composition of the rank and file militias, and even more so - their leadership, was motley. In March 1611, the militia besieged Moscow occupied by the Poles, on June 30 a provisional government was formed - the "Council of the Whole Land", but after the failure of the siege, the militia disintegrated.

This result was quite expected - the Ryazan militia was led by Prince Dmitry Trubetskoy, Prokopy Lyapunov and the Don Cossack ataman Ivan Zarutsky. All three were from among the "bags of change", and suffice it to say about Zarutsky. He was with Bolotnikov, then - "Tushino", received a boyar title from False Dmitry II. After the collapse of the First Militia, he tried to nominate one or another impostor to the royal throne, fled to the Don, then to

Astrakhan. In 1614 he was extradited to the government of the first Romanov and imprisoned in Moscow.

The first militia was for some a gamble, but for some it was a test of strength. One of the detachments was led by Prince Dmitry Pozharsky - the future military head and hero of the Second - really people's militia ... It began to form after the famous meeting of citizens in Nizhny Novgorod in the fall of 1611, where the townsman Kuzma Minin called on compatriots to fight for the liberation of the country from the invaders. The residents of Nizhny Novgorod decided to give the "fifth of the money" for this, that is, a fifth of the property. Some gave everything and joined the ranks of the army. Minin was elected zemstvo headman. Nizhny Novgorod became the center of the new militia not by

chance - he "did not pester the Thief", Patriarch Hermogen communicated with Nizhny Novgorod from imprisonment in the Miracle Monastery - before he was starved to death by the Poles. The surviving "service people" from Smolensk, Vyazma, Dorogobuzh appeared in Nizhny Novgorod, warriors from the Volga cities, from Kolomna, Ryazan, Vologda approached ... "Council of all the earth". In July 1612, Pozharsky's

army went to Moscow, in August they defeated the Polish hetman Khodkevich, who was going to help the Poles who had settled in the Kremlin, and in October 1612 he liberated Moscow. The relatively slow pace of events is explained by the same old infection - disagreements in the leadership environment ... By that time, few of the Russian boyars, princes and church hierarchs had not stained

themselves with one or another betrayal, and now it was not easy to achieve unanimity and agreement. Despite all the troubled years, not everyone thought in line with state problems - the question of the future tsar worried the princes and boyars in advance more than the task of expelling the interventionists as soon as possible. The example of Pozharsky was not typical in this regard, but the prince did not belong to the chosen family nobility, although he belonged to the descendants of the specific princes of Starodubsky. In 1608,

he defeated the Poles near Kolomna, surrounding Moscow with the aim of blockade ... In 1609, he led the defense of Zaraysk ... In the Moscow battles of March 1611

At the Cannon Yard on the Lubyanka, Dmitry Mikhailovich was seriously wounded and taken to the Trinity-Sergius Lavra. The public behavior of Prince Pozharsky turned out to be impeccable, which is why he was elected the military leader of the People's Militia.

The names of Dmitry Pozharsky from Vladimir, Kuzma Minin from Nizhny Novgorod and Ivan Susanin from Kostroma, who at the cost of his life led a detachment of Poles into the winter thicket to their death, became a personal opposition to the Time of Troubles. This series of names was formed not by propagandists, but by life itself, which at that time was equivalent to history. And this series turned out to be deeply symbolic: when a representative of the elite, a townsman and a simple peasant-patriot joined together in solving one problem, the result was successful and outstanding.

Now Russia had to determine its future political image. It was clear that post-Troubled Russia would be autocratic, but who would take on the Monomakh's cap after all the trials was still unclear.

It was also unclear how Russia would develop further and whether it would develop in the way that the challenges of the time require - after all, the Time of Troubles, although it lasted a little more than a dozen years, gave rise to a whole range of negative and difficult problems to solve.

For all that, it would be wrong to talk about a new bifurcation point in Russian history. Such a point fell on the era of Ivan the Terrible and was successfully passed with his personal outstanding participation, directing the course of Russian history in an ascending direction. The temporary recession during the Time of Troubles was precisely temporary, it could not but be overcome by the Russian people, and it was overcome.

The Time of Troubles from the death of Boris Godunov to the accession to the Russian throne of the first Romanov - Mikhail, could not but end the way it ended, that is, the eradication of the Troubles and the restoration of the principle of centralization and service to Russia.

However, this did not happen

immediately. During the storming of the Kremlin in the fall of 1612, Moscow burned down once again. The German mercenary Konrad Bussov, who served with both False Dmitrys, wrote in his Moscow Chronicle: "The great capital of Rus' was completely covered with ashes and mud in two days. Only survived

stone temples and the royal court. The rest of the buildings were made of wood and burned to the ground, including the outer ring of the fortress walls...". And the Russian capital had to start over again on a conflagration - on a conflagration in the truest sense of the word.

Nevertheless, on October 27, 1612, the newly convened "from all estates" Zemsky Sobor began to work in Moscow, the tasks of which were varied, but the main one was, of course, the choice of a new tsar.

It is believed that the election of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, the son of Fyodor Romanov, who was forcibly tonsured by Godunov, the grandson of Nikita Romanovich Yuryev-Zakharyin and the cousin-nephew of Tsar Fyodor Ioannovich, took place "unanimously". However, this is doubtful already because Mikhail's candidacy was finally decided only on February 21, 1613, and on March 14, 1613, Moscow ambassadors came to the Kostroma Ipatiev Monastery, where 16-year-old Mikhail lived with his mother Martha, to ask Mikhail for the kingdom. Officials later claimed that "Martha angrily spoke to the main

ambassadors - Archbishop Feodorit of Ryazan and boyar Fyodor Sheremetev, that the Russian people were exhausted during the years of unrest, often betrayed their rulers, and that she could not let her son go to the kingdom ... ". In this case, the official version is very similar to what actually happened, because Martha had reason to be afraid for her son. In addition, Mikhail's father, the future Patriarch Filaret, was then in Polish captivity. Most likely, the election of Mikhail was another compromise - in the early years, the tsar ruled with the help of the Zemsky Sobor,

where rotating elected representatives discussed and approved the tsar's decrees. However, the counterproductive role of the boyars in the end of the Troubles was, on the one hand, so great, and on the other hand, so obvious that then, it seems, they did not give much will to the boyar arrogance - it had to turn its tail for a long time. The position of Rus' turned out to be difficult again. Moscow was burned and plundered, like many Russian cities... The land was depopulated, thousands

of villages burned down, fields were trampled, robbers and hungry people multiplied... The treasury was empty.

The external situation also developed in a peculiar way... You can not even mention the increase in Tatar raids - they have become familiar just like steppe fires in dry times. When the Russian lands were occupied by the Poles, the Tatars were forced to hold back somewhat, but now the weakened Rus' turned out to be, it seems, easy prey. But the Tatars have not risen above the usual robbery for a long time, not claiming more ...

More dangerous was the persisting Polish aggressiveness, still encroaching on the very Russian statehood. The Poles occupied the region along the Dnieper and Desna with two dozen cities, and the prince Vladislav stood with the Polish army near Moscow and demanded that he be recognized as king. The Russians could not go out into the field, and just like the Poles themselves recently, they fought off Polish

attacks from behind the walls of the stone Kremlin. However, the Poles are brave only with the weak and disunited, and the main lesson of the Time of Troubles in Rus' was the understanding of the power of unification. On December 1, 1618, war-weary Poland had to conclude a truce with Moscow for 14 years, signed in the village of Deulino near the Trinity-Sergius Monastery. Russia ceded Smolensk, Chernigov and Novgorod-Seversk lands with 29 cities to the Commonwealth. At the same time, Prince Vladislav did not renounce

his claims to the Russian throne and the title "Tsar of All Rus'." The Swedes were in Novgorod and were not going to leave. The Vodskaya pyatina belonged to Veliky Novgorod from time immemorial, and now the Swedish ambassadors chuckled at the negotiations that had begun: "You will not see these cities like your ears" ... Nevertheless, on February 27, 1617, peace was concluded with the Swedes in the village of Stolbovo - through the mediation of Holland and England interested in restoring normal trade with Russia, primarily in the interests of the English and Dutch navies. At the conclusion of peace in Stolbovo, the official representative of the English

King James I, J. Merik, was present. According to the Stolbovsky Treaty between Russia and Sweden, the latter recognized the Romanov dynasty, returned to Russia the temporarily captured Novgorod, Staraya Russa, Porkhov, Ladoga, Gdov, but left behind Ivan-gorod, Yam, Koporye, Oreshek, Kexholm, Izhora, which belonged to Russia u

As a result, Russia then lost many lands in the Baltic zone, having lost access to the sea, and the Swedish king Gustav II Adolf, according to the Stolbovsky Treaty, became known as the sovereign of the land of Izhora. Speaking at a meeting of the Riksdag, he said: "Now, without our permission, the Russians will not be able to send even a single boat to the Baltic Sea; large lakes Ladoga and Peipus (that is, Pskov. - S.K.), Narvskaya Polyana, swamps thirty miles wide and solid fortresses separate us from them. Now the Russians have been deprived of access to the Baltic Sea and, I hope, it will not be so easy for them to step over this stream ...".

This position of Sweden unequivocally programmed the future Russian-Swedish wars.

According to the terms of the Deulinsky truce, an exchange of prisoners was to take place, and in early 1619, the father of Mikhail Fedorovich, the monk Filaret, returned from Polish captivity, in the world - Fyodor Nikitich Romanov. The tsar himself was a pale figure, so that from the moment he returned to Russia, his father, elected patriarch, actually ruled the state.

The position of Russia remained difficult, but before his death in 1633, Filaret strengthened the state building so much that it became clear to everyone both inside Russia and outside it that the Russian state was no longer threatened with internal

collapse. Today, from a distance of centuries, we know that the positive aftereffect of the era of Ivan the Terrible also affected this, but in real time, contemporaries see everything differently, rarely seeing in the current connection with the past. The role of the legacy of Grozny in the new strengthening of Rus' then, if understood, then only a few. And the fact that Rus' is strengthening under the hand of the tough Philaret and its forces are growing was seen by everyone in post-Troubled Russia.

At first, the outside world did not take the new Russia with the new dynasty seriously, and this caused a backlash. The author of an interesting monograph on the embassy customs of Rus' L.A. Yuzefovich writes that in the 10-20s of the 17th century, the new dynasty "still not firmly feeling on the throne, tried in every possible way to emphasize its legitimacy and continuity" with increased attention to the observance of the diplomatic ritual and demonstration

adherence to the "old times" ... "At this and only at this time," Yuzefovich emphasizes, "there arise in the West ideas about" petty stubbornness "interpolated to the previous era" ... At the same time, the previous era is understood, first of all, the era of Moscow diplomats often Ivan the Terrible. The period of the next "gathering of forces" lasted in Rus' for about 10 years. External threats did not disappear, but were temporarily mothballed. Since 1630, the formation of regular archery regiments

and regiments of a foreign system began. From 1635 to 1638, new "security lines" were built along the southern borders. The Volga region has long been firmly Russian, and the Volga peoples entered the general Russian life. Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk) was founded in 1636. Following Western Siberia, it was the turn of the Russian advance to Eastern Siberia, Krasnoyarsk was founded in 1628 ... And in 1632, Russia ventured into the war to return the Smolensk region and other lands captured by the Poles. The Smolensk War ended with the Treaty of Polyanovsky with the Commonwealth, signed on June 4, 1634, on the Polyanovka River between Vyazma and Dorogobuzh. Almost nothing was returned back, but Vladislav renounced the

rights to the Russian throne according to the Polyanovsky peace. The relative weakness of post-Troubled Russia also manifested itself in the story of Azov. In June 1637, this Turkish fortress at the mouth of the Don

was stormed by the Russian Don Cossacks ... The event was potentially the most important, and the Tatar raids stopped in real time.

The Donets fortified themselves and held out in the fortress recaptured from the Turks for five years - then the people composed songs about the "Azov Seat". The Cossacks offered Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich to keep Azov for the Muscovite state, but Peter's grandfather did not dare, fearing a complete discord with the Ottoman Porte. In January 1642, to resolve the issue of Azov, the Zemsky Sobor was convened, where 192 elected representatives from all classes, except for serfs and serfs, appeared. Formally, the Council was posed two questions: should we fight with Turkey and the Crimea for Azov, and if we fight, where will we get the money? But

in fact, it was a question of the readiness of the nation to reliably protect its southern borders and develop the potentially rich southern lands. A new, and considerable in its possible consequences, alternative emerged.

The answers of the class were given in the form of "petitions", and a revealing picture emerged. So, the clergy, who concentrated huge values in their hands, declared that it was their business to pray to God, and "the military business is not a custom for him." The contrast with the times of Sergius of Radonezh, who sent monks Peresvet and Oslabya with Dimitry Donskoy to the Kulikovo field, was evident. The Russian Church, from a factor of national unity, gradually became a national burden and a brake on state progress.

The boyars and the Moscow nobility disowned the Cossacks, because they are supposedly free, runaway people, and go along with them

it is forbidden.

The middle and petty nobility in their "petition" complained about the harassment of the governors, declared that they were ruined "more than the Turks and Crimean infidels by Moscow red tape" and demanded that money for the war be taken from the boyars, the clergy and clerks, who were getting rich on bribes ... The serving nobility also insisted that the collection of money should not be entrusted to orders, but to elected from the nobility and townspeople. At the same time, the nobles demanded the complete enslavement of the peasantry.

Large merchants - "guests" also complained about the governor and orders and demanded the introduction of an elected administration for the merchants, being also dissatisfied with the permission to trade in Rus' for foreigners.

In other words, already thirty years after the end of the Troubles, each propertied class was more concerned with its own than with national problems. And this despite the fact that the readiness of one church not only to bless the retention of Azov and the entire region, but also to allocate the necessary funds for this, which the church has *in abundance*, would be enough to ensure success. The boyars and merchants also had money. The Moscow townspeople

showed the most mature understanding of the moment and believed that the defense of Azov and its financing should become a matter for all classes. However, it became

it is clear that the contradictions between the estates are too great, that there is no unity necessary to start a difficult war. The

king sent an order to the Cossacks to leave Azov.

It's a pity... The pre-Petrine Russian XVII century, which began on February 21, 1613, with the election of the Zemsky Sobor to the reign of Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, continued from 1645 - after the death of the first Romanov, the reign of the father of the great Peter - Alexei Mikhailovich, which lasted until 1676. In

general, this period turned out to be a kind of intermediate period for Russia, although Alexei Mikhailovich would not have been Peter's father if he had not made his contribution to the further growth of Russia's capabilities

In addition, the situation for Russia was not developing in the worst way. Before her, as well as a hundred years ago, there were three main external problems: 1) the reunification with Russia of the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands that were under the rule of the Commonwealth; 2) ensuring access to the Baltic Sea; 3) effective neutralization of the Crimean Khanate and advancement in the South to the natural borders, that is, to the Azov and Black Seas and the

Caucasus. Each of the tasks was large-scale and difficult to solve. Here it was important to correctly set priorities, and correctly assess the possibilities, and understand how to use the contradictions between external enemies, if any.

And the contradictions between them were, and - serious. Poland and Sweden were in conflict with each other over the Baltics. Poland and Turkey with Crimea - because

of Ukraine ... In the fight against Poland, Sweden, Turkey and Crimea turned out to be natural allies. But, fighting for the Baltic with Sweden, Russia needed peace with Poland, and it was necessary to give up Ukraine, as in the case of an alliance with Poland against Turkey. However, by the middle of the 17th century, such prospects emerged that made it possible in the near future, concluding only temporary alliances (or doing without them at all), to solve all three historical tasks - in the North, in the North-West, in

the South-East and in the South . Firstly, the Polish gentry "republic" behaved more and more recklessly, wanting to have everything without cooperating with anyone. The magnates tore apart the already fragile Polish-Lithuanian

always ready to raise a "legitimate" rebellion against the central government - "rokosh" ...

Secondly, Sweden also pursued a broad aggressive policy, both in Poland, and in Western Europe, getting bogged down in its problems.

On the Ukrainian lands, a liberation war began under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The theme of the oppression of

the Russian Slavs by the Poles in the southwestern Russian lands that fell under the rule of the Poles is little touched upon in this book, but not because this topic is insignificant in Russian history, but precisely because it deserves a separate study. However, now it would be appropriate to recall, at least briefly, that foreign orders began to deprive the Russian people in Ukraine almost immediately after in 1569, according to the Union of Lublin, when Lithuania and Poland united into the Commonwealth, together with Lithuania, Ukraine was annexed to Poland. ... Ukraine was included in the Commonwealth "on the rights of a free country with a free population ...", as the author of the famous "History of the

Zaporizhian Cossacks", pre-revolutionary Ukrainian historian Dmitry Yavornitsky, wrote, and he himself continued: "It was said so on paper, but not that's how it actually happened. Acting under the authority of the Commonwealth, the Ukrainian population found here instead of "golden freedom" ... "indispensable slavery" ... ". Here is just the chronology: 1569 - the Union of Lublin ... 1591-93 years - an uprising against the Poles led by Krishtof Kosinsky ... 1594-96 years - an uprising in Ukraine and Belarus by Severin Nalivaiko and Grigory Loboda ... Then

there was the Great Troubles in Russia, when Moscow people served the Poles, and the Zaporizhian Cossacks went to Moscow with the Poles, but the turmoil ended in 1613. And anti-Polish uprisings began again ... 1630 - the uprising of Taras Tryasila, 1635 - Ivan Sulima. 1637-38 - in Ukraine, the flames

of the uprising of Pavlyuk, Dmitry Guni and Yakov Ostryanin ... And in 1648 the struggle of the great Bogdan begins ... With such a promising foreign policy alignment, Russia entered the second half of the 17th century.

Since 1645, the future father of the future has reigned on the Russian throne Peter the Great - Alexei Mikhailovich (1629-1676).

They called him "The Quietest", and - for good reason. According to all evidence, he was really quite a gentle and fairly fair person - one, by the way, of the most educated in Moscow society. At the same time, his purely state hypostasis was by no means weak and weak-willed ... And it was impossible to reign "lying on his side" in times that contemporaries called "Rebellious". In the 1930s and 1950s, about thirty urban uprisings took place on the territory of the Muscovite state. It was during the reign of the "quietest" father Peter that the uprising of Stepan Razin and its suppression fell.

Unsustainable taxes caused discontent in the cities and among the people - the eternal cause of discontent in absolutist states. Collections of archery and yamsky (for the maintenance of mail) money were especially difficult. It is interesting to

compare the solution of the last question - the postal one, in Rus' and in the Holy Roman Empire of the German people. Russian mail with a system of postal stations "pits" became one of the few positive borrowings from the Mongols. And at one time, the Russian post office was at its best - let me remind you that at the beginning of the 16th century Baron Herberstein admired her, who covered the 500-kilometer journey from Novgorod to Moscow in just 72 hours. In Europe, the development of mail is associated with the name of

Taxis. The first "postal" agreement with Janett Taxis was concluded in Innsbruck around 1488 by Emperor Frederick III. In 1516, Franz von Taxis strengthened the situation by agreeing with Maximilian I on the organization of a postal service between Brussels, Verona, Rome and Naples, and since then the Taxis post, improving, has become a profitable enterprise. In 1615, Emperor Matthew transferred the position of postmaster general to the Taxis family in hereditary possession. The ability of Europe to extract income where Rus' had a loss should have led to quite definite reflections,

But...

But the business initiative in Rus' was gradually lost. Since arrears accumulated on the archery and yamsky fees, these fees were canceled, introducing instead of them in 1646

"salt" tax - at the suggestion of a wealthy merchant Nazarius Pure.

Everyone buys salt, and salt collections were commonplace in all countries - no other tax in France, for example, was hated as much as "gabel" - a tax on salt. However, in Rus' then

they went too far with salt. Salt doubled in price, and tax collectors sometimes fought five times more than they should. They stopped buying salt, the treasury only lost, and the authorities were smart enough to cancel the salt tax in December 1647. Nevertheless, the revolt that broke out in Moscow in June 1648 was called both by contemporaries and later by historians, "Salt".

The "salt" of this speech by the Muscovites was not in the "salt" tax - already canceled, but in the unfair layout of state taxes in general. And the events of 1648 must be dealt with separately.

"Liberals" represent the Russian state of the times of Ivan the Terrible and, accordingly, the post-Ivanovo state, as a kingdom of alleged tyranny, where the slave people were silent. Pushkin's remark in "Boris Godunov" - "The people are silent", historians and intellectuals have taken and are taking to a "sign" level...

And this is at a time when, in fact, the Russian people during the 16th and 17th centuries were increasingly outliving the "Mongolian" syndrome and restoring the "veche" beginning in their thickness. If a stratum of voiceless "vanek-manek" grew up in the Russian people, and not a stratum of Ivanov da Mariy, then there could be no talk of any mighty Russia of the 18th century! In its place, we will get acquainted with the opinion of the intelligent German Christopher Heinrich Manstein, which would not hurt to knock on the forehead of all slanderers of the Russian people.

By the middle of the 17th century, there were 27 thousand households in Moscow, but only the "black" settlements carried the "sovereign tax": merchants, artisans and hired "working people". The "white" settlements of archers and artisans who worked for the royal court, as well as boyar and monastic settlements, were not taxed. At the same time, the prosperous layer of the "black" settlements - the "best", tried to shift the main tax burden onto the "middle" and "young", among which were cabbies, laborers, barge haulers ... The same

The situation was in other cities as well. His unnaturalness and injustice nourished natural popular discontent.

Boyar Morozov was especially hated. The tutor of Tsar Alexei, his senior comrade and relative, Boris (Ilya) Ivanovich Morozov (c. 1590–1661), was then the actual head of the government, was in charge of the treasury, archers and foreign affairs. The largest landowner (8 thousand households, 55 thousand souls), he owned land in 13 counties and a number of fishing villages. Morozov's relatives were no more loved - the head of the "outfit", that is, artillery, Trakhaniotov, who ruled the "black" settlements Leonty Pleshcheev, as well as the clerk from the merchants Nazarius Chisty ... In April 1648, a

collection of noble militia - cavalry was appointed in Moscow. The capital was filled with visitors, prices immediately jumped. Enough in Moscow and dissatisfied petitioners from the field, faced with red tape in the capital's orders. On June 1, 1648, when the

tsar, surrounded by nobility and archers, was returning from pilgrimage from the Trinity Monastery, a petition was filed against Pleshcheev. The archers began to disperse the people, and on the orders of Morozov, a dozen and a half people were arrested. The next day, during the procession from the Kremlin to the Sretensky Monastery, a new attempt was made to submit a petition, and a riot had already begun. Streltsy, dissatisfied with non-payment of salaries, were ready to support the people against the boyars, but not the boyars against the people.

The noble militia took a neutral position - the events did not directly affect the nobles, and were even indirectly beneficial to them. The crowd

broke into the Kremlin, two boyars sent by Alexei Mikhailovich for negotiations were beaten. The rebels also did not listen to the bewildered tsar, who came out onto the porch, and moved to smash - first Morozov's courtyard in the Kremlin, and then the courtyards of Trakhaniotov, Pleshcheev, Nazarius Chisty and other merchants and clerks at the same time. Serfs from the boyar households joined the townspeople. As usual, fires

started... Dyak Pure was killed and thrown on a dunghill - "for salt." Pleshcheev was handed over by the tsar to the crowd on June 3 and stoned to death. Trakhaniotov tried to escape, but was detained by order of the tsar and executed on Red Square on June 5. The tsar himself asked for

was exiled to the Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery. The archers were given a salary, they were treated to wine and honey in the

Kremlin. From June 5, the intensity of passions subsided, and Tsar Alexei turned out to be not so incompetent already at the beginning of his reign - when he was not even twenty years old, if he did not begin to chop off violent heads, but began preparing state reform.

The Moscow uprising was also echoed by uprisings in Solvychevodsk, Ustyug the Great, Solikamsk, Kozlov (now Michurinsk), Kursk, Voronezh, Oskol, Tomsk, Surgut ... Everywhere they were directed against the boyars and clerks. What kind of "servility" of

the people and the "tyranny" of the king, allegedly exuding "Byzantine splendor" and recognizing only "lack of words", can we talk here? On the contrary, there is a quite definite and rather pronounced social activity of the masses here, who turned out to be able, by their actions, to influence the authorities in the direction they needed. Moreover, it is characteristic that the readiness for concessions was then shown

by the central government - the tsar, and the higher boyars provoked excesses with their self-interest.

On September 1, 1648, the Zemsky Sobor was convened to develop a new code of laws. Morozov also participated in its work, returning to Moscow on October 22 and again taking over the reins of the current government. When developing the articles of the new Code, the materials of the "petitions" of the "Azov" Council of 1642 were also used ...

The Council Code of 1649 finally took shape serfdom, the judicial system was improved and the concept of state crime was introduced for the first time. The management system was structured fundamentally more deeply and broadly. The division of settlements in the settlements into "black" and "white" was destroyed, and the entire population of the settlement was subject to taxes and duties in favor of the state. The Code of 1649 became the main code of state laws of Russia for almost 200 years - only in 1835 did the manifesto of Emperor Nicholas I appear on the introduction of the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire. The administrative system of Alexei Mikhailovich, with

its almost seventy orders, became the pinnacle of pre-Petrine Russia and was

already highly branched and debugged. With the assistance of the king, in 1653 the Customs Charter was adopted, and in 1667, the New Trade Charter, which contributed to the development of domestic and foreign trade. The development of industry was encouraged, in Russia, there were iron-working, potash, glass factories, salt works, there was a blacksmith, leather, linen, soap-making production ... And all this was still happening

in an atmosphere of not "silence" and social inertia. On the contrary, the very dynamics of state development in a divided society programmed unrest. The last major urban uprising in Rus' was the so-called "Copper Riot" - the uprising of Muscovites in the summer of 1662. Russia then waged wars with Poland and Sweden for the return of Russian lands and access to the Baltic. Government spending was huge, the tax burden increased greatly. Since 1654, the government began to resort to the issuance of defective silver money, then moving on to the "copper" turnover. At the same time, taxes and taxes were accepted only in silver coins. On the night of July 25, 1662, proclamations were posted around

Moscow, accusing the boyars of abuse and calling for an uprising. This fact itself testifies to a thorough preliminary preparation, and the fact that the alarm bell uprising immediately acquired a mass character only confirms the premeditated plan.

The rebels moved to the royal residence in Kolomenskoye, and the tsar was forced to enter into negotiations with them. However, this time Aleksey was simply gaining time - after pulling up the troops, the Copper Riot was brutally suppressed - several thousand people were captured, many of whom were executed or branded and sentenced to eternal exile in Siberia.

Tough measures were explained to a large extent by wartime, but the very intensification of the class struggle was an objective reaction to the unwillingness, first of all, of the boyars to alleviate social oppression.

The peak of social confrontation was the peasant war of 1667-1771 under the leadership of Stepan Razin. This powerful phenomenon of the social life of pre-Petrine Rus' was, of course, unequivocally only a class one - there was an element of revelry in it,

and it is hardly possible to talk about the progressive potential of the "razinschina" - it did not give practical results in terms of alleviating the situation of the serfs. However, the completely mass and completely peasant character of Razin's uprising proves not its "robbery", but its social meaning. No wonder the uprising was suppressed by the tsarist troops with exceptional cruelty. Razin himself was quartered in Moscow on June 6, 1671. However, the

Russian elite did not draw proper conclusions from the events. The feudal regime intensified further... A century and a half

before the "razinshchina", the German feudal lords no less bloodily suppressed the performance of the peasant "Bashmak Union" under the leadership of Thomas Müntzer. And then the social oppression in Germany was also strengthened - in terms of social stupidity, the German feudal lords were second only to the Russian feudal lords. But even the Germans gradually grew wiser, and only the Russian elite showed enduring social myopia, explained by special greed and inability to understand the essence of time.

Nevertheless, the Russian state lived and expanded. In particular, Aleksey Mikhailovich took such an important step in the history of Russia as the reunification of Ukraine with Russia in 1654. This act was sanctioned on October 1, 1653 by the last Zemsky Sobor in Russian history. And in 1654, at the Pereyaslav Rada, Bohdan Khmelnytsky announced the reunification of Ukraine (so far only the Left Bank) with Russia.

Looking ahead, it can be noted that the strengthening of Russia, its subsequent successes in the confrontation with Poland and Sweden reduced the intensity of Polish-Ukrainian passions, and anti-Polish popular uprisings, which had been almost constant before, subsided for almost a hundred years. But in 1768, the Right-Bank Ukraine (still under Poland) was shaken by Koliivshchyna, sung by the immortal Shevchenko. In 1832-35, Ustim Karmalyuk (1787-1835) beat the Polish pans in Podolia and Volhynia. Right-bank Ukraine was then already part of Russia, and Karmalyuk fought not against the Russian tsar, but against the Polish pandom. Yes, the tsarist authorities caught him and handed him over to the soldiers (and, of course, they couldn't do otherwise), but his life was cut short by a Polish, pansky treacherous bullet ...

The Karmalyuk movement turned out to be the last major uprising of the Ukrainian people against the Polish oppressors, but the Ukrainian people never rebelled against Moscow. Yes, for example, Yurko, the son of the liberator from panism - Bogdan Khmelnytsky, signed the Slobodischensky treaty in 1660, returning Ukraine under the rule of Poland ... So what?

In the history of Ukraine, there have been other things like that... Is it possible to find in it examples of leaders who fought against the dominance of Poland? Can! For example, Hetman Doroshenko (1627–1698). While still a colonel at Khmelnytsky, he participated in the liberation war of the Ukrainian people against the Polish-gentry dominion, carried out the diplomatic missions of Bohdan. But in the same story, many Ukrainian leaders are also found who were drawn under the rule of the Polish king. For example, Hetman Doroshenko...

And in the history of Ukraine there is an example of a leader who seized the hetman's power already with the help of the Crimean Tatars and gave Ukraine to the Turkish sultan. And his name was... Petro Doroshenko!

And, of course, in Ukrainian history there are many leaders who are close to the Muscovite state, for example, the same hetman Petro Dorofeevich Doroshenko. In 1676, during the reign of Fyodor Alekseevich, he came to confess to the Russian government, and was ... appointed governor in Vyatka.

In 1684, Doroshenko received possession of five villages near Volokolamsk and a thousand households in the village of Yaropolche, where in 1698 (already under Tsar Peter) he died peacefully.

"You need a head to the mace," they said then in Ukraine. Bogdan Khmelnytsky had both. Alas, after his death, the usual Russian history began in Ukraine: there is no head, there is no business ... The Ukrainian elite found itself at the turning point in the history of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian people no more national than a considerable part of the Great Russian elite. The historian of the Ukrainian Cossacks Dmitry Yavornytsky writes: "After the death of Bohdan, ambitious

people arose (this was written not in 2015, but at the end of the 19th century. - S.K.), pursuing their personal interests, and it is not surprising that throughout Little Russia time such strife, turmoil and civil strife, as a result of which

Ukraine of that time can be called a "self-love fair", and its powerful persons "self-devouring dragons" ... The people themselves

aptly named the era after Bohdan Khmelnytsky "Ruin" ... Discords came, however, not from the majority or the masses, but from the minority, "powerful" or "significant" persons and higher spiritual persons of Ukraine: while the Ukrainian mass gravitated towards Russia, "significant" persons and clergy, brought up in the Polish spirit, were drawn, with a few exceptions, to the Polish order and Polish life ... The offended people and the suppressed

Cossack The mob incessantly tried to seek their rights ... The noble class in general was drawn to Poland; the estate of the embassy (that is, the peasants. - S.K.) and the Cossack rabble were drawn to Moscow, but, not always having politically developed leaders or often misled by secret supporters of Poland, sometimes opposed Moscow ... ".

So Yavornitsky wrote in 1892, but he could have written in ... 2015 year, replacing Poland with America.

However, then the second Ukrainian "Ruin" was still far away, and after the Pereyaslav Rada - on February 5, 1654, the Russian tsar for the first time called himself "autocrat of all Great **and Small** Russia."

Aleksei Mikhailovich, as said, also led external wars. The Council of 1653 approved an emergency tax on the war with Poland, and already in 1654 Smolensk and Polotsk were taken, in 1655 Minsk and Vilna. The tsar himself took a personal part in the "Polish" campaign. Finally, he returned to Moscow only at the end of 1655 - when the plague epidemic stopped in Moscow, which wiped out a third of the population. The plague was then a common scourge, regularly affecting Western Europe as well. Hostilities in the

"Polish" direction were periodically resumed further, but the "Polish" problem in the reign of Tsar Alexei was resolved, in fact, finally and triumphantly. In 1667, a "truce" was concluded in Andrusov near Smolensk, according to which the Commonwealth legally returned Smolensk and Chernihiv lands to Russia, and also recognized the inclusion of left-bank Ukraine with Kiev into Russia.

In 1686, the "truce" was secured by the "eternal peace", but the truce itself determined a completely new European "status quo". The German history professor Hans-Joachim Torke rightly calls the Andrusovo "truce" "the beginning of the end of Poland as a great power" and emphasizes the fact that after that for Russia there arose - as a direct - already Turkish

danger.

The Polish danger was no longer a source of headache for Moscow, and Alexei Mikhailovich ventured to try to solve the "Baltic" problem as well.

After the conclusion of the Peace of Stolbovsky in 1617, which cut off Russia from access to the Baltic Sea, the Swedish king Gustav II Adolf boasted that it would not be so easy for the Russians ... to step over this stream ... Mikhailovich tried to do this during the Russian-Swedish war, which lasted until 1658. This next "northern" war began successfully. The main forces of the Russian army advanced towards Riga along the

Western Dvina (Daugava) on 1,400 plows and barges. Then Dinaburg (now - Daugavpils) and Kokenhausen (now - Koknese), located in the lower reaches of the Western Dvina, were taken with battle. They were renamed Borisoglebov and Tsarevichev-Dmitriev. At the initiative of the prominent pre-Petrine statesman voivode Ordin-Nashchokin, construction of ships for the Baltic began in Tsarevichevo-Dmitriev -

about a hundred and a half kilometers from Riga. However, the increasing backwardness of Russia, including the military one, which was especially visible against the backdrop of the powerful Swedish army, had an effect. And according to the peace treaty of 1661,

Tsarevichev-Dmitriev had to be returned to Sweden. The ships were burned. The Kardis Treaty of 1661, concluded in the town of Kardis (now the town of Kärde in Estonia), ended the Russian-Swedish war of 1656-58 with "eternal peace". The

treaty restored the situation of the Stolbovsky treaty. Russia was again completely cut off from the Baltic Sea.

But it was under Alexei "The Quietest" that the Russians began to explore the Pacific coast - in 1647 Okhotsk was founded. In 1648, Semyon Dezhnev undertook his campaign, reaching the extreme eastern tip of Asia - the cape, later named after him... In 1620, after a three-month voyage on the northern tip of the Cape Cod peninsula, 41 families of Puritan settlers landed on board the Mayflower ship - these were the famous "Pilgrim Fathers" in US history. Thus was founded

the British colony of New Plymouth. In some respects, America has no natural history of its own—almost from the beginning, history has been shaped by mighty external forces, shaped with a long-term vision. And for this, in many ways **constructed**, history, reference legendary points were needed. One of them

was the alleged "epopee" of the Mayflower with the adoption on board by the "pilgrim fathers" of the charter of a self-governing community. The influx of English Puritans across the ocean was growing - in 1630, six settlements were formed on the shores of Massachusetts Bay, including Boston. However, the Dutch West India Company also worked for the future United States, which founded the colony of New Holland in America and secured Manhattan Island, the

basis of the future Anglo-Saxon New York. It would seem that all this was so far from the Moscow of Alexei "Quiet" and its problems ... However, the movement of Alexeev's Russia to the east - to the Asian shores of the Pacific Ocean, led it in the future to the northwestern American shores of the Pacific Ocean, to Russian America, where the interests of Russia and the West were to collide.

However, this was already in the next - Peter and Catherine 18th century, but for now, the 17th century dominated

the court. By the beginning of the 70s of the XVII century, the new position of Russia - both external and internal, was clearly visible from the composition of the highest bodies of state administration - seventy orders that were either formed or developed during the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich. So, in Moscow since the 60s, in addition to the old orders like

orders of the Kostroma quarter, which were in charge of the old regions, new separate orders appeared: the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; principality of Smolensk; Livonian Affairs, Little Russia, Kalmyk Affairs... All of them were in charge of the lands that were again part of Russia... The Ambassadorial Prikaz was actively working at the

same time. The defense was in charge of the Bronny, Pushkar, Discharge, Barrel, Streltsy, Cossack orders, as well as the orders of the Gathering of military people and the Gathering of archery bread ... In addition, the order of Great Russia controlled the territory of the frontier "Sloboda" regiments of Sloboda Ukraine -

Sumy, Kharkov, etc. Separate Inozemsky and Pansky orders were in charge of foreigners

in the Russian service ... The Aptekarsky, Upper Printing House, Zhitny, Stone Affairs, Monastic, Polonyanichny (for the ransom of prisoners), Silver, Counting, Detective, Kholopye Court, Petition, etc. orders

worked ... And, nevertheless, all this was not enough - catastrophically little. The epoch and the outside world threw new challenges to Russia, but many in Russia - let alone "many", the absolute majority - did not see this. Accordingly, a crisis was brewing, the potential for another bifurcation was ripening.

Alexei Mikhailovich reigned from 1645 to 1676, that is, thirty-one years. This thirtieth anniversary of Russian history is also not very much sought after by the attention of historical science, although important processes took place at that time, both positive and negative. And the main struggle did not

unfold openly - as was the case as a result of the church reform of Patriarch Nikon, begun in 1653 and marked the beginning of a split into "Nikonians" and "Old Believers".

The Russian schism is a socially ambiguous phenomenon, since the way of life and worldview of the schismatics were a good basis for the economic success of the schismatic communities. Later, a number of well-known names of Russian merchants and industrialists emerged from among the schismatics.

But as a purely spiritual trend, the schism is not curious - the struggle between the Nikonians, who were baptized with three fingers - "pinch", and

by the Old Believers, who were baptized with two fingers, by and large resembled the disputes between the “blunt-pointed” and “pointed-pointed” in Swift’s Lilliput, who could not agree on which end to break a boiled egg at breakfast. Both the Nikonians and the

Old Believers, although to varying degrees, were obscurants and xenophobes, that is, enemies of scientific knowledge and knowledge, enemies of European culture. Their discussions are not only few, but completely uninteresting for a thinking historian. One can only be surprised that Klyuchevsky wrote about the patriarch: “From the Russian people of the 17th century. I don’t know a person bigger and more original than Nikon...” – Nikon was by no means a Russian Richelieu or Mazarin, his purely state significance, if it took place, was only in a negative way. But the church schism occurred openly and split not only the “tops”, but

also the “bottoms”. But the struggle among the secular elite between the adherents of preserving the old order of things in secular and state life and the innovators was not so open. It was less noticeable already because it took place almost exclusively in the “top”. On the other hand, its historical significance for the future of Russia was immeasurably greater than the idle disputes of churchmen and even the exodus of the Old

Believers into backwaters. Vasily Osipovich Klyuchevsky, referring to somewhat different times, nevertheless very accurately described the situation in which pre-Petrine Russia found itself in the middle and end of the 17th century ... Referring to an educated Russian person, Klyuchevsky wrote that he “fell himself in an awkward position: then what he knew turned out to be unnecessary, and

what he needed

he did not know. The formula is right! “He knew the sublime legend about the moral decline of the world and about the transformation of Moscow into the third Rome,” continued Klyuchevsky, “but artillery, fortification, mining, medical knowledge was needed to save the third Rome from the fallen world. He could count on his fingers all the heresies of Roman, Luthor or Armenian, but he did not know the blatant domestic vices or pretended not to notice ... An educated Russian man knew Russian reality as it is, but did not guess what she needed and what he should do ”...

However, everything was both so and not so ... For example, the boyar Artamon Sergeevich Matveev (1625–1682) knew Russian reality and guessed what to do. The head of the Ambassadorial, Little Russian and Aptekarsky orders, he was married to a Scot from the "German" settlement Lady Hamilton (in Orthodoxy, Evdokia Grigorievna) and enjoyed a reputation as a supporter of not only Western customs, but also broad ties with the West in general - not only trade and political, but and cultural and social. After the death of Tsar Alexei, Artamonov fell into disgrace and returned to Moscow only in May 1682 - in order to soon die during the Streltsy rebellion - the so-called "Khovanshchina" ... Here is another major "Alekseevsky" nobleman - Afanasy

Lavrentievich Ordin-Nashchokin (c.1605–1680), diplomat and statesman. A broad-minded person, being a governor in Pskov, he managed to ensure the stabilization of the situation there, tense after the uprising of 1650, not by executions, but by reforms.

The "New Trade Charter" of 1667, which strengthened the position of the merchants as opposed to the boyars and the clerks, is the brainchild of Ordin Nashchokin. He promised the merchants a separate Merchant Order, but this idea was realized only much later in the form of the Petrine Commerce Collegium. Klyuchevsky singled out Ordin-Nashchokin so much from the general series that he dedicated a separate chapter

to him in his course on Russian history. In Peter's times, Ordin-Nashchokin, a small estate nobleman, would certainly have gained a strong position and become an outstanding ally of Peter, and in pre-Petrine times, despite personal friendship with the tsar, Ordin-Nashchokin's possibilities turned out to be limited. And in 1672, after his son had fled to the West, he took the veil as a monk.

But why did the young Nashchokin run away? Georgy Plekhanov, the first Russian Marxist, assesses this escape as follows: "Escapes to Lithuania were not uncommon in Muscovite Rus'. But the mood of the young Nashchokin hardly had much in common with the moods of the fugitives of the past. They were not "sickened", as he was, in general by the Moscow order; they were looking abroad not for enlightenment, but perhaps only for the aristocratic boyar "will" ... ".

Plekhanov determined the motives for Nashchokin's escape "to enlightenment" psychologically and historically accurately. It was only necessary to add that in, again, the time of Peter the Great, Nashchokin Jr. would not have fled to Europe, but would have been **sent** there by Tsar Peter! And he would, no doubt, become one of the "chicks of

Petrov's nest" ... Okolnichiy Fyodor Mikhailovich Rtishchev (1626-1673) was a member of the inner circle of the tsar ... Klyuchevsky wrote: "For all the dissimilarity of characters and activities, one common feature brought Rtishchev and Ordin-Nashchokin together: both of them were new people of their time and each did a new thing, one in politics, the other in moral life. In this they differed from Tsar Alexei, who grew into ancient Russian antiquity with his mind and heart, and only amused himself

with novelty, decorating his environment with it ... ". If Ordin-Nashchokin acted in the sphere of foreign policy and domestic economic policy, realizing the need to develop the productive forces, then Rtishchev tried to soften and enlighten morals. He paid much attention to social issues, founded a school in the Andreevsky Monastery, the first

hospital, as well as an almshouse and an orphanage. Rtishchev and Simeon Polotsky, along with Prince Ivan Petrovich Pronsky, were the educators of Tsarevich Alexei Alekseevich (1654–1670), and the heir to the throne

was brought up in the spirit of growing Western influence. The tsarevich showed great promise, and if not for his early death, then after Alexei Mikhailovich, not the weak and sickly Fyodor Mikhailovich, but a strong tsar, ready to carry out reforms, could have become the head of Russia. One can only guess - could Alexei, this half-blooded deceased brother of Peter, do what Peter did? But it can be confidently asserted that Peter's reforms were not a whim of Peter, but the realization of trends that had arisen in Russian society decades before Peter. Returning to Klyuchevsky's formula, we can say that already in late pre-Petrine Russia, a layer of Russian people was expanding, who knew what Russia needed, but this layer did not yet determine the situation and did not have a powerful leader, which in Russia could only be an

The highest boyars did not need such a tsar - it was hostile to such a tsar in advance, even before his possible appearance. "Service people" were potentially more loyal. And,

perhaps, it was the service part of Russian society - both civilian and, moreover, military - who understood better than others that Russia was falling further and further behind the West. This was especially evident in the most important sphere for the state - the military.

Academician Sergei Fedorovich Platonov (1860–1933) was right when he wrote in his work "Moscow and the West" that "in numerous combat clashes with enemy detachments, the Russians became convinced that their military art is much lower than that of the "Germans", where it is turned into a special, highly developed craft ... ", and that as a result of this, the Russians" came to the conclusion that ... it is necessary to

adopt their military equipment from the "Germans". A certain craving for the achievements of Europe was observed even before Alexei Mikhailovich. So, the regiments of the "foreign system" - Reiter, Dragoon and soldier, were first formed in addition to the archery army under the first

Romanov - Mikhail Fedorovich in 1631-1632. The famous "German" settlement was formed in Moscow, although quite spontaneously, but a long time ago - from prisoners captured in the Livonian War by Ivan the Terrible. During the Time of Troubles, it was destroyed, but by the 60s of the 17th century it had grown again and became an integral part of the life of Moscow. Another thing is that Tsar Alexei did not particularly gravitate towards the knowledge of its inhabitants,

although he brought the Scot Patrick Gordon, the future teacher and associate of young Peter, closer to him. And this lack of a powerful impulse from the pinnacle of power - an impulse for renewal, radical transformation and familiarization with the achievements of Europe, again led Russia off the straight historical path sideways. The invasion of Batu in two years threw Rus' back two centuries, and we have not been able to eliminate this civilizational gap in sacramental two hundred years. Even at the end of the 17th century, Russian society was not nearly as developed intellectually, educationally and technologically as, for example, the Italian society of the late 15th century, in which

The passions of Archpriest Avvakum, a member of the Circle of Zealots of Piety under the young Alexei Mikhailovich and the author of the amazing autobiographical Life, were not inferior in strength and power to the passions of Dante, the author of The Divine Comedy. However, the intellectual, educational and social basis of the great Italian, who died in 1321, was, whatever one may say, immeasurably higher than that of Habakkuk burned in 1682.

Humanly, Awakum was equal to Thomas More, who in 1535 in London laid his head on the chopping block for his beliefs, or Giordano Bruno, who was burned in Rome in 1600 for the same... information about the world that mankind possessed by that time. But Avvakum... Young Ordin-Nashchokin wanted to be useful to the Motherland, but useful in its transformation, in the

elimination of

its backwardness. And his then homeland not only did not welcome such impulses, but stupidly rejected them.

Former members of the Circle of Zealots of Piety - Nikon, who became patriarch, and Avvakum, who became the head of the Old Believer schism, remained unanimous to the end in one thing - in rejecting the idea of not only usefulness, but also the vital necessity for the future of Russia of the widest and most diverse connection to European knowledge - scientific , technological, social, and to the European practice of life in its constructive aspects.

But one very significant circumstance should not be overlooked here... When

comparing the civilizational level of various social strata in Western Europe and in Russia by the middle of the 17th century, that is, the level of intellectual development, education, familiarization with scientific knowledge, culture, etc. , an interesting and ambiguous picture is revealed when comparing **separately** the European and Russian "lower classes", and the European and Russian "tops" ...

If we do not take into account the declassed elements, then the lowest (and overwhelmingly massive) social stratum in both Europe and Russia was the peasantry, so let's start with it ...

In his Journey from Moscow to St. Petersburg, Pushkin gave a description by the French writer of the 17th century, Jean de La Bruyère (1645–1696), of French peasants - contemporaries of Russian peasants from the time of Alexei Mikhailovich.

In 1688, La Bruyère, in his famous book "Characters or Morals of this Century", showed both the insignificance of the French aristocracy - no more morally attractive than the Russian boyars, and the plight of the French peasantry, about which La Bruyère wrote: "Some wild animals are scattered across the fields, males and females, black, with earth-coloured faces, burned by the sun, bent over the earth, which they dig and pick with irresistible tenacity; they seem to have articulate speech, and when they straighten up on their feet, we see a human face; and indeed they are people. At night they retire to their lairs, where they feed on black bread, water and roots; they save other people from the labor of sowing, cultivating and gathering for food and deserve not to suffer a lack of bread, which

sow themselves...

Even if we make allowance for the possible polemical sharpening of the issue by La Bruyère, the position of the French peasant masses in the "enlightened" age of Louis XIV cannot be envied. Yes,

and it is unlikely that La Bruyère exaggerated ... Let's say, frog legs and snails are among the delicacies of modern "French" cuisine, but they came to this kitchen not from an aristocratic table, but from the "lair" of starving French peasants. In other words, even by the end of the 17th century,

the masses of Europe, and above all the peasantry, were just as far from the achievements of European culture and science, from education and civilization, as were the Russian masses. Raphael, Titian, Rubens, El Greco, Dante, Erasmus, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Molière, Galileo and Paracelsus were also unknown to the French Ivan in a wooden sabó, as well as to the Russian Ivan in bast shoes.

At the same time, the social and material situation of the Russian common people was even more advantageous. So, Pushkin refers to the opinion of Fonvizin, who traveled around France already in the middle of the 18th century. Fonvizin wrote that "in good conscience, the fate of the Russian

the peasant seemed to him happier than the fate of the French farmer" ... Pushkin himself writes about the contemporary Russian peasant of the first third of the 19th century: "Look at the Russian peasant: is there even a shadow of slavish humiliation in his steps and speech? There is nothing to say about his courage and intelligence ...".

Finally, I will cite an even later opinion of Chernyshevsky, who, half a century after Pushkin, in the article "Is it the beginning of a change?" declared: "It is difficult for a Russian peasant to connect two practical thoughts in a sensible way in his head, ... his mind is too clumsy, the routine has settled into his thought so tightly that it does not allow to move anywhere - this is true; but what kind of peasant surpasses our speed of understanding? Everyone says the same about the German villager, the same about the French, the English almost ranks even lower. their...".

And Chernyshevsky judged the Russian peasant too harshly - from time immemorial, the Russian economy was developed mainly by people from the peasantry, and by no means the nobility.

Comparison of the inhabitants of European and Russian cities of the XV-XVII centuries will be far from in favor of the Russians. But even here the Russian craftsman could teach the Parisian craftsman something. Nevertheless, the social development of European and Russian cities and their infrastructure also differed greatly. However, the plague

was then a scourge both in Hamburg and Ryazan ... The mass development of then wooden, and not stone, construction in Rus' cannot, by the way, be attributed to signs of backwardness. The court physician of Alexei Mikhailovich of the English, Samuel Collins, who lived in Moscow from 1659 to 1669, wrote to a friend in London: "The Russians think that wooden rooms are much healthier than stone ones, and not without reason, because in their stone chambers thick vaults emit from evaporation itself, especially when the oven heated...".

Today we know for sure that our ancestors were right - all other things being equal, a modern person would prefer to live in a wooden dwelling, rather than in a concrete one. However, the crowding of Russian wooden cities - with their vastness and predominantly one-story character, was one of the causes of crushing fires. "However," Adolf Lisek noted in his notes,

secretary of the Austrian embassy in Moscow in 1675 - it's not a big deal if the house burns down. The belongings of the Russians are stored in a hole dug under the house, and remain intact "...

Nevertheless, such houses were, as foreigners unanimously noted, "bad" and primitive, so that in the long term the replacement of wood with stone - in the European way, turned out to be inevitable in cities. Lisek,

mentioned above, gives interesting, although often superficially understood, pictures of urban Russian customs, while noting that "ordinary people, like ***in other countries*** (bold italics mine. - S.K.), are prone to vices." Lizek clearly describes from nature how "the husbands lay drunk, unconscious, and the wives sat next to them, and taking off their clothes after clothes, put the kisser on the wine and feasted until they lost the use of reason and even the ability to drink ... ". But the same Lizek writes that "Russian women are as beautiful as they are smart ...", but when drunk, as a vice, they do not remain beauties.

Lizek notes the love of Russians for steam baths and admits that "curiosity lured us to look into the garden where the baths were, and we saw more than three hundred Dian ..." But then he notes: "We were mistaken, however, in our assumption that in these countries know no shame; it is the instinct of nature"... It was, of course, not the instinct of nature – the aborigines of the tropics are not very burdened with this "instinct". In general, when reading the notes of foreigners about Russia

by Alexei Mikhailovich, one cannot bear the impression that the Russian urban "lower classes" were socially and psychologically downtrodden and undeveloped in comparison with the European urban "lower classes". But if you start comparing the civilizational level on the upper

social "floors", it turns out that comparing the European elite of the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries with the Russian elite of the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries is simply meaningless, like comparing heaven and earth. And it would be fine if the matter was limited to the ignorance of the Russian "tops" of Molière and Ronsard ... The gap in general development, in knowledge about the world was depressing ... And the gap between the scientific, technological and cultural

achievements of Western Europe, which was part of the New Age, and pre-Petrine Russia,

stuck in the late Middle Ages. For Aleksey Mikhailovich's Russia, European technologies, science, and education turned out to be behind seven locks - and not so much because Europe was fenced off from Russia by the "Iron Curtain", but because Russia itself was fenced off from Europe by a mossy and rotten log "curtain".

Two or three decades, half a century at the most, and Europe, seeing Russia as an easy prey, would forcefully break through this medieval "palisade", break into Russian lands, and then there would be grief for the peoples inhabiting them ... From the "civilized" European invasion Russia would not have recovered by now ... But

the Russian Church, on the eve of possible upheavals, argued to the point of hoarseness - is it permissible to triple "hallelujah" instead of double, and how to go around the altar - from east to west, or from west to east? .. And at the same time it fiercely resisted civilizational entry of Russia into Europe.

And the Russian boyars, stroking their well-groomed beards, in turn, talked about the fact that Moscow is "the third Rome", "there will never be a fourth", and also stupidly cherished their ignorance ...

The ignorance of a Russian peasant or townsman could be excused - it did not come from a reluctance to learn something new and sensible. The possibilities of the "lower classes" in this respect were zero. Although, by the way, it can be recalled that Tsar Alexei started modern shipbuilding in Rus' - for starters, in the form of navigation along the rivers to the Caspian Sea, but Razin's rebels burned the tsarist Astrakhan fleet along with its flagship, the Eagle ship. The fundamental ignorance of the "tops" and their rejection of the European turned out to be contagious for the "bottoms".

But no one forbade the "tops" from joining European knowledge - from the second half of the 17th century, Moscow was simply flooded with foreigners. Patrick Gordon, mentioned above, to whom we shall return, reported in 1663 that "during the last two years, many foreign officers have arrived in the country, some with wives, but most without ...".

Yes, the departure to Europe was difficult for the Russians - this reign of Alexei Mikhailovich did not paint. But, firstly, the departure on business was possible for the representatives of the elite. Secondly,

material possibilities completely allowed the Russian elite to bring European knowledge to Russia. The opposite mood was ubiquitous - despite the not so rare

exceptions.

In the new conditions - when the borders of the state expanded, when the prospect arose of taking its best achievements from Europe, elite Russia had to roll up its sleeves - as Tsar Peter did later, and work ... The boyars, instead, simply smoked the sky, dropping their sleeves in the literal sense of this word, that is, dressing up in stupidly arrogant clothes with sleeves below the hands.

For the umpteenth time, the Russian elite betrayed the interests of Russia, and at best was indifferent to them. There was a real danger that the "racist" "vanki and manki" of all levels, but especially the elite, would crush the great people of Ivan da Marya, with all the ensuing consequences.

Foreigners wrote a lot about Alekseev's Russia... Moreover, even in these notes there is a bad tradition of seeing a speck in the Russian eye, not noticing the log in the European one. As a result,

outside the consciousness of the modern reader, for example, the fact remains that the exquisite - on the pages of Dumas' novels - the court ladies of Louis XIV were abundantly perfumed with perfume in order to beat off the stench **from** long-unwashed bodies. And for Russians,

a regular bath was a custom. One of the indispensable attributes of the secular "equipment" of European ladies, even in the 17th century, was elegant sticks - bone, silver, gilded, for **scratching**. After all, fleas then inhabited not only Russian peasant jackets, but also velvet French camisoles, and powdered hairstyles were very suitable for lice ... Looking at the picturesque masterpieces of European masters, it's hard to believe, but it really happened! And yet, the course of European and Russian life was very different. And in very

many respects, the difference was not in favor of Russian life, which was noted by foreigners, and not always, after all, and falsely. Let's say, from Alekseev's Russia there was such an amazing and absolutely authentic document of the era and customs as the "Diary" of General Gordon ...

Patrick Leopold (Peter Ivanovich) Gordon (1635–1699) was born in Scotland into an ancient noble family... "My parents are John Gordon and Mary Ogilvie," Gordon wrote at the beginning of his diary, "the heirs and owners of the Ochluris estate"... But John's son and Mary Gordonov did not have to become a rural squire - he became a mercenary warrior, fought as an officer in almost all European troops, including the Polish troops. It is curious, by the way, that he wrote about the ingratitude of the Poles "to the Almighty for such a great and significant mercy of God in granting them victories" and about their "excessive impudence", that is, arrogance.

In the summer of 1661, Gordon appeared in Russia to give her - for the rest of his life - his sword, and, perhaps, his heart, although he asked more than once to retire, wishing to

die in his homeland. The first impressions of the Russians on 26-year-old Captain Gordon were depressing. Having left the "German" Riga, in two days he reached the city of Kokenhausen on the Dvina, where the Russian garrison was already stationed. Taken by the tsarist troops in August 1656, Kokenhausen (Kukeinos, Koknese) was renamed Tsarevichev-Dmitriev, but according to the Kardis Peace Treaty between Sweden and Russia, signed on June 21, 1661 - just on the eve of Gordon's arrival in Russia, the city was to be transferred Sweden, along with

other Livonian cities. Gordon wrote in his diary: "There was a Muscovite garrison in the city. Seeing that the streets were so filthy, disgusting everywhere, people so gloomy, and the houses dilapidated and empty, I foresaw - *ex ungue leonem* (*lat* . change. Coming from a friendly land, where the cities are crowded, neat and clean, and the people are mostly well-bred, courteous and amiable, I was very alarmed ... ". Here, of course, one

cannot fail to take into account that Gordon entered the city, which was supposed to be surrendered to the enemy under the contract, and the Russians could not rejoice about this, and even at the sight of a foreigner. However, Pskov amazed Gordon only at the entrance to the city walls. The Scot wrote: "About noon we saw Pskov. It was an amazing sight, being surrounded by a stone wall with many towers. There are many churches and monasteries here...".

Alas, it follows: "After spending the night in a city that stank of mud and in no way corresponded to its magnificent view from afar and our expectations, ... we set off along a pleasant wooded edge, a detailed description of which I did not consider worthy of labor, and I did not have patience, disappointed in these people, to notice their habitats.

Arriving in Moscow and receiving an audience with the tsar, Gordon, "recorded" as a major, quickly came to the conclusion that "foreigners are looked upon as a bunch of mercenaries" and "no honors should be expected", but later he himself wrote that many foreigners, hired in Russia as officers, "bad and low people who never served in an honorary rank" ...

In general, from the surviving diary entries of Gordon, who became a colonel in Russia Alexei Mikhailovich, and in Peter's Russia - a general and a rear admiral, one can see a very peculiar and far from attractive in everything, but viable Russian society, capable of original, but not denying **the** European , development. Subsequently, having already gained

the confidence of the king, Patrick Gordon went on an embassy mission to the court of the English king Charles II, but returned to Russia, and later served young Peter a lot and usefully. Foreigners

wrote a lot about rampant drunkenness in Russia, and in light of this, Gordon's notes about how he, sent from Moscow to London, crossed the English Channel to England, are interesting: "We boarded right after noon, and all the sailors were drunk , and the captain is drunk ... ", or how in Germany, to facilitate travel," he promised the postmaster money for a drink ... However, the diary

contains enough similar entries related to Gordon himself, such as: "We barely got settled (on the outskirts of Moscow to Tver. - S.K.), as English merchants arrived with a huge supply of all kinds of drinks. We spent the whole night in plentiful libations and cheerful conversations. And

how much has already been written about the fires of Moscow ... However, on the eve of Gordon's arrival with the embassy in London, a fire broke out there on September 2, 1666 - another one that raged until September 6. Four-fifths of the city burned out, St. Paul's Cathedral and 87 other cathedrals, 52 guild buildings and 13,000 houses burned o

were left homeless... When Gordon appeared in London on September 9, he was a "smoking ashes"... And this is not in "barbaric" Moscow, but in the middle of "enlightened" Europe. Here

are two more interesting stories from the "Russian-Scottish" XVII century ... Scottish royalists during the protectorate of Oliver Cromwell were forced to hide abroad ... Thomas Dalyell of Beans, having fled from the Tower of London, entered in 1656 with a letter of recommendation from King Charles II, who was in exile to the Russian service, became a general and commander of the garrison in Smolensk. After the restoration of the Stuarts, Thomas Dalyell returned in 1665 to Scotland, where he was appointed a member of the Privy Council and in 1681 founded the famous regiment of Royal Scots Grays (Royal Gray Dragoons) ... For his harsh temper, his opponents at home called Dalyell "bloody Muscovite" and "Moscow beast" ...

I wonder if they called him in Moscow and Smolensk a "Scottish monster"? Together with

Dallyell, the noble royalist William Drummond of Cromlix, Lord Madderty, also fled to Russia. He successfully fought in the Russian wars with Poland, in the battle of Chausy he won an important victory, where 15 banners of the Polish infantry were exterminated. Drummond also returned to his homeland in 1665 - with the rank of lieutenant general, and was later awarded the title of Viscount

Strathellan. Patrick Gordon was not as famous as his first two compatriots who served in Russia, but, having returned to Scotland, he certainly would not have been in poverty. Yes, and he wanted to return ... However, he never returned - it was not easy, it was clear, for a person with a mind and heart, having given a large piece of his life to Russia, to part with it forever. So, through the Russian mud, Gordon was able to see something else, something not peculiar to Europe, but worthy.

The reign of Alexei "The Quietest", as one might assume, also had one more latent process. It was not documented, but an analysis of the then situation suggests that it was Aleksey "The Quietest" who carried out a kind of disarmament of the peasant masses. Yes, and the urban masses - too.

The armament of the common people and the habit of the Russians for weapons had a thousand-year tradition, which, in the vicinity of the Wild Field, is understandable. Vladimir Monomakh and Alexander Nevsky looked at the smerd not only as a plowman, but also as a warrior - this has already been said.

The Mongolian period changed a lot here, and it was not for nothing that so many "unprecedented" Russian guys went to the Kulikovo field, who had not been in battles before and had not received a baptism of fire. Then the subsequent centuries of Russian history again massively accustomed the Russian man to weapons, and this was perceived by the authorities as the natural state of the people.

Let's compare the situation in medieval Rus' and in, for example, medieval Japan... In Japan, only a nobleman - a samurai, as well as a professional warrior could have and carry weapons. A commoner who carried a weapon was subject to death, which is why in Japan, as in medieval China, martial arts without weapons were so developed. In Rus', everything was "exactly the opposite" - everyone had the right to hold a weapon in their hands, and everyone knew how to hold it.

In Europe, the arming of the people was also not welcomed. There were no Japanese strictnesses, but, among other things, the functions of a warrior and a plowman were performed by different people - Europe could well afford it. In the famous historical novel by Walter Scott "Quentin Dorward", the professional mercenary Leslie, the Scottish guardsman of the French king Louis XI, says to his nephew Quentin: harrow, your pick or shovel - and my brave Scots will fight for you. Your concern is to pay for their work out of your own pocket, and only "...". The detail of the novel also accurately described the real historical situation: neither European kings nor European feudal lords needed an armed and armed peasant. In only one country in

Europe - in Switzerland, the common people and the townspeople held spears and swords in their hands skillfully and firmly, and this immediately led to the fact that in the mountainous center of Europe feudalism was replaced by a medieval federation of Swiss cantons - in fact, republican.

The special position of Muscovite Rus - the neighborhood with the Crimean Khanate, ensured the special position of the Russian masses in terms of weapons. The need for power in the armed people remained. No wonder the border Cossacks, which consisted of fugitives, were not persecuted by Moscow, but were involved in guard service. But by the time of

Aleksey Mikhailovich "The Quietest," the Crimean factor had moved from a strategic threat to the very existence of the state into the category of secondary ones, only disturbing, but not fatal. Since the time of Ivan the Terrible, the military potential of the state has been increasingly concentrated in the regular army, and under Alexei Mikhailovich this situation has only consolidated and intensified, including due to the formation of numerous regiments of the "foreign system". On the other hand, the peasant

masses were already enslaved, and this created an everlasting threat of their indignation. And the strengthening of tax oppression worried both the peasants and the urban settlements. And in the coming "rebellious time" the armed people were no longer needed by the Moscow supreme power.

The Peasant War of Stepan Razin finally revealed the danger of the armed people for the power-hungry elite, and the tsar simply could not help but carry out - not by washing, by rolling, not by confiscations, by bans, the course towards disarming the masses and weaning them from military traditions.

Perhaps, including in this, one should look for the reasons for the failure of the Crimean campaigns of Vasily Golitsyn in the pre-Petrine era and the first military failures of Peter himself. By the beginning of the Petrine era, among the masses of the people, from which the army was recruited and which, if necessary, was involved in military projects, the military spirit had largely disappeared. And only the military needs of Peter fully revived

him. Although regular troops fought in the era of Alexei Mikhailovich, as we know, often not without success.

Yes, the era of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich turned out to be ambiguous, ambiguous in Russian history ... And it was not so

"Byzantine" frozen in its personal expression at the very top of power - on the throne.

In personal communication, Peter's father was quite simple. The "Slavic Encyclopedia" of 2004, a major publication that has become a collection of many sources, reports: "The simple, so to speak, paternal, treatment of the almighty tsar with his subjects amazed foreigners who had not seen anything like it in the West, where significant sovereigns at the end of the 17th century began to hold themselves at an unattainable height for subjects, like the French king Louis XIV. At the same time, the tsar, who could not

stand empty boasting and was angry, for example, with the boasting of the boyar Miloslavsky in the Boyar Duma, could rashly tear his beard and push him out the door ... But - without any further consequences for the boyar. So both the simplicity of Peter's treatment of his employees and his ardor without rancor were inherited by him. Aleksey Tolstoy, however,

believed that Peter was not the son of the tsar, but of Patriarch Nikon - a man from the common people, powerful, strong and energetic ... One way or another, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich did not reject Peter as a legitimate son. And the opponents of Peter did not resort to such an argument as the dubious origin of the prince. For us, however, what should be important is not the origin of Peter, but the fact that he became the most important personal factor at the moment of one of the most important bifurcations of Russian

history. Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich was married twice. From Maria Miloslavskaya, who died in 1669, he had eight daughters - including the future ruler Sophia, and five sons, two of whom reigned - Fedor from 1676 to 1682, and Ivan (together with Peter) from 1682 to 1696. ... By the second marriage,

Alexei Mikhailovich was married to Natalya Kirillovna Naryshkina (1651–1694), a pupil of Artamon Matveev and Evdokia Matveeva (née Hamilton). From this marriage were born the future Tsar Peter (1672–1725), as well as daughters: Princess Natalya (1673–1716), and Theodora (1674–1678), who died four years old. Artistic interpretations of the image of

Peter's mother Natalya Kirillovna show her as an adherent of the rather old system

life, however, the pupil of Lady Hamilton simply could not be the personification of "Domostroy" ... She, no doubt, had a fairly free and fairly European upbringing, and certainly influenced her son in the spirit that was imbued with all Peter's undertakings from a young age. There were

many, many historical and systemic "undercurrents" in the era of Alexei Mikhailovich, and they had to bring Russia, sooner or later, to the forefront of world history. Summing up the

results of the reign of Father Peter, it does not hurt to turn to the opinion of a person from the outside, but a person who knew Russia well and was not alien to it. This refers to Christopher Heinrich Manstein (1711-1757). His father served as Peter I, and his son - a colonel in the Russian service from 1727 to 1744, returned to his homeland in 1745, became a general in the Prussian service and published his notes

on Russia ... And this is what Manstein wrote about the Russian people, looking at a historical retrospective:

"Some writers claimed that before the reign of Peter I, all Russians in general, and each of them in particular, were completely stupid and stupid, but this is completely false, and the opposite is very easy to prove. Those

who have formed such a concept for themselves need only read the Russian history of the seventeenth century, at a time when Godunov's ambition and the intrigues of the Poles divided the nation into several parties and brought the kingdom to the brink of destruction. The Swedes owned Novgorod, and the Poles the capital - Moscow; despite these disasters, the Russians, by their reasonable actions, managed to get rid of the dominion of two enemies so powerful at that time, which were Sweden and Poland. In less than fifty years, they reconquered all the lands taken from them during these troubles, and yet, at the same time, they did not have a single minister, not a single foreign general. Reflecting on these events, it is not difficult to admit that such important undertakings cannot be conceived and carried out by fools. And

was it not so? Starting twenty years after the expulsion of the Poles from the Kremlin, the first war with Poland, fifty years later, Russia not only won back the lost Russian lands, but also completely withdrew

Poland is among the serious threats. Of course, Poland itself helped Russia here, or rather the "state" system of Poland, which carries in itself the weakening of the state and the death of statehood, but the main efforts to return Smolensk and Ukraine were made by the armed Russian hand. Half a century

after the occupation of Novgorod by the Swedes, many of the original Russian lands in the North were also conquered. At the same time, although the Swedes were confident in the inviolability of cutting off the Russians from the Baltic, the Russians themselves did not think so. Actually, could it be otherwise, if at one time the Russian Proto-Slavs came to the North to develop and settle it, and the Swedes always came here only to control and exploit these

territories. And everything that Manstein wrote about in the 18th century, the Russians themselves did in the 17th century - exceptions like generals Thomas Dalrymple and William Drummond do not count. Moreover, foreigners did not determine either a general military policy or general plans for

conducting military campaigns ... All this was done in the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich through the efforts of an active leading group from the tsar's entourage. But by itself, this group of a dozen or two people could not have done anything if it had not given downward impulses to the already more mass active group of Russian military leaders, Russian administrators, Russian merchants and industrialists, townspeople ... And this middle layer directed the efforts of thousands and tens of thousands of ordinary active Russian people ... In the same new Russian Eastern Siberia, waiting for the royal decrees, Russian people would

not have worked out much ... And if all this is understood and taken into account, it becomes clear how convincingly the "Russian" German Manstein refutes such an alleged expert on the Russian soul (in fact - an expert on just the psychology of Vanek-Manek) Dostoevsky, who, a hundred years after Manstein, argued that "in pre-Petrine, Moscow Russia there was an excessive amount of ... Eastern laziness, pretense," wrote about the "dull monotony of pre-Petrine Russia" and its "inner help

An accurate assessment of pre-Petrine Rus' should be exactly the opposite - in its best manifestations and in its best part, the Russian people of pre-Petrine Rus' were both talented and active, and

quite ready for a civilizational breakthrough - if he was inspired by the "tops" and the active king.

For all that, Alexei Mikhailovich did not become a great reformer of Russia - he led a completely measured, palace lifestyle, stood between Westerners and conservatives, did not put forward new ideas, did not strongly support one group or another. There were centers of activity in pre-Petrine "Alekseev" Russia, but so far they were only islands of solid ground in the middle of the "swamp" of ignorance, inertia, backwardness and

complacency. For the 17th century, it was bad, poor, but it turned out to be enough of what was. The approaching 18th century demanded something

else - the draining of this historical "swamp". This is what fell to the lot of Peter... So far, Russia, regardless of anyone's personal desires or unwillingness, has been advancing (partially aware of this, partly not) to the next point of historical bifurcation.

Alexei Mikhailovich died on January 29, 1676, and the accession of his successor, Fyodor Alekseevich, the son from his marriage to Maria Miloslavskaya, was not without conflict. The deceased tsar left behind three sons: 15-year-old Fedor, 10-year-old Ivan and 4-year-old Peter - the half-brother of Fedor and Ivan. Fedor and Ivan were lethargic and sickly, Peter, on the contrary, was strong and mobile. Behind

Fedor stood the Miloslavskys, behind Peter and his mother Natalya Kirillovna - the Naryshkins. And this immediately meant a confrontation between the Miloslavskys and the Naryshkins, and on the side of the Naryshkins was the most significant statesman - Artamon Matveev.

Miloslavsky managed to neutralize Matveev and send him into exile. Reaction reigned in Moscow... However, the huge state could no longer live its own life apart from the action or inaction of the tsar. A long stagnation without an active monarch or a reformer-regent close to him was, of course, fraught with disaster, especially in the event of the activation of external enemies, among which even a revived Poland could be, not to mention Sweden, Crimea and Turkey ... But a certain reserve of historical

Russia had time, and just by the end of the short reign of Fyodor Alekseevich, this reserve was almost exhausted. Fedor

himself, apparently, did not represent anything - in a sense, he can be compared with the weak-willed Louis XIII, but - without his Richelieu ... However, Fedor was also capable - albeit not immediately - of a sound line of behavior. In the first years, he was influenced, or rather, ruled for him, by his uncles Miloslavsky - typical narrow-minded boyars, to whom the ambitious princess Sophia, Fyodor's sister, naturally adjoined.

The Naryshkins made up the oppositional and powerless party ... The Dowager Empress was born Naryshkina, but she and her son were not welcomed, like the Naryshkins in general.

The "reign" of the Miloslavskys is a completely mediocre period of the reign of Fedor, but then two "gray cardinals" began to come forward at the court - the noble nobles of the bed-keeper Ivan Maksimovich Yazykov, elevated by the tsar to the boyar rank, as well as the room steward (bed-keeper) Alexei Likhachev. Semyon Likhachev, a bowler, adjoined them ...

The influence of Yazykov, gradually increasing, became very great, especially after the marriage of the widowed Fyodor to Yazykov's relative Marfa Matveevna Apraksina ... Prince

Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, the future favorite of the "ruler" Sophia, became another "neighbor" of Fyodor. A "team" of three "thin" and one prince could shake up Fedor's reign with a number of important innovations, in particular in the field of taxation. She didn't succeed in everything, but she succeeded in one thing - cancellation localism.

The abolition of parochialism - this purely Russian and exceptionally ugly phenomenon - was an overdue (more precisely, long overdue) necessity. From time immemorial, the boyars have been suing every now and then because of who should obey whom. Localized - quite officially, even on the battlefield, instead of leading her. Even the king could not lower or raise the "tribal" status. Under Alexei

Mikhailovich, people were increasingly nominated on their merits, and not on the basis of the antiquity of the family, but only de facto. And finally, under Fyodor Alekseevich - obviously at the initiative of Ivan Yazykov and Alexei Likhachev - in 1681 localism was abolished de jure,

"class books" were solemnly burned, and only the most noble families were listed in special genealogical books ...

Some people remembered and sighed about the former localism even in the 18th century ... Alexander Nikolayevich Radishchev in his "Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow" in the chapter "Tosna" put the words into the mouth of one of the characters: "You know how much blessed memory the faithful Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich offended the Russian nobility by destroying localism. This strict legal provision has put many honest princely and royal families on a par with the Novogorod

nobility ... ". Yazykov, Likhachev and Golitsyn also proposed the introduction of a table of ranks of 34 or 35 classes; the establishment of governorships with appointments based solely on ability, as well as a general administrative reform. All this was realized in one way or another only under Peter, and the professor of history Hans-Joachim Torke from Berlin had every reason to remark: "If you look at it as a whole, the new times under Fyodor Alekseevich, due to the circumstances of his reign, advanced

hesitantly and half-heartedly ..." . Both Fedor himself and Golitsyn, Simeon Polotsky, who were influential under him, and even earlier Ordin-Nashchokin, were inclined towards the option of modernization through Poland close to Europe. Concluded in 1686 - after the death of Fedor, the "eternal peace" with Poland was based on Russia's participation in the anti-Turkish coalition in alliance with Poland, the German Empire and Venice. And, say, Vasily Golitsyn, influential both after the death of Fyodor - under Sophia, and during the life of Fyodor, fluently spoke Polish and Latin, which was also popular at that time only in Poland. So Klyuchevsky had every reason to believe that if Fedor had ruled for 10-15 years and had a son, then Western culture would have come to Russia from Rome, and not from Amsterdam - as happened u

However, God forbid Russia from such a variant of "modernization"!.. This would mean one thing - the ever-increasing third-rate Russia, since Poland itself has always been the third European grade in intellectual, scientific and cultural terms. At the same time, Italy was already becoming

the second grade. As a humanist, Klyuchevsky did not seem to understand that for Russia, which had lingered in the Middle Ages, it was necessa

there was **only** a technocratic, technological version of modernization, and here the leaders were Holland, England, Denmark, Germany ... The Italian Galileo as a

beacon of science was the past, and the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th centuries passed under the sign of the genius of the English Boyle and Newton, the German Leibniz, the Dutch Huygens and Leeuwenhoek...

Russia was supposed to become a maritime power, and the best ships were built by Holland, and the best theoretical shipbuilding was in England ... In addition, the rustic and hard-working Dutch compare favorably with the insidious Vatican wise men in Jesuit cassocks, and the simple-hearted and hard-working Russians were more suitable for intelligent teachers ... However,

Klyuchevsky's assumption remained an assumption - on April 27, 1682, Tsar Fedor died after, in modern terms, a short illness, twenty-one years old. As far as is known, the version of his poisoning has never been expressed by anyone, but it suggests itself. A few months before his death, Fedor married Martha Apraksina, who was not only a relative of Ivan Yazykov, but also the

goddaughter of Artamon Matveev, who was exiled to Pustozersk through the efforts of the Miloslavskys. Martha began to bother with her husband for Matveev, and he was first transferred to Mezen, then - "until the decree", to one of the Kostroma suburbs -

Lukh ... It must be assumed that a decree was also being prepared to cancel the disgrace and return Matveev to Moscow. Actually, after the death of Fedor, he appeared in the capital.

The state "bundle" of Artamon Matveev, Ivan Yazykov and Alexei Likhachev - taking into account the fact that the last two tended to support the Naryshkins, would mean a quick and final fall in the influence of the Miloslavskys, which was already fading away ... And Peter was already growing up, and his mind was not Tsar Fedor, and not Tsarevich Ivan. In the party of the Miloslavskys, Princess Sophia was eager for power.

If the sickly Fedor had died, then Ivan, frail and lethargic, should have inherited Fedor in seniority. And the power, almost lost in recent years by the Miloslavskys, returned again

to the Miloslavskys in the form of an official or actual regency of the same, for example, Sophia.

Could the Miloslavskys - self-serving, state insignificant, envious, do not dare to eliminate Fedor?

They could very well, but rather even - they could not **help but** decide to eliminate Fedor ...

The Miloslavskys, it seems, decided, but they miscalculated in some ways - the prospect of Ivan's nominal figure on the throne under the regency of state mediocrity (if not more) Miloslavsky many in Moscow didn't inspire. But Peter was seen as an unequivocally promising option, and when the patriarch in the Front Chamber of the royal palace after the death of Fedor turned to the highest church hierarchs and the Boyar Duma with the question of which of the two princes should be in the kingdom, voices were heard that this should be decided by the Zemsky Sobor ... At that time in Moscow,

elected representatives from the townships were gathered to discuss the tax reform. The Consecrated Cathedral headed by the patriarch and the Boyar Duma, as well as service ranks were available: stewards, solicitors, Moscow nobles, clerks, "tenants", city nobles, boyar children ... There were merchants-"guests", members of the living room and cloth hundreds. In fact, in the aggregate, this was the Zemsky Sobor, and he sentenced Peter to be in the kingdom. At the same time, Natalya Kirillovna became the

official regent, but already at the funeral of Fyodor, Princess Sophia decided on an open provocation - contrary to the custom that forbade the princesses to appear in public, she appeared in the Archangel Cathedral, and on the way back from the cathedral to the palace, turning to the people, "shouted "And lamented that the enemies had poisoned her brother Fyodor, and removed his brother Ivan from the kingdom. The Russian people combined two sayings

about such a line of behavior: "From a sick head to a healthy one" and "The hat burns on a thief" ... Fedor, judging by the cries of Sophia, was indeed poisoned, but not by the Naryshkins, but by the Miloslavskys themselves. Subsequent events only reinforce this version, since Sophia went further and began to provoke a rebellion of archers under the leadership of Prince Ivan Khovansky.

Having proven himself in the wars with Poland only by defeats, this prince earned the nickname "Tararuy", that is, "chatterbox, talker". It was this Tararui who raised the archers, as a result of which Artamon Matveev, summoned by the regent to Moscow, was torn to pieces almost in front of Peter, like the boyar Ivan Yazykov. The father of

Natalya Kirillovna and the grandfather of Peter Kirill Poluektovich were forcibly tonsured, many Naryshkins were exiled. Also exiled were the bed-keeper Alexei Likhachev, the treasurer Mikhail Likhachev, the roundabout Pavel Yazykov, and the chalice-keeper Semyon Yazykov...

Ivan was proclaimed king along with Peter. In fact, Sophia, who was declared the "ruler", and Vasily Golitsyn, who became her favorite, received power. Sagittarius rioted from May to September 1682 - while Sophia was profitable turmoil. Then the "head" of the rebellion was seized, and Khovansky was executed ...

Sophia was clearly removing an unnecessary witness. At first glance, "Khovanshchina" marked the point of bifurcation, which was passed with a negative effect for the future of Russia, but in reality, Sophia's action was only a local "outlier". The real crisis, containing a bifurcation point with a positive effect for Russia, was simply postponed for seven years - until Peter grew up. Sophia played "tsarina" during these years... Vasily Golitsyn led troops on unsuccessful Crimean campaigns in 1687 and 1689, working off the political advances given to Russia in 1686 by the "eternal peace" with Poland... The boyars stroked their beards... The churchmen still could not agree on with how many fingers you need to "fan yourself" ... Russia lived - as it should ... And young Peter in 1686 formed the first "amusing troops" as part of the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments ... The time will come, and the words "Preobrazhensky" and "Semenovtsy" will become in Russian life the notion of sonorous and common noun.

In 1689, Sophia decided on her final provocation - she tried to raise the archers again against Peter. This adventure ended in failure, and Peter took the throne - while formally sharing it with Ivan.

Ivan died on January 29, 1696, and six months later, on July 19, 1696, Peter took the Turkish fortress of Azov. In 1697, as part of the "great embassy", the 25-year-old tsar went to Europe to study ... Upon his return from Europe in 1698, it was time to study

and all of Russia.

Chapter 8

The era of Peter is a huge layer of Russian history. In itself, such a statement is trivial, but is it really realized by both Russian historians and Russia that the immensity of this era lies not only in what was done **directly** under Peter.

The immensity and greatness of the era of Peter and Peter personally is that the time of Peter became, on the one hand, summing up the results of the entire **previous** development of Russia with the absorption of the best that this previous development gave ... On the other hand, the time of Peter created a huge and the depth of the historical "bridgehead" for **the future** historical development of Russia.

Moreover, thanks to Peter and his associates, the era of Peter the Great turned out to be not transitional, but fully creative, innovative ... But from the standpoint of an alternative study of history, the Peter's period turns out to be especially interesting and eventful - the question: "What would happen if?" accompanies almost the entire reign of Peter. Let's say what would

happen if Peter's elder sister, Princess Sophia, declared the "ruler", but above all - her favorite Vasily Golitsyn, would be more energetic and active than it was in reality, and at least strengthen their position with some state successes, but did not weaken it?

What would happen if this or that anti-Peter's streltsy rebellion succeeded? What

would happen if Peter fell ill and did not return from his first trips to Europe during the Great Embassy of 1697-98?

What would have happened if, during the Battle of Poltava, a Swedish infantryman had taken a slightly lower sight, and the bullet had pierced not Peter's hat, but his head? This happened when Peter took a personal part in the counterattack of the Novgorod regiment. And such a step of the king was, by the way, not an adventure and not youthfulness, but a necessary step of the great commander, who is aware that there are moments

when on the scales in the name of victory you must personally throw everything yourself in order to win everything.

Or one more thing - what would happen if Peter was succeeded by his son Tsarevich Alexei? Finally, what

would have happened if Peter had not died on January 26, 1725, at the age of fifty-three, but had lived for at least another five years, and preferably ten? What would Russia and its history be like if

any of these "if only..." were realized? Briefly answering some of the questions above,

then you can say the following...

If Sophia, with the help of her favorite, Prince Vasily Golitsyn, had taken up the reforms that Peter began, then the history of Russia would have developed in much the same way as under Peter. Another thing is that neither Sophia nor Golitsyn would ever undertake what Peter undertook. They didn't even take it! They were just what they were, that is, people with great ambitions and dreams, but without a large state potential ... Shortly before the fall of Sophia, a Polish envoy came to Moscow - rather even a political intelligence officer, de la Neuville. Later, he wrote about Golitsyn: "If I wanted to

write everything that I learned about this prince, I would never have finished; suffice it to say that he wanted to populate the desert, enrich the poor, turn savages into people, cowards into brave men, shepherds' huts into stone

chambers...".

In other words, Prince Golitsyn was the ideological predecessor of Gogol's Manilov, but with a "Manilovism" even more pronounced than that of Gogol's character. After all, Golitsyn explained to Neville about his *intentions* seven years after he had received *a practical* opportunity to deal with those transformations that he had explained to Tsar Fyodor. De la Neuville argued that Golitsyn's reform projects "were considerably broader than those proposed by Peter". But who prevented the powerful

nobleman, with the support of the ruler of the state, from turning savages into people and huts into stone chambers? If we compare the Sophia-Golitsyn Russia of the sample of 1682 with the same model of 1689, we will not find much difference. But

If we compare Petrine Russia in 1700 and 1707, we will find a fundamental, striking difference. But at the beginning of 1700, Peter had at his disposal no greater material potential for transformation than Sophia had in 1682!

If not less... The

praises of de Neuville and his ilk towards Golitsyn are quite understandable... Golitsyn looked at Europe from the bottom up, and Peter immediately - from the top down, and not only because of

his gigantic growth. In Russian history, only President Putin can be compared with Prince Vasily Golitsyn, who also makes many smart speeches with complete practical inaction and inability to perform those actions, the need for which follows from smart speeches. No, Sofya and Golitsyn could not be

a real alternative

Peter and his sovereign "team".

For approximately the same reasons, not a single anti-Petrine Streltsy revolt could be successful - behind these riots there was no idea inspiring and necessary for the Moscow state, and their organizers were people "without a king in their heads" not only figuratively, but also literally sense of the word, because the unpromising Princess Sophia "sat" in their head ...

But if young Peter had died during the Great Embassy to Europe, the subsequent Russian history could have received a sad and inglorious development - exactly that "Sofya", with a focus on Poland, with a dependent policy ... Then he moved to the slow-moving "Muscovites", allied to Poland, would Carl

XII, the Ottomans allied to the Swedes would have fallen, and the prospects for Russia in the XVIII century would have been very "tempting" ...

It is possible that Russian history would have jumped off the rod of world history in the 18th century even if Peter had been killed at Poltava ... But by Poltava, Peter had done a lot, so it is unlikely that even his death on the Poltava field would have led Russia astray great reforms on the path of vegetation.

But to say what would happen if Peter was succeeded by his son Tsarevich Alexei, you can immediately: most likely, Russia would have survived

an acute crisis, from which, nevertheless, she would have gone on a more or less

Peter's path. Tsarevich Alexei Petrovich - the son of Peter from his first wife Evdokia Lopukhina, was born in 1690 and brought up in such an environment that he could not continue his father's work. By the 1810s, the conservative part of the Russian "top" objectively turned from conservatives into terry reactionaries. The implementation of their views would mean not just regression, but the future death of Russia as a self-sufficient state. Aleksei fell precisely under reactionary influence...

Having provoked the wrath of his father, Alexei fled abroad in September 1716, from where he was returned at the request of Peter in January 1718. In Russia, the prince was put on trial, according to Peter's manifesto, he was deprived of his rights to the throne and died in June

1718. What if Alexey hadn't run away? It is possible that Peter, having become convinced over the years that his son is not only not helping him and Russia, but is a deadly hindrance, would deprive Alexei of the rights of succession to the throne even without escaping him abroad. However, Alexei would have remained alive in the latter case, unless his father forced him to cut his hair - as Boris Godunov did in his time with Peter's great-

grandfather Fyodor Romanov, who later became Patriarch Filaret. And what if the virtual, that is, Aleksey, who did not escape anywhere and retained the right to

the throne, after the virtual death of Peter, reigned under the same Poltava? Well, in reality, the former history of the 18th century convinces us that the palace "tops" would then immediately split into two main parties - "for" and "against" the new emperor. And although the basis of the confrontation would be - as after the death of the real Peter - personal ambitions and interests, those that would stand against Emperor Alexei II would objectively reflect the historical interests of the Russian state. And since they were more or less united by past joint work under Peter and had much higher organizational talents than their opponents, Alexei would not have been able to turn Russia back

The only question is what price this virtual turn of Russian history would cost Russia.

If Peter would not have died on January 26, 1725, but would have reigned for several more years, then the longer he would have been at the head of Russia, the stronger the foundation of Russian power would have been, the more glorious and confident the development of Peter's and after-Petrine's Russia would have been.

The main "alternative" question related to the era of Peter is undoubtedly the following: "What would have happened if this era had not come? What would Bespetrov's Russia be like? In order to understand what

Russia would have expected without Peter, it is useful to refresh in memory the dates of some discoveries, inventions and achievements of science and technology dating back to the pre-Petrine XVII century and earlier ... By the beginning of this century, Europe

already had the theory of Copernicus - although February 17, 1600 year, the Italian scientist Giordano Bruno was burned in Rome for her support, among other things.

At the end of the 15th century, Columbus reached the shores of America ... Eighty years before the beginning of the 17th century, Magellan made the first trip around the world, and at the end of the 16th century - in 1590, the Dutchman Zacharias Jansen invented a microscope with a complex lens. As for

the 17th century itself, then: - in 1610, the Italian scientist Galileo Galilei made the first astronomical observations and discovered four satellites of Jupiter. In the same year, he used a microscope to study the anatomy of insects; - in 1620, the English philosopher Francis Bacon published his "New Organon", which outlined a scientific method based on experiment;

- In 1625, the German chemist Johann Glauber discovered that hydrochloric acid can be obtained from sulfuric acid and common salt. The remainder of this reaction, Glauber's salt, quickly became a popular laxative; - in 1628, the English scientist William Harvey gave a

fairly accurate diagram of the human circulation; - In 1640, the first passenger cars appeared in England.

stagecoaches;

- in 1642 the French scientist Blaise Pascal invented the first adding machine, the Italian mathematician Evangelista Torricelli in 1643

year - a mercury barometer, and the Dutch traveler Abel Tasman in 1644 discovered that Australia is a continent;

- in 1650, the Belgian astronomer Godroy Wendelin calculated the distance from the Earth to the Sun - although still very inaccurate, but 20 times more accurate than Aristotle;

- in 1657, the Dutch scientist Christian Huygens invented a pendulum clock with an escapement, and around 1660, the Dutch biologist Anthony van Leeuwenhoek created a microscope (actually a magnifying glass) with a magnification of up to 200 times, and in 1677 discovered unicellular creatures through it (in 1698 young Peter came to look at them to Leeuwenhoek);
- in 1658, the Moravian

educator Jan Amos Comenius proposed teaching subjects in accordance with the stage of development of the child and introduced the concept of the school year; - in 1662, the

English physicist and chemist Robert Boyle discovered the most important physical law, called the Boyle-Mariotte law, since in 1676, independently of Boyle, the French physicist Edmond Mariotte discovered it; - in 1670 the first clock

with a minute hand was made, in 1675 the construction of the Royal Observatory in Greenwich was completed, and in 1687 Isaac Newton published his "Beginnings", where the law of universal gravitation and Newton's three laws were formulated ... Here's what (and more very many besides

this!) could boast

Europe at the beginning of the 18th century. There is no Russian contribution here at all.

Moreover, in pre-Petrine Russia, practically no one had the slightest idea about all this and much more, obtained by European science and technology, even diplomats who worked in Europe! Did the Russian boyars care about

the "Beginnings" of some kind of Newton, was it about the "Torricellian" "emptiness"! Artamon Matveev, who was exiled under Tsar Fyodor, found a textbook on mathematics and anatomy, which he wrote for his son. And the disgraced boyar was immediately accused of sorcery!

In Europe, as early as 1609, the Strasbourg publisher Johann Carolus began publishing the first weekly newspaper, Strasbourg Relations. In Russia, Ordin-Nashchokin tried to organize the release

the Russian newspaper Chimes, but nothing came of it - the first Russian newspaper Vedomosti appeared only in 1702, already under Peter ... No, if in the relatively

technically virgin XIX century it was still possible to be a good historian, and doubt In the grandiose, decisive for the historical fate of Russia, the significance of Peter's reforms, then in the science-intensive 20th century (not to mention the 21st century!) Only clinical cretins can doubt the greatness and necessity for Russia of Peter! But the salvation of Peter's reforms for the future

questioned in Russia even today...

So, by the beginning of the significant state activity of Peter - and it refers to 1695, when the 23-year-old tsar set off on the first Azov campaign, the Russian state lagged behind Western Europe almost hopelessly in all major civilizational indicators, except for the vastness of the territory - here we had no equal .

And in one more thing, Russia had an advantage over Europe - in a huge potential for development. Already very weak militarily, not having a strong industry, fenced off from the European achievements of science and culture, Russia, nevertheless, is a quick unique civilizational breakthrough, combining had knowledge possibilities commit the and skills of Europe with its natural wealth and the talent of the Russian people, combined with the habit of Russians to pull strap, clenching his teeth.

With regard to the latter, perhaps the most powerful passage from the autobiographical Life of Archpriest Avvakum, where he describes his return from Siberian exile, is characteristic: "For five weeks

they rode sleds across the bare ice. They gave me two nags (voivode Pashkov. - S.K.) under shyness and under the rubble ; and he and the archpriest wandered on foot, killing themselves on the ice. The country is barbaric, foreigners are non-peaceful; We do not dare to lag behind the horses, and we will not be in time to follow the horses, hungry and dark people. The poor archpriest wanders, wanders, and falls down, - [with] how much! At a certain time, raving, she fell down, and another languid (tired. - S.K.) person came across her, immediately fell down; Both are screaming, but they can't get up. A man shouts "Mother Empress, forgive me!" And the archpriest scr

you, batko, crushed me?" I came, - the poor woman blames me, saying: "How long will the sowing flour, archpriest, be?" And I say: "Markovna, until death!" She, with a sigh, answered: "good, Petrovich, we'll wander some more" ...

". **Ino will still**

wander ... Representatives of other nations could go forward, in spite of everything - the Norwegian Roald Amundsen, the American Robert Peary, the Englishman Robert Scott ... But no one else could do it as massively as the

Russian people could do it. Academician Robert Yuryevich Vipper (1859–1954), in his 1922 work on Ivan the Terrible, quoted the chronicle of Ryussov, an ardent opponent of the Russian invasion of Livonia.

Vipper reminded that "you will hear the best praise from the enemy", and Ryussov's assessment is worth knowing: "... Russians are a hard-working people: Russian, if necessary, is tireless in any dangerous and hard work, day and night ..., Russian from youth is accustomed to to fast and make do with meager food (here it does not hurt to notice - to fast if necessary. - S.K.), ... but the German cannot ... Russians in foreign lands cannot, and do not want to stay. Therefore, they stay in the fortress to the last man, they would rather agree to die to the last man than to go under escort to a foreign land. The Germans absolutely do not care where they live, there would only be the opportunity to eat

and drink enough ... ". This is how a German wrote about the Russian people of the times of Ivan the Terrible...

Have they

changed for the worse by the time of Peter the Great? Of course not! And in this readiness of a Russian person to endure **and not break down**, to remain a patriot, there was also an encouraging chance for Russia. However, in the conditions of pre-Petrine Russia, it could be realized only with a strong national leader who met the tasks of the era, which then

As already mentioned, in the Moscow "tops" by no means all the boyars, the Duma nobles and clerks were inclined only to sing in sable coats, sitting on familiar benches and parochial, that is, in squabbles measuring the antiquity of the family and the place in the state hierarchy laid down in antiquity . If everything had been so, then young Peter would not have succeeded from the very beginning.

But it wasn't! And not only among the young, thirsting for great things, but even among the older generations, there was a layer of those who were disturbed and offended by the lagging behind of their Fatherland from

other peoples. What about the metropolitan and provincial merchants? And the Ural Stroganovs? And let and not numerous, but industrial circles? Samuel

Collins also reported to London that Alexei Mikhailovich, Peter's father, built "beautiful houses for processing hemp and flax in the vicinity of Moscow, which are in great order, very extensive and will deliver work to all the poor in the state" ... Managers of the first Russian manufactories, too would only be glad to learn from Europe in order to then compete with it ... And the Russian "leaders"? Pomor sailors? Tula blacksmiths and gunsmiths? All of them together - from the clever Prince Fyodor

Yuryevich Romodanovsky to the Tula craftsmen, were the future support of Peter.

Nevertheless, if Peter, for one reason or another, had died, perished, been killed or poisoned **before** such an important historical milestone as the Poltava victory, the historical fate of Russia would most likely have been deplorable. Too great was the inertia of the "tops" - "tops" as a whole; the state initiative at all levels of society is too suppressed to be able to overcome and defeat all this and stir up Russia without a powerful

and tough personally sovereign will. Peter began, as already mentioned, with an attempt to gain access to the Black Sea through the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. For this, the construction of the first Russian fleet began in Voronezh, which then moved under Azov.

Crimea was unsuccessfully fought by the favorite of Peter's sister Sophia - Prince Vasily Golitsyn. And Azov was taken for the first time by Russian Cossacks back in 1637 and, let me remind you that the Cossacks then held out in the fortress recaptured from the Turks for five years, but Peter's grandfather Mikhail Fedorovich did not hold it, fearing a conflict with Istanbul. Again, Azov was taken by his grandson - on July 18, 1696, the Turks surrendered to capitulation.

The story of the cannons donated to Russia by Sweden is connected with the Azov epic...

Young Peter ordered in Sweden in the second half of the 90s of the 17th century six hundred guns for his fleet under construction in Voronezh, intended for operations on the Black Sea against Turkey. The father of Charles XII - Charles XI, having learned that Peter needed guns to act against the "infidels", decided to give half of the guns - three hundred, to Russia free of charge. Charles XI died without having time to make a gift, but Charles XII hastened to fulfill the "father's will". In the summer of 1697, 300 guns were delivered to Narva-Rugodiv, from there to Novgorod, and then to Moscow. On February 10, 1698, the guns were sent to Voronezh. The "generous" gift was intended to divert interest

Petra from the North, from the Baltic, to the South, to the Azov and Black Seas.

The Swedes hoped that the Russians would get bogged down in a conflict with Turkey, or even better, they would exhaust their already small forces in this conflict. However, almost immediately after the Azov campaigns and the creation of the Voronezh fleet, Peter realized that the Black Sea would not give Russia access to Europe, and almost immediately turned to the legacy of Ivan the Terrible ... The Northern War that began in 1700 was, in fact, the resumption of the Livonian War, but already in new historical conditions. And only after the end of the Northern War in 1721, the state building of Petrine Russia was already built to such an extent that it became impossible to bring it down. To spoil, to spoil, to run - yes, it was possible, and after Peter's death they dirtied it and kept it neglected for more than one year ... But it had already been built and survived.

In addition, although in technological and cultural terms, pre-Petrine Russia was very far behind Europe, some systemic prerequisites for Peter's future success in the 18th century were laid in Russia as early as the 17th century under Peter's father and even under Tsar Fedor ... These were just prerequisites that would not have been realized without Peter, but these prerequisites, nevertheless, were. Peter used them to the fullest... In the future, he did not always turn out to be at his

best, sometimes he went too far, and even very much, but on the whole his reign became a very complete realization of the historical opportunities that Russia then had.

How *the intellectual* (not official, but precisely intellectual) perception of Russia in Europe has changed is best seen, perhaps, in the example of the great German mathematician and philosopher Leibniz.

Two years before the birth of Peter - in 1670, Leibniz developed a plan for the creation of a European Union in the name of eternal European peace. Similar plans were developed back in the 16th century by Maximilien de Bethune, an outstanding associate of the French King Henry IV, Baron Roni, Duke de Sully ... However, Russia was absent from his European "concert".

Unlike Sully's plan, Russia found a place in Leibniz's plan, but what a place! According to Leibniz's plan, each great European power received its own zone of expansion outside Europe. They were no longer allowed to quarrel with each other, as it was not recommended to violate "operational

standards". The crooked Panikovsky in Ilf and Petrov's novel *The Golden Calf* divided the country into thirty-four operational areas for the same number of swindlers - "the children of Lieutenant Schmidt."

Leibniz had six "sites" all over the world: North America stood out for England and Denmark, Africa and Egypt for France, South America for Spain, East India for Holland, and Russia for Sweden. Germany was bypassed because, according to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War, Germany was fragmented into hundreds of small "states", the unification of which was forbidden.

Thirty years have passed, in 1700 the Russians were defeated in the "first Narva" - when Peter's troops unsuccessfully stormed the Swedish fortress. And Leibniz, who had been watching Peter with interest from some point, expressed the hope that Charles XII would take possession of the entire Muscovite state - up to Amur. At the same time, the great German

greeted the Swedes with an ode. But a year later, the Russians begin to gain a foothold on the coast of the Gulf of Finland, take Derpt and Narva ... In 1703, St. Petersburg was founded, the first Russian field marshal

Sheremetev successfully operates in Livonia ... Six more years pass, and in 1709 the glory of the Poltava victory rises over Russia ... What or Leibniz

Poltava as a memorable event in history, in a letter to the Russian resident in Vienna, Baron Urbich, insists on the need to mint a medal in memory of the Battle of Poltava and expresses confidence that Peter will henceforth take an active part in world politics. "In vain," writes Leibniz, "they feared the excessive power of the king, calling him the Turk of the north. As for me, I am very glad that reason and order have been established in Russia." Two more years pass, and Leibniz writes in a letter to the Elector of

Hanover: "I am convinced that Russia will have the same importance in the north that Sweden had before, and that it will go even much further." Now Leibniz is corresponding with Peter, meets with him and gives him government advice. But Peter, even without Leibniz, from the very beginning of his state work, was confident in the potential of Russia and in the

great future of its people. Reviewing the results of the reign of Peter's daughter, Elizabeth Petrovna, the historian Sergei Solovyov wrote in volume 24 of

his History of Russia from Ancient Times: growth, national development, and the great significance of Peter lies in the fact that he, by the power of his genius, helped his people make a difficult transition, associated with all kinds of

dangers...

In the West, where many were worried at the sight of a powerful new power suddenly appearing in the east of Europe, they consoled themselves with the fact that this phenomenon is transient, that it owes its existence to the will of one strong man and will end with his life. Expectations were not justified precisely because the new life of the Russian people was not the creation of one person ...".

Sergei Mikhailovich Solovyov (1820–1879) is our greatest pre-revolutionary historian. In general, he is very highly - as an outstanding scientist, estimates the 2nd - "Stalinist", Great Soviet Encyclopedia. And the above thought of his lies, in fact, quite in line with the Hegelian and even Marxist dialectics, despite the fact that, according to political views, Solovyov was a moderate liberal.

However, Solovyov was both right and wrong. He was right that if Peter's transformations had not had a mass base accumulated by the previous centuries of Russian life, then nothing would have happened to Peter ... However, if it were not for Peter personally, then it could have happened that nothing would have happened to Russia.

Moreover, there was a real danger that nothing would have worked out for the healthy forces of Russia, even with Peter! As now, in our 21st century, much then in Russia depended on many things...

The fate of Peter himself, and the fate of his transformations, swayed on the scales of History all the years until Poltava, which immediately sharply strengthened both the external and internal position of Peter ... Until that moment, inertness, Old Believers, xenophobia, that is, hostile, categorical rejection of everything alien ... Grozny overstrained himself in the Livonian War, but Peter could have overstrained himself in the Northern War, if not for his stubborn civilizational and technological modernization of Russia. Later, Voltaire, in his "History of

Peter the Great", will write about the Battle of Poltava that this is the only battle in the whole history, the result of which was not destruction, but the happiness of mankind, because it allowed Peter to go further along the path of transformation. An appraisal flattering not only for Peter, but for any Russian! The battle, and, suddenly - creative! Paradox? No, it's just a feature of Russian

foreign

policy destiny - Russia fought a lot, but it always fought in the name of building and strengthening its own State, and not in order to destroy and destroy foreign states. And Peter's Poltava rightfully entered the ranks of the most glorious Russian **defensive** victories along with the victories of Alexander Nevsky on the Neva and on the ice of Lake Peipus and Dmitry Donskoy on the Kulikovo field. And the future of Russia and its greatness were firmly secured after Poltava! Yes, after Poltava, the new in Russia and the new Russia found a solid base under their feet,

indestructible by anyone and nothing. And it became - like the Poltava victory itself - possible because Peter not only brought European knowledge and skills to Russia, but also managed to create in Russia a completely new system-forming factor,

the presence of which in any country inevitably provides a rich and advantageous situation for it and its future - **a layer of new people!** And not just new people, but active people ... And not just active, but already educated people ... And not just educated, but inquisitive, constantly looking for and developing themselves and their Fatherland, devoted to him and his leader.

And these were no longer "islands" in the former Russian "swamp" ... An interesting and little-known fact: under Peter, one of the duties of the nobility became ... study! Noble children began to study at the age of nine in special schools - up to 15 years. Then the young nobleman had to go to serve. Moreover, by special decrees of Peter it was determined that generosity does not affect promotion. And those who could not master even the initial course of sciences were not given the so-called "crown memory" - permission to marry. So the statement of Fonvizin's undergrowth Mitrofanushka: "I don't want to study, but I want to get married" in Peter's time would have been ignored. If you didn't study, you couldn't get married. In 1704, Peter himself distributed the children of the "most distinguished persons" to the service. Up to 600 young

princes Golitsyn, Cherkassky, Khovansky, Lobanov-Rostovsky and others were painted as soldiers in the guards regiments. They pulled the soldier's strap along with the commoners, and this gave good physical and moral hardening. Most importantly, the results were impressive. The well-known historian of the era, Professor Nikolai Nikolaevich Molchanov, reports that on his first trip to Europe

in 1698, Peter hired over 1,000 people to work in Russia. And the vast majority of those invited were officers. And in 1717, during his second major official visit to the West, Peter invited about 50 people, and they were architects, sculptors, jewelers, and scientists.

For twenty years, Russia's needs for command, engineering and industrial personnel have increased many times over. However, now they were satisfied at the expense of the "internal", so to speak, "product". This detail alone speaks of the scale and scope of the Petrine transformation of Russia in their purely personnel dimension!

Two hundred years later, Stalin will say: "Cadres who have mastered technology decide everything!" ... Two hundred years before him, Peter also realized that everything in his new Russia could be decided not only, and not so much by his personal efforts, but by the ones he brought to life and the cadres educated by him, who mastered modern European knowledge.

They have decided everything! I think that many of the pupils of the era of Peter, if they ended up in the USSR during the times of stormy and active socialist construction, would have been just as useful to the Russia of Lenin and Stalin, as they were useful to the Russia of Peter the Great! The tasks were the same, similar - creative in the name of Russia.

Among the new people, of course, there were all sorts of people, but if most of the "chicks of Petrov's nest" were discharged parrots and pugnacious roosters, and not eaglets, then how would young eagles appear in the new - Peter's and post-Petrine's Russia? Where would the new Russia, even in the bad times of Anna Ioannovna and her favorite Biron from Courland, take success?

Already after Peter!

But after all, these sovereign pets had parents, a family, a children's environment, which lays certain traits of nature. And, it turns out, the Russian people were not so couch potato - including those on the upper rungs of the social ladder, if they were able to give Peter new human material ... And, in general, mass material ...

The same Peter's mustaches who survived and won under Poltava, after all, they were not boyar, not noble, but peasant sons. Perhaps symbolically, at the same time, the Novgorod regiment became the hero of that all-Russian battle. Then he had a cool time - on the eve of the battle, a non-commissioned officer of the Semyonovsky regiment ran across to the Swedes, who informed Charles XII that unstable recruits were still wearing gray cloth uniforms. However, Peter, foreseeing the consequences of treason, ordered one of his best regiments, the Novgorod regiment, to be dressed in gray. And the Novgorodians did not disappoint. So on the Poltava field, the effectiveness of the policies of both Ivan III the Great and Ivan IV the Terrible, who suppressed the separatism of the Novgorod nobility, was once again confirmed. On the one hand, without Peter -

personally Peter, that is - an energetic reformer tsar, a revolutionary on the throne, Russia would not

would have moved, and our lag could lead to a civilizational catastrophe - the same Charles XII created a lot of problems for us even under Peter at the head of Russia, he planned to reach Moscow ...

And what could have happened in that situation with Russia **without** Peter? On the other hand, the victories and success of Peter's reforms, as Solovyov correctly grasped, were deeply conditioned by all previous Russian history, which managed to break through the thistles of the Mongol Tatar yoke. It would seem that the Russian people could not support Peter, and did not immediately support him ... From 1705 to 1706, the population and archers in Astrakhan rebelled. From 1707 to 1708, an uprising raged under the leadership of Kondraty Bulavin in the Don, Left-bank and Sloboda Ukraine, and the Volga

region. But these are the first, pre-Poltava years of Peter ... After Poltava, there are no more major popular uprisings, despite the hardships of the Northern War and Peter's reforms. Russia is not only the Russia of Prince Sheremetev, but also the Russia of the Tula and Ural blacksmiths understood: you need to concentrate, work and - if you have to, then fight.

As already mentioned, Peter's pupils had parental families that instilled in them the first patriotic feelings and aspirations. But after all, young Peter also lived in a family, he also had a father and mother. Moreover, there was a father who was guided not by personal whims, but by the interests of Russia - as he understood them. And it was a worldview and worldview, directly opposite to the position of Louis XIV: "The state is me!" and Louis XV: "After us - even a flood..."

Like the fathers of Peter's future pets, Alexei Mikhailovich was not particularly active, but he was able to convey to his son a sense of the Fatherland. When Peter grew up, this naturally and deeply rooted feeling suggested to him the path that the Fatherland needs - the path of reforms based on European knowledge. Young

Peter for the first time went abroad as part of the "great embassy" not for revelry, but to study the sciences, maritime and shipbuilding. Many years later, he himself admitted that he would be ashamed to know less than those whom he sent to Europe for training. Here is the *Decree of the Tsar* to navigators of August 10-31, 1712:

they acquire a person so that they learn from the very sailor's business and would know how to equip

the courts themselves. The majority of those sent abroad did not benefit from this Decree. But the majority sincerely perceived these lines as a life principle, because it was the life principle of the Russian supreme leader himself!

It is interesting and useful to return once again to the Battle of Poltava and, in general, to the "Russian" campaign of Charles XII, in order to understand something on their material

and compare someone with

someone ... I'll start with a semi-amusing detail ... When Russia concluded with Saxony (and Poland) an alliance against Sweden, the Saxon elector and Polish king August II received a precious sword as a gift from his ally, Tsar Peter. However, things were not going well for the Northern Union at that time, and Augustus in 1706 concluded a secret peace with Charles behind our backs in the Saxon town of Altranstadt. And as a sign of his "loyalty" (or betrayal?), he gave the gift of Peter's sword to the Swedish king. And Charles XII cherished the gift so much that he dragged it everywhere with him, until he lost it in the Poltava battle along

with the entire army and convoy. Soon after Poltava, Peter and August met again. And the Russian tsar, having forgiven the unfaithful king of Poland, as if by chance inquired at the feast: where, they say, is the sword, my gift? August zayulil - I keep in Saxony as an expensive relic. And then Peter took out a sword, taken from the battle from Karl, and

said: "So here's **a new** sword for you!" Such was our

history - under such and such a leader! As for the Swedish king, Charles XII went on his Russian campaign in January 1708. He wanted to move to Moscow through Smolensk and Mozhaisk, but Peter, with his military leadership, did not allow him to do so. And if you look at the map of the Russian campaign of Charles XII, then Peter's plan and its strategic depth

immediately become clear. From the Smolensk region to the Poltava region, Karl always walked in a double encirclement of Russian troops. All the time, the Swedes were "accompanied" like wolves by a flock, on the left - Sheremetev's infantry and the corps of General Inflant, on the right - Menshikov's cavalry. The Swedes were not allowed to pass in the direction of Moscow a

strength, stretch communications (or rather, lose them). The Swedes were forced to go to hungry and cold places, counting on profit in the South of Russia. Arriving there, Karl intended to move to Moscow through Kharkov and Belgorod.

In addition, Karl soon began to count on the support of Hetman Mazepa, whom Peter trusted immensely, but who was already preparing to betray his own sovereign - Peter, and Russia, and Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.

The first cavalier of the first and highest Russian order - the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called was in 1699 Fyodor Alekseevich Golovin, an outstanding senior ally of Peter, diplomat, general admiral and field marshal. But who remembers today that Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa was the second holder of this highest order? But this is so! The Russian historian

Kostomarov wrote about Mazepa: "We can hardly be mistaken if we say that he was an extremely deceitful person ... <...> In front of the tsar, praising his loyalty, he lied to the Little Russian people ... and meanwhile, in front of the Little Russians, he groaned and complained about the harsh Moscow order."

Characteristically, already in exile, Mazepa lent King Charles 240,000 thalers. That is, Mazepa was not only incredibly mean, but also incredibly gold-loving! Already after his death, 160 thousand chervonets were found in his

possession. Mazepa died on March 18 (old style), 1710, from senile exhaustion in the village of Varnitsa near Bendery. His body, which had been sung in the presence of Charles, was taken and buried in the ancient monastery of St. George on the birch of the Danube near Galati.

The then Zaporizhian ataman Kostya Gordienko differed from Mazepa only in a significantly smaller caliber of treason and incomparably less education (if this word is applied to Gordienko at all). After Poltava, Gordienko fled with Karl and Mazepa to Bendery and, as academician Tarle writes, "for a long time but unsuccessfully, he intrigued abroad with Orlik in the interests of England and other enemies of Russia."

"This adventurer died," concludes Tarle, "in 1733." However, in the fall of 1708, this was still

far away - Mazepa and Gordienko were only preparing to change.

For almost the whole of 1708, the Swedes had to wander between Smolensk and Novgorod-Seversky, and by September 28, 1708, they received the first powerful blow, which largely predetermined the entire course of further events - Peter himself defeated Levenhaupt near the village of Lesnaya in the Mogilev region. The Swedish field marshal, at the head of the 16,000th corps, went to connect with Karl and led a huge convoy of strategic importance, either at seven, or even at eight thousand carts.

The seven-hour battle of the 12,000th Russian flying corps (corvolant), consisting of infantry on carts, cavalry and artillery, Peter spent brilliantly with the superior forces of the "natural" Swedes. He, like a truly great commander, pulled up all the near "cash" of troops to the battlefield in advance, and this fully justified itself - at a critical moment, Bour's 5,000th corps hastily approached the battlefield and this decided the matter. The Swedes fled, losing their cargo, and at Propoisk Menshikov finished them off and took at least two thousand carts. The Swedes lost up to 8 or more thousand people, the Russians - a little over a thousand.

The victory was complete, but its significance went beyond a purely military framework - the death of Lewenhaupt's convoy became a prerequisite for the future collapse of the entire campaign for the Swedes. Lewenhaupt for a long time assembled his gigantic convoy in rich Livonia and his supplies should have been enough for the entire Swedish army for the entire Russian campaign. Plus - reinforcements by troops that never reached

Karl. And winter was

coming ... Peter called Lesnaya "the mother of the Poltava victory" and invited everyone to calculate that the Poltava battle followed exactly nine months after the battle of Lesnaya.

Karl, however, did not lose heart. The Russians had already beaten the Swedes in Livonia, and Karl was still nonchalantly declaring that he would regain the Baltic states in Moscow. In the winter of 1709, thousands of his people died from frost and hunger, and he wrote about this to his sister in Stockholm

as something funny. At the end of October 1708, Mazepa obviously changed, having fled from his "capital" - Baturin, to Karl. The starving Swedes hurriedly moved to rich Baturin, where there were huge military supplies, especially gunpowder. But Menshikov was ahead of Karl and Mazepa

and ruined Baturin. In Ukraine, as in Seversk Great Russia, a popular guerrilla war flared up with might and main. Peter wrote that "the people of Little Russia" behave in such a way that it is impossible to wish for

better. By the way, shortly after the ruin of Baturin, the Cossacks of Menshikov during a dashing raid killed Linrot, the last adjutant general of the king. Charles XII began a campaign against Russia with six adjutant generals. One - Kanifer, was taken prisoner, and also - by the Cossacks. Five others were killed. But the entire Swedish army continued to die without a general battle. Having survived a

terrible winter, the Swedes eventually went to Poltava, hoping to take it easily. However, things did not turn out the way they wanted. And Peter gathered troops here for a general battle.

By the time of Poltava, then Europe (that is, primarily France, England, Holland, Austria, but also seemingly pro-Russian Saxony, etc.) was already psychologically anti-Russian. For various reasons, but the Europeans did not want and were afraid of a strong Russia. Even before Poltava, the ruling circles of Europe were preoccupied with the growing power of Russia and followed the processes in it very carefully - for which there was every reason! By 1709, the first,

unsuccessful, siege of Narva was blocked by the capture of Narva by a Russian assault on August 4, 1704 - five years before Poltava. In the same 1704 Derpt-Yuriev (Tartu) was taken. Even before that, Sheremetev and Peter himself undertook serious expeditions to Livonia and Courland. This did not please Europe, and on the eve of Poltava, the fall of Russia and Peter (or their weakening) was desired not only by Karl, but by all the politicians of Europe ...

In the spring of 1709, Peter fell ill, left for Voronezh for a while and returned from there to the army in mid-June 1709, passing through Kharkov.

Karl arranged his main apartment in Opishna and besieged Poltava for two months. The Poltava commandant Colonel Kellin (Kellen) Aleksey Stepanovich and the inhabitants of Poltava bravely defended themselves. Three days before Peter's arrival at Poltava, the Swedes undertook a heavy bombardment of the city. Fires started. They extinguished them all, not excluding the elderly, women and children. Taking advantage of the fire, the Swedes climbed the rampart and even hoisted the Swedish flag on it. But Kellin shot them down and himself made a bold sortie, repulsing

Swedes two guns. After the Battle of Poltava, the tsar promoted Kelin to major general. Arriving at

the Russian camp on the other side of the Vorskla, Peter announced his arrival to the commandant of Poltava with a letter thrown in an empty bomb. The king thanked the garrison for their heroic deed and said that he hoped to lift the siege soon. The king's letter strongly encouraged the defenders of the city. It was solemnly decided that anyone who spoke of surrender would be put to death as a traitor. The answer was also sent to Peter in an empty bomb: "Push and save the perishing." The king ordered the troops to be transported to the other side of the river for a general battle. The

crossing lasted several days, on June 20 the Russians were on the other side, camped and began to fortify it with trenches. The Swedes tried once again to storm Poltava, but were repulsed, and the siege from Poltava was lifted.

As already mentioned, before the battle, a non-commissioned officer of the Semyonovsky regiment ran across to the Swedes, who, as Peter immediately understood, would advise Karl to hit the regiment of recruits. Peter immediately ordered that "gray uniforms of plain cloth" be removed from yesterday's recruits and put on the soldiers of one of the strongest army regiments - Novgorod ... century the difference was 11

days). The Swedes opened fire before dawn. An infantry column led by Major General Roos advanced on our redoubts and captured two of them, unfinished. The Swedish cavalry

attacked the Russian cavalry, but was repulsed. The Swedes lost 14 banners.

Peter, on the other hand, ordered General Bour to move back in order to bring the Swedes under the fire of Russian retrenchments, which succeeded. General Roos continued the attack. Menshikov attacked this detachment and defeated it.

At six in the morning, Peter lined up his army in two lines. The center of 12 infantry regiments was commanded by Sheremetev and Repnin, the right wing of 10 regiments by Boehm and Weisbach; left of 11 regiments - Alart and Belling. Bour commanded the cavalry on the right wing, and Menshikov on the left. Five regiments guarded the camp. The Swedish army consisted of 30 thousand people, plus Poles, Cossacks and Volokhi. Infantry commanded

Field Marshal Renschild and General Schlippenbach, cavalry - Major General

Kreutz. The Russian army numbered 55 thousand. Our artillery was three times stronger (72 guns versus 24), but the Swedes had only 4 guns.

Peter in the uniform of the Transfiguration Colonel flew on horseback from detachment to detachment, accompanied by Sheremetev, Menshikov, Repnin and Golitsyn, and

inspired the soldiers. Karl, wounded on June 17, was driving around in a cart, with a bandaged leg in one boot. He assured the soldiers that they would dine with him in the tents of the Tsar of Moscow. It almost happened: the Swedes dined in them, but without Karl, and as prisoners.

At nine o'clock the armies converged on a cannon shot. Then Peter entrusted the army to Sheremetev, and he himself assumed the functions of commander in chief.

At first, the Russian left wing entered the battle, then the battle became general. The Swedes attacked with the two best battalions - as they thought, a regiment of newly recruited recruits, but in reality it was a tried and tested Novgorod regiment. The blow was strong, but then Peter arrived in time with a

battalion of Preobrazhenians. Karl tried to stretch the infantry, but the Russian cavalry surrounded it, and the artillery smashed the Swedes. Sheremetev's infantry finished the job. At eleven o'clock, the Swedes, divided into small detachments,

rushed along the road to Reshetilovka. Our second line was inactive, but the battle was great and hard. Peter was on the verge of death three times: one bullet pierced the cocked hat, the second hit the saddle, the third damaged the golden pectoral cross that hung in the kiotse on his chest. Then Peter uttered his famous words: "You are fighting not for Peter, but for the state entrusted to Peter ... And know about Peter that life is not dear to him, only Russia, glory, honor and prosperity would live!".

Two hours later, the Swedes were completely defeated. Field Marshal Sheremetev was shot through his shirt, which had fallen out from under his camisole. Three horses were killed near

Menshikov. The trophies were huge. In addition to the famous sword of Karl - a former gift from Peter Augustus, Peter's cavalymen,

broke into the private chambers of Charles in the Swedish retrenchment, they found two million golden Saxon efimks alone!

Carl's cart was found on the battlefield with one drogue hit by a cannonball. It seems that only after that he moved to a stretcher carried by the drabants. Almost all Swedish

commanders: Field Marshal Count Renschild, Generals Schlippenbach, Roos, Stackelberg, Hamilton, Colonel Prince Wirttemberg, the first royal minister Count Pieper and Secretary Ziderhelm, 4 colonels, 7 lieutenant colonels, 4 majors, one hundred and seventy chief officers and 2578 ordinary Swedes surrendered

in captivity.

Peter heartily thanked the soldiers. Right on the battlefield, the Russian army presented Peter with the rank of lieutenant general in the army and shautbenacht (rear admiral) in the navy. The victorious feast

was cheerful and bright, but by no means as long as it is usually imagined - hasty affairs and orders could not be postponed. The enchantment with wine, however, was lifted, and the defeated Swedes, whom the king had invited to dinner, sat at the table of the winner. Then he raised a toast to the health of the teachers! The Swedish field marshal Renschild asked Peter: "Who are these teachers?" "You, gentlemen, Swedes," answered Peter. "We have learned how to defeat you!" The next morning, the fallen were solemnly buried, a high hill was poured over the mass grave.

On the same day Peter visited Poltava. Kellin received a medal on a gold chain and 10,000 rubles. The entire Poltava garrison - an annual salary, and the families of the dead -

life pensions.

June 29 - according to the old style, was Peter's namesake day. In the spread tents, Peter treated his army to dinner, went around the tables, greeted the soldiers, said: "Bread, salt, comrades!" and drank to their health. The next day, he moved to the Dnieper, to Perevolnaya, where the forces pursuing the Swedes left: Prince Golitsyn with guards regiments and General Bour with dragoons under the general command of Menshikov. July 1 - according to the old style (July 12 - according to the new one), Menshikov,

Golitsyn and Bour finished off the Swedes at the crossing across the Dnieper at the mouth of the Vorskla near Perevolochna. The General-in-Chief was taken prisoner and

Riga Governor-General Count Levenhaupt, Major Generals Kreutz and Kruse, Adjutant Generals Duclas and Boyd. The rest of the army capitulated. 14 thousand people with 128 banners and 28 guns were taken prisoner. 400 thousand money was also taken.

Karl and Mazepa fled and took refuge with the Turks. Among the trophies, several Orthodox icons were also found, which the Swedes turned into chessboards. Peter, arriving at Perevolnaya, bowed to the desecrated shrines in view of the entire army and then venerated them.

The Russian tsar triumphed, and there was good reason! Poltava shocked Europe - although far from all European capitals expressed their feelings openly - it was more profitable to pretend that nothing special had happened. Below we will see that King Charles himself assured everyone of the same.

But the illegitimate son of Augustus II, the famous European commander Moritz of Saxony, in his fundamental work on the history of military art, devoted a special chapter to the analysis of the Battle of Poltava - the ninth, and called it: "On redoubts and their excellent value in military formations." About Peter, Moritz of Saxony, who knew the king personally, writes as follows: "Tsar Peter, the greatest man of his century, fought against military failures with patience equal to the greatness of his genius, and did not stop giving battles in order to accustom his troops

to war." Especially Moritz of Saxony admired Peter's redoubts on the Poltava field. There were ten of them, and they were placed in such a way that they required significant forces for their assault, and at the same time they reliably covered the Russian infantry standing behind the redoubts.

"The Swedish king and his generals, who knew nothing about this disposition," wrote Moritz of Saxony, "saw what was happening only when it was under their noses ... The inevitable result of this was that the entire Swedish infantry was upset when attacked on these redoubts, while the infantry of the Muscovites in the correct order quite calmly watched this spectacle at a distance of two hundred paces. When the Swedes retreated

in confusion from the Russian redoubts in order to restore order in the ranks, the Russian infantry freely passed between the redoubts and lined up in the correct formation.

face to face with the frustrated Swedish army. And then hit her!

The French military theorist Rocancourt also recognized Peter's innovation and wrote: "From this battle ... a new combination of tactics and fortification begins ... Peter I rejected the routine method that for a long time doomed armies to immobility behind continuous lines" ... This is Peter the commander in

his assessment objective foreign experts... And how did Charles XII, who is glorified as a great warrior, assess the defeat?

Having fled from the Poltava field, Charles took refuge with the Turks in the fortress of Ochakov. At the end of August 1709, a letter from Karl, dated July 12, arrived in Stockholm from Ochakov to the Swedish State Council, called the "Defense Commission". The very name "Defense Commission" was, of course, false - no one directly threatened Swedish territory, but the Swedes themselves threatened foreign lands and seized them.

The King's letter to the Council of State is always a document of great importance. And this is how Karl described Poltava in it: *"... the circumstances here were good, and everything went well, so they expected soon to get such a big advantage over the enemy that he would be forced to agree to receive such peace as they demand from him. But it turned out, thanks to a strange and unfortunate accident, so that the Swedish troops on the 28th of last month were defeated in a field battle. This was not due to the courage or large numbers of the enemy, because at first they were constantly thrown back, but the place and circumstances were so favorable for the enemies, and the place was so fortified that the Swedes suffered heavy losses as a result. With great fervor they, in spite of the advantage of the enemy, constantly attacked and pursued him. At the same time, it so happened that most of the infantry died and that the cavalry also suffered losses ... However, we are now busy finding means so that the enemy does not gain any advantage from this ... "*

The letter of the king ends with an order to tighten the regime for Russian prisoners, who in Sweden were already beaten to death and starved.

Karl, in his assessments, is simply pathetic in his frivolity ... In the war with the generals of the Wehrmacht, "General Frost" helped the Russians, and against Karl, it turns out that "General Relief" was on the side of the

Russians ... Well, well .. In the same vein, Karl wrote his beloved sister and heiress Ulrika Eleonora already from Turkish Bendery. In a letter about the Battle of Poltava, already after the signature "Karolus" in a short postscript, it is said: *"Everything is going well here ... Only ... due to one special case, the army had the misfortune to suffer losses, which, I hope, will be corrected in a short time. A few days before the battle, I also received one courtesy (a wound in the leg. - S.K.), which prevented me from riding, but I think that I will soon get rid of the damage, which consists in the fact that I had to stop riding.* These letters from Karl are an amazing human document.

They show a strategically ignorant man who could win a series of campaigns against an unstable enemy, but could not win the war as a whole. and even with such an adversary as Peter and Peter's Russia! Poltava has become a powerful factor in the formation of a new Russian identity...

Even today it shows us how great is the role of the leader of the nation, the leader of Russia, who is ready to fight and work together with the people for the great future of Russia.

Poltava also became a symbol of the new unity of Great Russia and the broad masses of the Ukrainian people, which was opposed by renegades such as the renegade hetman Mazepa, the Zaporizhzhya ataman "Kostya" Gordienko and the "significant" Ukrainian "foreman". The "foreman" was drawn not to strict Moscow, but to Warsaw, which was on the "gentry" liberties. Well, the elite is the elite in Africa, and not only in Ukraine... And there are no two kinds of "elite" - both stink.

The modern American historian Robert Massey, the author of the monograph "Peter the Great" said about Poltava as follows: "The new balance of forces established ... by Sheremetev's infantry, Menshikov's cavalry and Bruce's artillery, led by their two-meter ruler, will be preserved and developed in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries."

And the "two-meter ruler" himself, having returned to his beloved Petersburg after the Poltava victory, immediately laid down a new battleship and named it "Poltava".

In the autumn of 1709 Peter returned to Moscow. He lived in his residence in the village of Kolomenskoye near Moscow, waiting for the completion of preparations for a grand celebration on the occasion of the Poltava victory. December 21 - according to the old style, the celebrations began. Trumpeters and timpani players opened the procession. Behind them, on horseback, the Semyonovsky regiment moved with unfurled banners and drawn swords, led by its colonel, Prince Mikhail Golitsyn. They were followed by the trophies of Lesnoy. Then came the grenadier company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment and the trophies of Poltava.

During the celebrations, more than 20 thousand captured Swedes were held in Moscow. At the head were six captured Swedish generals, including Field Marshal Rehnschild, Generals Schlippenbach and Lewenhaupt. Then in Moscow - unlike the twentieth century - there were no wide streets and avenues, so the twenty-thousand column of Swedes walked through the Russian capital even longer than 55 thousand German prisoners walked along it in 1944 year.

Unlike the 20th century, there were no newsreels in Peter's time. But it is unlikely that the expression on the faces of the Swedes, defeated in 1709 near Poltava, was very different from the expression on the faces of the generals and soldiers of the Wehrmacht, captured in 1944

near Vitebsk. Almost two and a half centuries separate these two parades of the shame of the enemy and the triumph of Russian weapons. But the connection between these two events is undeniable. While Russia is alive, the enemy can get to Moscow in only one capacity - a prisoner. It is possible that Stalin, who knew history well, came to the idea of the German Moscow "parade" of 1944, knowing about the Swedish Moscow "parade" of 1709.

However, the Northern War did not end with the Poltava victory - King Charles was even more stubborn than strategically stupid. Almost twenty years have passed since the beginning of the war between Peter's Russia and Sweden. It was hard for Russia, but for Sweden - because of Karl's stupid stubbornness, it was even harder. Russia also developed during the war, and the Swedes fought to the point that the country was half depopulated, trade and industry fell into decline, the merchant fleet decreased

three times, there was no money in the treasury. However, Charles XII did not go to peace, and the British fueled his stubbornness.

On November 30, 1718, the king died in Norway, during the siege of the Friedrichsgal fortress, either from a fragment, or from a bullet of conspirators. But Queen Ulrika Eleonora, Karl's sister, did not want to put up with Russia, although Peter offered favorable "peace conditions".

And then in July 1719, the Russian galley fleet moved to the Swedish coast for landing under the cover of battleships. It was commanded by General-Admiral Count Fyodor Matveyevich Apraksin. Soon, the landing detachment of Major General Lassi landed in skerries, ten miles north of Stockholm, and Apraksin himself, three miles south of the Swedish capital. The Swedes were in a panic ... Nobody resisted Apraksin, and Lassi, with two thousand paratroopers with two

guns, took the fight with a large Swedish detachment of seven guns and quickly dispersed it.

Landing forces burned and devastated eight cities and many villages, the best ironworks in Sweden, copper smelters, tanneries and brick factories, up to twenty in number ... St. Petersburg Vedomosti published victorious reports, and Cossack patrols appeared in the suburbs of Stockholm. Sweden still hoped for England and Hanover, but everything turned out to be in vain. I had to negotiate, and in

1721 the Treaty of Nishtad was signed, ending the Northern War.

But Sweden remembered the Russian "Cossacks" for a long time, and in fact, it remembers even today ... It is a pity that this episode of Russian military history is now forgotten in Russia itself. And do

Putin's Russia really remember the essence and meaning of the entire Northern War in Russia? Is the continuity of its goals with the goals of Grozny's Livonian War and the inevitability of these deeply national wars recognized? Academician Tarle wrote in his Northern War:

"The destruction of the Russian state, the return of the Russian people to the times not only of specific principalities, but to the times of complete political subordination of these specific principalities to a foreign yoke (in this case, not Tatar, but Swedish) - all this was an unrealizable dream, due to boundless ignorance

Karl and his associates and like-minded people. To erase almost half a millennium from Russian history ... not only to ignore the history of the Russian people, but also to close before it all its future, to throw Russia forever into the moral and mental darkness of hopeless political enslavement - all this would under no circumstances be feasible, even if in Russia even then there were not much more inhabitants than Charles XII, even if Russia did not have those natural resources that she had, even if she had not caught up with Swedish military training and technology as quickly as she had caught up with her in reality, even if Peter had not turned out to be a genius of the magnitude he turned out to be."

Well said, dammit!

There are many vile myths about Peter, as well as about Grozny, about Stalin, depicting the clever Peter as almost a neurasthenic and alcoholic, now and then guided by an impulse, and not by state calculation ... However, the

Petrine era - unlike chronicle times, left behind already a considerable array of authentic documents. A multi-volume academic edition of the Letters and Papers of Emperor Peter the Great has been published, and Peter can be judged not only by lampoons, but also by numerous documents. Here in front of me is only

one volume of these "Letters and papers ..." - volume 12 (issue 2). It was published in 1977 in a meager - by Soviet standards - circulation of 6300 copies, and it contains Peter's papers and his business correspondence from just the period from July to December 1712! Documents numbered from 5329 to 5794. Total - 465 documents in just six months. And after all, only the most important things were recorded from the daily flow of affairs!

Dozens of addressees, hundreds of names and geographical names... In the subject index to this volume there are **more than two thousand** subjects of Peter's attention... The following is only extracts from this index. Taken almost at random - what the eye snatched out, they are, nevertheless, quite representative and allow us to assess the size and variety of Peter's state work ...

So: "Marine Academy; barns; arithmetic; sternpost; boatswain business; ramparts; felt; wax; Vyshnevolotskaya

water system; midshipmen; nails; general feldzekhmeisters; borders; trees (chestnuts, cedars, lindens, etc.); noble children; deserters; salary in the army; brick, horse, foundry, gunpowder, cloth and other factories; cabbies in the army; Spanish monarchy; ropes; clerks; map of the Smolensk district; Kyrgyz; cereal for the army; infirmaries; timpani; horses; compositors; navigators; tents in the army; stove-makers; pontoons; pork fat; Sandomierz Confederation; allies of Russia; Warband; trade with Venice; Finns; frigates; trenches ... "... And so - up to: "... anchors; Janissaries; Yaroslavl Treaty;

barley; yachts".

With such a busy schedule, did Peter have time for "drunk spree" and everyday "debauchery"?

Here are his only outgoing papers ***only for the first half of November*** 1712:
- a patent for the

admission to the Russian service of G.V. Leibniz on November 1 and
a letter to him dated 12

November; - letters to the Danish king Frederick IV dated November 4 and 12; - Letters to the Polish King August II dated November 4, 8, 11, 12 and 14; - letter to the Prussian king Frederick I dated November 8; – letters from A.D. Menshikov on November 4, 7, 9, 12 and 14; – letters from P.P. Shafirov on November 4 and 7; – letters from P.P. Shafirov M.B. Sheremetev on November 4 and 7; – letter from B.I. Kurakin for Dutch merchants of November 7 and a general letter of credit to him of November 7, as well as a letter of November – letters from R.-H. Bour on November 8–9 and November 13; – letter from I.B. Lvov on November 10; - letter to V.N. Zotov on November 11; - a letter to the Hanoverian elector Georg-Ludwig dated

November 12; - a letter to the Duke of Wolfenbüttel Anton-Ulrich dated November 12; -

"abshid" to the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Baron I.Kh. Urbihu from 13 November and letters of recall on him to Emperor Charles VI;
– Credentials and instructions for traveling to Vienna
Russian Ambassador to Holland A.A. Matveev...

This, I remind you, is only what came from Peter ... But there were also letters received by the tsar - you also had to work with them, make some decisions on them ...

On November 14, 1712, Peter wrote to the ship's master Fedosey Sklyayev: *"Tea, which is already shnava (shnyava, light ship. - S.K.) and rounded with barkouts, so is the deck of the watchmaker. And when you do this, then the side and windows of the cannon, just above the cabin of the half-bay of the coat and the tackboard, do not do*

it before me ... ", etc. And on the same day he orders another shipmaster - the Englishman Richard Brown: *"If you are still the deck was not strengthened, then let it go back and lower, so that instead of a cabin it would be possible for the commanding officer to use the hut ... "*, etc.

On November 17, 1712, Peter, with a courier, the "Dragoon of the Ustyug Regiment" Scriabin, reports from Berlin to Menshikov that *"I came here just in time and I won't linger for more than three days"* and on the same day informs *"friend Katerinushka"* ...

Sovereign labor, and not spree - this is the meaning of the daily life of Peter and his associates. But how vilely slandered are its great workers in their own country ...

From the first 50 young nobles sent abroad by the tsar in 1697 (28 to Italy, 22 to England and Holland), such prominent figures of the Petrine era as Boris Kurakin, Grigory Dolgoruky, Pyotr Tolstoy, Andrey Khilkov came out ... The example of Pyotr Andreyevich

Tolstoy is especially vivid (1645–1729). In 1697 he was already 52 years old... Family, children, secure position... Nevertheless, Tolstoy volunteered to go abroad to study maritime affairs. Through Poland and Austria, he travels to Italy, sails for months on the Adriatic Sea, studies countries and languages. Receives a certificate that he was "completely" acquainted with the maps of sea routes, with the name of "trees, sails, ropes and all kinds of ship tools."

Together with the Knights of Malta, Tolstoy fought against the Turks, in Venice he studied mathematics with great success. All this helped him later to fulfill with honor the most difficult duties of the Russian ambassador to Turkey.

In the year of Peter Tolstoy's departure to study, the son of a poor Novgorod nobleman, Ivan Neplyuev, was four years old - he was born in 1693. From 1714 he studied at the Novgorod Mathematical School, then at the St. Petersburg Naval Academy. In 1716, at the age of 23, he was sent to Venice and Spain. He returned home in 1720, together with others he was subjected to an examination by the emperor himself, received a commendable review from Peter and was appointed head of the ships under construction in St. Petersburg. Peter then said to Neplyuev: "You see, brother, I am the tsar, but I have calluses on my hands, and all from this: to show you an example and even in my old age to see me worthy helpers and servants of the Fatherland."

When Peter died, Neplyuev lay unconscious for more than a day and then explained it this way: "Yes, otherwise it would be a sin for me: this monarch compared our Fatherland with others; taught to recognize that we are people; in a word, no matter what you look at in Russia, everything has its beginning, and no matter what is done in the future, they will draw from this source "... During his

long life, Ivan Ivanovich Neplyuev was a resident in Istanbul, the commander-in-chief in Ukraine, for 16 years he was a governor in Orenburg and commander-in-chief in St. Petersburg during the first period of the reign of Catherine II. In the Orenburg Territory, he built up to 70 fortresses, founded a number of fortified lines, and reorganized the Cossack army. Neplyuev died at the age of eighty in 1773 and left a good memory for himself - he is mentioned in all three Great Soviet Encyclopedias. Here is another example ... Vasily

Dmitrievich Korchmin, Major General. One of the active employees and favorites of Peter the Great. He studied military and mathematical sciences abroad in 1697-98. Young Vasily Korchmin went to Europe one of the first, and corresponded personally with the king. He wrote from Berlin as follows: *"Thanks to God, Stenka Buzheninov and I learned fireworks and all artillery by March 20, now we are learning trigonometry ..."*.

And Vasily Korchmin learned well in Berlin, becoming one of the creators of the new Russian artillery, a major military engineer. Immediately upon his return to Russia, he was appointed sergeant of the bombardment company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, in the spring of 1700, under the pretext of buying guns, he conducted reconnaissance of the Narva fortress. At

the siege of Narva was led by aproshi, in 1703 he participated in the capture of Noteburg and in

1703 - Nyenschantz. Then Korchmin commanded a battery on Vasilyevsky Island. According to legend, this island itself was named after Korchmin. They say that Peter often wrote to Korchmin and, for brevity, addressed the letters: "Vasily to the island." If

this is a legend, then it is quite indicative ... In 1706, Korchmin arranged a defensive line between Smolensk and Bryansk, fortified Bryansk. In 1707, in fear of the Swedish invasion, Peter sent a detailed decree to Captain-Lieutenant Korchmin to strengthen the Moscow Kremlin and Kitay-gorod. Vasily then already firmly entered the number of young employees of Peter. The tsar did not write to any of the foreign engineers as often as to the Russian engineer Vasily

Dmitrievich Korchmin. In 1719, Korchmin was sent to investigate the construction of a canal from the Mologa River to the Msta River, to describe the Volga, Mologa and Tvertsa, and in general carried out the most

diverse orders of Peter. The famous Russian historian and geographer Vasily Nikitich Tatishchev, author of the multi-volume History of Russia from the Most Ancient Times, was born in 1686 and died in 1750. Sent by Peter to Sweden and Saxony, Tatishchev eagerly absorbed knowledge, bought many books abroad on mathematics, history, geography and military

affairs. At the age of 23, Tatishchev took part in the Battle of Poltava, later, at the request of Peter, he studied the geography of Russia. In the 30s he opposed Biron and German

dominance in Russia. These are the cadres that Peter the Great brought up. But let's not forget - they were also brought up by Russia, the homeland of their fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers, ancestors ...

Ivan Pososhkov, a peasant in the village of Pokrovskoye near Moscow, was born in 1652. He was two years younger than the boyar Fyodor Golovin, the future general admiral and field marshal, and exactly twenty years older than Peter himself. At forty-five, Pososhkov, as dissatisfied with the tsar and talking about his vices and shortcomings, was taken to the Secret Preobrazhensky order in the case of the Moscow monk Andreevsky

Monastery of Abraham. And Pososhkov ended up becoming one of Peter's ardent and staunch supporters. He spoke about the king: "Our monarch himself pulls ten (that is, ten times. - S.K.) up the mountain, but millions pull downhill: how will his business be quick?".

Yes, millions were pulled "downhill" - there are always enough of them at all times. But after all, Pososhkov himself, like Peter, pulled "up the mountain", and other employees of Peter, too. That's why Russia was on the rise.

Two years before his death, in 1724, Ivan Tikhonovich Pososhkov wrote The Book of Poverty and Wealth, where he defended the all-round development of the country's productive forces by expanding the production of domestic goods, advocated an active trade balance with foreign countries. This is what, and not on the

notorious "club" or bones of the men who built "St. Peter did not create new people, he could not have created such a Russia.

Therefore, it is not enough to define the Petrine era as an era of discoveries. She herself is the whole discovery, because only with her begins the connection of Russian intelligence and courage with European knowledge. And one of the main achievements of this era should be considered a new mass type of Russian man, created by the will and genius of Peter.

In the same Siberia and the Far East, active Russian people were not a wonder even before Peter the Great - others did not go there. But **the educated** active Russian people ... Such people came to remote eastern places for the first time - under Peter and after Peter, but thanks to Peter ... And the new, learned

Peter's geodesists began a huge work on already scientific surveying of the territory of eastern Russia, as well as on the development of marine spaces The Pacific Ocean, which also had to be bypassed, studied and put on maps. Pyotr Chichagov, Alexey Kushelev, Mikhail

Zinoviev, Pyotr Skobeltsin, Pyotr Chaplin, Vasily Shetilov, Ivan Svistunov, Dmitry Baskakov, Ivan Evreinov, Fyodor Luzhin... All of them are young guys. All names are Russian. And all are Peter's pets.

The last two from this list in June 1721 for the first time reached the central group of the Kuril Islands up to and including Simushir, and fourteen of them were mapped. At the end of 1722, Evreinov in Kazan personally presented the tsar-worker with a summary map of Siberia, Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands. That was almost three hundred years ago! They were sent directly to the Far East by Peter,

who ordered that the surveyors Ivan Mikhailov Evreinov and Fyodor Fyodorov Luzhin pass the exam for the full course of the Naval Academy, where they studied, ahead of schedule, and at the head of a detachment of twenty people went on a distant secret mission.

Their feeder was the Arkhangelsk Pomor Kondraty Moshkov, sent by order of Peter again from Arkhangelsk to Okhotsk ... Later, Moshkov sailed with Bering and Chirikov, and in 1732, together with Fedorov and Gvozdev, reached the northwestern "nose" of America. The route for Evreinov and Luzhin was determined

by the tsar himself: *"To Kamchatka and beyond, where you are indicated, and describe the places where America and Asia converged ..."*.

It was one of the last ideas of the reformer tsar - the promotion of Russians to America. It was realized after Peter, but also thanks to Peter. In 1714, on the occasion of the descent of

the ship "Ilya the Prophet", Peter delivered a brilliant speech, which included the following words:

"Which of you, my brothers, even dreamed, 30 years ago, that we are here, by the Baltic Sea, we will be carpenters, and ... we will build the city in which you live; that we will live to see such brave and victorious soldiers and sailors of Russian blood, such sons who have been in foreign countries and returned home so smart; that we will also see many foreign artists and artisans among us, we will live to the point that foreign sovereigns will begin to respect me and you so much ... ". This was no longer spoken on the swampy banks of the Neva, overgrown with shrubs, over which an eagle

soared alone ... This was said in the city, the majestic appearance of which was then completely determined. And Peter saw his future greatness and the future development of Russia when he said:

"Historians believe the cradle of all knowledge in Greece, from where (through the vicissitudes of times) they were expelled, moved to Italy, and then spread to all European lands ... Now it's our turn, if you only support me in my important enterprises, you will obey without any reservations and get used to freely recognize and study good and evil ...". Peter knew how to distinguish between Good and Evil. He put Russia from the bed side on its feet. He also changed the pan-European situation by introducing into it a previously unprecedented factor - a strong Russia.

Moreover, this new Russia in its best civilizational manifestations was successive in relation to the old Russia. Sometimes this was revealed in the most unexpected and vivid way ... In 1715, when Peter was in Paris, he was shown the coronation attributes of the French crown in the Reims Cathedral. There was also a certain ancient sacred book, written in a language unknown to the French, in which, according to tradition, French queens swore allegiance.

Peter took it in his hands and, to everyone's amazement, began ... to freely read the old Russian Psalter, brought to Paris in the 11th century from the capital city of Kiev by the Russian princess Anna Yaroslavna - the daughter of Yaroslav the Wise

and the Queen of France. It is also significant that - as the tsar himself admitted to Field Marshal Sheremetev and General Admiral Apraksin - the idea of the need for Russia to enter the Azov and Black Seas first arose in his early youth, when he read Nestor's chronicle describing Oleg's campaigns to Constantinople ... So it stretches - not in the novel, but in life, the connection of times - if this, of course, is the life of the great patriot of Russia.

In my book there is no way to describe the entire era of Peter consistently, even in the form of a brief chronology of events - even a short, but relatively complete, this chronology would take more than one page. Indeed, in addition to the military aspect of the activities of Peter and the Russian people, under Peter's hand, all other aspects were successful and breakthrough - economic, technological, cultural, social, educational, scientific ... Peter is

not only the Poltava land and sea Gangut victories, but also the Kunstkamera, and geological surveys in the Urals and in

Siberia, and the School of Navigation, and the establishment of Colleges, and the "Table of Ranks", and the division of Russia into provinces, and the Russian Academy of Sciences, and many other things that arose, created and established for the

first time, under Peter ... But, perhaps, in this book there is no and the need for at least a brief coverage of the entire reign of Peter. What has already been said should be sufficient for understanding the essence and spirit of the Petrine era.

However, among the many documentary and memoir sources, historical studies and monographs relating to the Petrine era, there is a certain study that interprets the era of Peter in a very different way from others and conveys its essence and spirit far from being as optimistic as shown above.

At the same time, this study is by no means a slanderous libel... It simply contains a very special look at Peter and this stands out from the general series. We are talking about the "Petrine" section of the capital work of Mikhail Nikolaevich Pokrovsky "Russian History from Ancient Times", to which references have already been made more than once in this book. Academician Pokrovsky died in 1932, when the main

achievements of Soviet historiography were still ahead, and his course of Russian history was written back in pre-revolutionary times, in 1909-1914. However, even today one cannot disagree with Academician Militsa Nechkina (1901–1985), who wrote about Pokrovsky's "Russian History" in the early 1920s: "This work is a major contribution to science ... The future researcher of Russian history will definitely go through studying the work of M.N. Pokrovsky. You can disagree with it, but you can't get around it."

This is indeed so... On the one hand, Pokrovsky approached the analysis of Russian history with too much skepticism, sarcasm, and a very great confidence that everything in Russian history - and even more so, in the Petrine era - was determined by economic factors and causes. In a sense, Pokrovsky reduced the essence of the era of Peter the Great only to "the conquest of feudal Russia by commercial capital" ... Or this passage: "The bankruptcy of the Petrine system did not consist in the fact that "at the cost of ruining the country, Russia was elevated to the rank of European

powers", but in the fact that, despite the ruin of the country, this goal was not achieved...".

On the other hand, although Pokrovsky's interpretation of the Petrine era, of course, cannot be accepted as a whole, it, as Militsa Nechkina correctly noted, "cannot be bypassed." It is impossible, among other things, because Pokrovsky writes about such details and aspects of the era that others almost never write about, or write sparingly. Pokrovsky's assessments and even concrete information must be approached critically, and his conclusions are rarely profound. However, his information and conclusions are very useful as starting points for various reflections on the topic, since in a good way they provoke thought and a desire to understand the Petrine era in essence. Alas, a

detailed analysis of Pokrovsky's approaches and assessments would take too much time, and I, having simply pointed out their importance, will perhaps

confine myself to this here. It must be said that a correct understanding of a historical era by a researcher is, as a rule, not a one-time act, but a process ... Moreover, over time, the assessment can seriously deepen, or even change ... Let's say Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin was not only a great poet, but also a researcher, who was interested in Russian history already in his youth. In his mature years, the result of this interest was the "History of the Pugachev rebellion" - not an artistic, but

a purely documentary, historical study of Pugachevism. Pushkin, of course, was also interested in Peter - moreover, long before writing "Poltava" and "The Bronze Horseman" ... At the age of 22, in Chisinau, Pushkin sketched out "Notes on Russian History of the 18th Century", where he co

"After the death of Peter I, the movement transmitted by a strong man still continued in the vast structures of the transformed state ... The new generation, brought up under European influence, got used to the benefits of enlightenment from hour to hour ... Peter I was not afraid of people's freedom, the inevitable consequence of enlightenment, for he trusted his power ... But further,

contradicting himself, Pushkin remarked: "History represents around him universal slavery ..., all states

indiscriminately, were equal before his *club*. Everything trembled, everything silently obeyed ... ". Mature

Pushkin would most likely shrug his shoulders about such an assessment of his own. The information about the relationship between Peter and his entourage, reported by the pre-revolutionary biographer of Peter S. Knyazkov, who writes that "participants in friendly conversations between the tsar and his employees almost unanimously assure that it was easy to feel at ease with him in the role of a hospitable host" ... With different people Peter was different. And
He did not put a

penny on idle and mediocre high-ranking boyars, and made jesters out of them, joking himself - for the sake of ridicule and entertainment. But with a simple Dutch or Russian shipbuilder, the tsar behaved "without fools", as with equals. For the king and the ship's carpenter were, although not equal in size, but equal in the matter of building a state - this is how the king himself put the matter.

People of state affairs, honestly doing it (after all, there were many such Peters in Russia), the tsar had the right to speak, but they had no time to tremble. Embezzlers and lazybones trembled - and, alas, there were quite a few of them in Peter's Russia. And the number of the latter, perhaps, exceeded the first, which is why the notorious royal club flew into the air so often. For all that, the delusion

of young Pushkin is quite understandable - after all, a great historian, academician Pokrovsky, almost a hundred years after Pushkin, at the age of forty, wrote about the last year of Peter's life, that then "the life of everyone (bold italics is mine everywhere . - S.K.) hung in the balance - up to and including Menshikov and Ekaterina "...

"But this plan of **general** extermination," continued Pokrovsky, "smelled too much of madness to give any practical results. It only shows that by that time more than one of Peter's physical health had been completely undermined, and that the catastrophe of January 28, 1725 came just in time "... The hint at Peter's incipient madness is as obvious here as it is incorrect. Peter was really close to seriously -

with the help of Chief Prosecutor Yaguzhinsky and Chief Fiscal Colonel Myakinin - to shake up his inner circle and

generally "tops". But this degrading environment and self-serving "tops" did not deserve anything but repression by that time, which was well shown by the events after the death of

Peter. It is strange that the Marxist (however, rather, a sharp-sighted from Marxism) Pokrovsky did not see that Peter's anger and repressions were directed not against **everyone**, but against **a handful** ... Namely, a handful, if we compare the size of a high-ranking snickering group, not even with the number of the entire people of Russia, but with the

number of only its especially active part. It seems that Pokrovsky, although he considered himself a Bolshevik, psychologically separated himself and the "educated" layers in general from the main "dark" mass of the common people, not realizing that his "all ..." and "universal" have no more mass and universal

meaning than the expressions "all Petersburg" and "all Moscow"... Lomonosov ends his "Concise Russian Chronicler" with a concise description of the reign of Peter, but even extremely concentrated information about

Peter takes several pages in the "Chronicler". This description ends with the words: "Suffered many obstacles, sorrows and dangers in his great labors ... the sovereign, - by nature, unmemorable in morals, patient with human weaknesses and more subjects a friend than a lord in enterprises and labors, firm and unshakable, thrifty steward and generous rewarder, in battles a fearless warrior and a cautious military leader, in alliances a reliable friend and a witty politician, in everything Peter the Great, father of the fatherland.

Lomonosov was a younger contemporary of Peter - in 1725, when Peter died, Lomonosov was 14 years old. And Lomonosov came out of, as they used to say, "the very thick of

the people" ... Lomonosov also drew his information about Peter from documents, of course - and all the papers still, so to speak, kept the warmth of the hands of Peter, who wrote or read these papers ... But Lomonosov knew Peter and, according to the live stories about him, those who remembered the tsar

well, worked with him, or simply saw him ... Finally, Lomonosov - especially in his first years in St. to academic heights. But Peter was remembered and

judged not only in the golden chambers of the palaces, but also among the people. Nevertheless, Peter in the description of Lomonosov is impeccable.

Peter died unexpectedly (and, perhaps, was poisoned) and far from doing everything that he could and should have done. If he had lived for another ten years, then his increasingly mature state mind and experience, multiplied by the increasing maturity of the former "chicks of Petrov's nest" - finally fledged and sent by him on a big state flight, would certainly have given us a Russia that could become leader and fair arbiter of the world. After all, having settled in Europe, linking possible opponents, albeit unreliable, but with alliances, Peter was extremely rational and pragmatic. He was great both as a political thinker and as a practical politician. The skeptical Duke of Saint-Simon, in his memoirs, enthusiastically compared him with the heroes of antiquity. Saint-Simon, on the other hand, gave a description of the political situation in

which Peter's negotiations with the French took place during Peter's visit to France in 1717:

"The king's troops were stationed in Poland and Mecklenburg, and these latter were extremely disturbing to the English king (who was also the Elector of Hanover. - S.K.) ... For all that, the king expressed an ardent desire to establish a close alliance with France ... He played a huge role in Asia, and in Europe, so that France would greatly benefit from a close alliance with him He ... wanted to gradually wrest us from our dependence on England; after all, England forced us to show downright indecent deafness to his proposals ... Then we had to repent for a long time that we succumbed to the disastrous spell of England and so foolishly despised Russia "...

Stupid - according to the assessment, we note, a Frenchman - the West's policy towards Russia will later become a bad tradition of European diplomacy. But Peter's Russia could well have been a factor in genuine, lasting European equilibrium. The French recording of Peter's speeches at the Paris negotiations in 1717 reads: *"Put me in the place of Sweden. The system of Europe has changed, but the Peace of Westphalia remains the basis of all your treaties. Why did France unite with Sweden at the time? Because*

that then the king of Sweden owned lands in Germany, and the forces of Sweden ... this alliance could balance the power of the Austrian empire. ... The strength of the Russian Empire has increased infinitely, and I, the Tsar, offer you myself in the

place of Sweden ... ". It was a rational approach, not obsolete even today. Let's substitute "America" instead of "Sweden" in Peter's words, and this line of Peter's foreign policy will look quite modern and very fruitful.

Of course, if the leaders of Russia will take care of Russia and its power no less than Peter

did. Peter could have done much more if he had lived longer. However, even what was done provided Russia with a great destiny already in the 18th century - despite the subsequent twists and turns in our history in this

century. The Petrine era is one of the few epochs of Russian history that can be viewed in historical retrospect as **practically flawless** in the light of their historical results and positive impact on the future... Under Peter and under the leadership of Peter, Russia used historical opportunities to the maximum, not missing them... Sure! Peter is not

President Putin! As for the "calculations" of those economic and human losses of Russia, which allegedly were the only ones given by the era of Peter the Great, such calculations in historical terms turn out to be, in fact, intellectual sabotage. Relatively accurate

data on the population of Russia can be counted, perhaps, from the revisions of Peter the Great, and even then we should speak more about estimates, and not about reliable statistics. In different sources, the figures of the population of Russia differ significantly! In addition, censuses and revisions, although they are sometimes confused, are different things. In the course of revisions, only the taxable population was enumerated - that is, adult males who were subject to taxation of the poll tax. At the same time, revisions give, of course, an idea about the general dynamics of population growth.

But the revision data of the 18th century reveal a quite definite and by no means catastrophic picture.

Academician Pokrovsky cites the population figure according to the Peter the Great revision after the Northern War at 5,600,000 people. Twenty years later, the Elizabethan revision - rather underestimating the total figure - gave a result of 6,643,000 people, the first Catherine's revision - 7,363,000 people, and the second - about 8,500,000 people. In other words, for half a century after Peter's death, the taxable population of Russia increased one and a half times.

Such results could have been achieved if the reforms Peter tore Russia?

Yes, Peter made a lot of mistakes. Aleksey Nikolaevich Tolstoy, who understood Peter well, in 1933, in an interview with the editorial team of the Smena magazine, said: "For that time, he made colossal bends. His task was to regulate the industry. He wanted to do something between state and private industry. But private industry had to be subordinate to the state and be under constant control and accounting of the state ...".

And then Tolstoy continued: "Here, for example, Peter issues such an order: weave a cloth of 16 inches, and whoever will weave 12 inches, tear his nostrils and exile him to eternal hard labor. And then the crisis began, because there were no large factories, all the production of linen was handicraft. In the peasant huts there were machines of a certain size, which weaved a linen of 12 inches, and in order to weave a linen of 16 inches, large camps were needed, which did not fit in the huts. The handicraftsmen went bankrupt, and the production of the canvas fell "...

Tolstoy was a clever girl, but, nevertheless, a humanist, and, it seems, did not understand that as a result, the Russian canvas entered the world market widely. Oleg Platonov, in his introductory article to the modern encyclopedia "1000 Years of Russian Entrepreneurship," writes: "The broad development of private initiative from below gave rise to a powerful industrial movement. So, in the areas of ancient weaving - Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Vladimir provinces - townspeople and peasant children ..., starting with a handicraft weaver's fireworks ..., gradually create large textile enterprises ...".

The serf of Count Sheremetev, Grigory Bugrimov, began in 1744 with 30 camps, and nine years later he already had 69 camps. Then his manufactory passed to Ivan Grachev, who in 1756 had

in the amount of 216 mills and produced products of the highest quality, which went abroad through the port of St. Petersburg ... And the example of Bugrimov is one out of many...

These are the true historical results of Peter's reforms. Academician Strumilin defined

precisely: "With his reforms and creative initiative, Peter the Great for the first time opened a wide road for industrial entrepreneurship. And it was quite natural that first of all, people from the same labor ranks who received their training in the field of the so-called "folk" handicrafts and handicrafts of Muscovite Rus' entered this path with a firm foot. That is why there were so many former blacksmiths and all sorts of tax-payers at the head of Peter's factories and manufactories. At the same time, out of more than two hundred Peter's factories, including forty large manufactories, only a few were headed by foreigners or nobles. Peter created a special Berg

Collegium and Manufactory Collegium as governing bodies for the development of the industry ... Entrepreneurs were granted privileges and benefits, interest-free loans

were issued for the construction of plants and factories, supplies were provided with tools and production tools ... New Peter's people who created domestic industry were exempted from public service, from duties and taxes, were provided by state orders ...

The modern "liberal" sees behind Peter's decree on the prohibition of weaving a 12-inch linen only "torn nostrils" - of which there are not so many that were torn out. The historian, worthy of being called that, sees a powerful industrial linen production, which without Peter's reforms and without his state support would not have developed so quickly and so powerfully in Russia in the 18th century. And was the interest of the "King Carpenter" limited to

only one canvas? Mining and metallurgy, shipbuilding and vocational education, infrastructure development and development of new lands, strengthening of Russia's foreign policy positions and urban planning - all this and much more became the life work of Peter the Great.

In fact, his figure in terms of power and personal positive influence on the history of his own country and the world is unique in the entire world history until the twentieth century. Only in the 20th century did

two more powerful and inimitable figures in their unique impeccability enter world history - Lenin and Stalin.

It is curious that two such dissimilar people agreed in a negative assessment of Peter, like the prince of Catherine's times M.M. Shcherbatov, who saw the origins of the "damage to morals" in Rus' in the activities of Peter, and the French educator Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who stated in the Social Contract: "Peter had an imitative mind; he did not have a genuine genius who is creative and makes everything out of nothing"... As often happens, in fact, Shcherbatov and Rousseau characterized

themselves with their assessments ... Shcherbatov once again proved his acrimony, and Rousseau - the inability to look not only wide, but also deep. Rousseau, in particular, did not understand that not a single truly creative state genius makes "everything out of nothing", but brilliantly synthesizes in his activity - sometimes developing, sometimes denying, all previous experience - both domestic and world.

However, there can be no unambiguous assessment of Peter simply because Russia had and still has not only friends, but also enemies. And depending on how this or that figure relates to Russia, she evaluates Peter. They argued about it in the 18th and 19th centuries - in Russia and outside it, they argued about it in the 20th century and are arguing about it in the 21st century. And the watershed invariably runs along the line - are you for Russia, or against? To be for Peter means to be for Russia. And to be for Russia means to be for Peter...

Peter left, and post-Petrine Russia faced a difficult, but generally glorious 18th century ... In this century, there was a place for two insignificant namesakes of Peter the Great - his two grandchildren - Peter II the Insignificant and Peter III the Fleeting ... Two Annas, the Empress, were also noted in this century Anna Ioannovna and the "ruler" Anna Leopoldovna ... And even two Catherine's ruled Russia in the 18th century - the widow of Peter the Great Catherine I and the widow of Peter III - Catherine II the Great ...

The second Catherine - as before her "daughter of Petrova" "Elizabeth" was elevated to the Russian imperial throne in the 18th century by Russian guards bayonets, and the last Russian emperor in this century - Pavel, was vilely killed by the degenerate descendants of Peter's mustachioed men ... However,

he was not marked by betrayals and intrigues in Russian history of the 18th century, not Biron and Palen became its "iconic" figures, but Bering, Rumyantsev, Potemkin, Suvorov, Ushakov, Lomonosov, Derzhavin, the pioneers - "leaders" of Russian America ... And the efforts of the best Russian people - in the upper strata, in to the masses of the people, Russia in the 18th century developed and grew stronger, despite all the betrayals of its elite to the Russian cause.

The 19th century, which replaced the 18th century, brought the "thunderstorm of the 12th year", and then - new wars, and new successes, however, in general, five Russian emperors of the 19th century - three Alexanders and two Nicholas, did not glorify Russia, but increasingly lost and historical pace, and the historical perspective given to Russia by the civilizational breakthrough of Peter. As a result, all the bifurcation points of the 19th century, Russia, mediocrely ruled by the tsars and increasingly betrayed and sold by the

elite, went negatively. Only Lenin's new historical feat once again gave Russia an outstanding pace of development and a brilliant historical perspective for decades.

However, all this - the ups and downs of post-Petrine Russia of the 18th century, the dramatic collisions of the 19th century and the pre-October years of the 20th century, we have yet to analyze and evaluate in the second volume of "Russian Crossings", which analyzes Russian history by October 1917 ... For now we leave Russia, just acquiring a new quality - European. Not only clothes became new, but also thoughts, and feelings, plans, hopes - both personal and public. Pushkin found a brilliant and faithful image in terms of artistic

expressiveness - Peter cut a window to Europe. However, historically, this was, nevertheless, not entirely true - Peter knocked down the boards from that window to Europe that once connected Russia with Europe, and which was sometimes boarded up by Russia itself, but more often by Europe, deliberately fencing off Russia from Europe.

And now, through the efforts of Peter, Peter's associates and the active part of the Russian people, Russia was returning to Europe again, becoming its weighty part. And with this new reality I had to be considered by everyone.

Afterword. Russia and Europe: a difficult return to reason

So, we reviewed Russian history from our Proto-Slavic roots to the civilizational feat of the Russian people under the hand of Peter the Great. And at the end of the first volume of "Russian Crossings", it remains to express a number of thoughts, the starting point of which is everything that

has been said above ... The title of the afterword does not refer the reader to the once famous book "Russia and Europe" by Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevsky, which was first published in 1871, although below this book will be discussed. Simply, looking at the first millennia of Russian history, you involuntarily compare the fate of Russia and Europe, and you think: "But at one time this opposition - Russia to Europe and Russia's Europe, did not exist. Kievan Rus was a part of Europe, and an

important, active part of it"... It was not Europe that pulled Russia out of itself, and it was not Russia that left Europe – the toe of the Mongolian boot drew a fatal line between them. And from that moment on, the history of Europe and Russia began to differ so much that Peter's line on the return of

Russia to Europe aroused opposition both in Russia and in Europe. In Russia, this return was resisted by the reactionaries and "house builders", while in Europe, quite refined and educated circles, who claim to be an advanced and

enlightened way of thinking,

were dissatisfied with Russia's arrival there. And there were reasons for this... World history and its integral part - Russian history, for almost its entire length - is the history of a disunited, class society. Moreover, it was not Marx's theory that divided society on this basis, but the greed of the ruling elites. Not Marx, but Prince Charles-Maurice Talleyrand even before Marx clearly defined: "Society is divided into two classes - shearers and sheared." This is the most antagonistic and most profound division of people, a division that does not recognize temporal

However, socially divided humanity is divided both within the framework of nation-states, and at the level of nation-states, the antagonism of interests can reach intensity no less than the antagonism of the interests of those who cut their hair and those who are cut. And this leaves its mark on the history of a divided world and on the coverage of this history - people involved in history and writing history can deceive contemporaries and future generations not only in the interests of the class, but also in the interests of their nation, or rather, the elite part of their nation. Here is a

concrete example concerning the perception by two different authors of the era of the mature Peter

the Great... In 1717, Peter visited England, and then moved to France, where, among others, he was observed by such an attentive Frenchman as Duke Saint-Simon de Rouvroy (1675–1755). The duke was a contemporary of Peter and later in his famous "Memoirs" devoted a separate chapter to Peter's visit to France, which began like this:

"Peter I, Tsar of Muscovy, deservedly became so famous both at home and throughout Europe and Asia that I would not dare to say that I know another equally great and illustrious monarch, equal to the heroes of antiquity, who would cause such admiration in his time will call in the ages to come..." In the chapter about

Peter, Saint-Simon also wrote this: "Tsar

Peter held England by the throat with trade, and King George with fear for his German possessions (the English king George I was also the Elector of Hanover. - S.K.) . He greatly respected Holland, but he treated the emperor (of Austria. - S.K.) with extreme restraint. It cannot be denied that he played an enormous role both in Asia and in Europe, so that France would greatly benefit from a close alliance with him. He did not like the emperor, he wanted to gradually wrest us from our dependence on England; after all, it was England that forced us to show downright indecent deafness to his proposals ...".

In the image of Saint-Simon, a competent contemporary and memoirist of the European class, the mature Peter is seen as a gigantic figure who had a huge influence on the course of contemporary European events - which is fully consistent with historical truth. At the same time, the interests of the homeland of Saint-Simon did not conflict with

Russian interests of Peter, so that Saint-Simon wrote about Peter objectively.

But let's take another contemporary of Peter - the Englishman Henry St. John Bolingbroke (1678-1751). In 1736, at about the same time as Saint-Simon's Memoirs, Lord Bolingbroke, at the request of the young aristocrat Lord Cornbury, who wished to know Bolingbroke's opinion on the method of studying and the usefulness of history, wrote his Letters on the Study and Use of History.

Bolingbroke could not have been unaware of Peter and his significance for Europe; could not have been unaware of the influence, in particular, of the events of the Russian Northern War on the events of the English War of the Spanish Succession ... Nevertheless, in eight voluminous letters, Bolingbroke never **mentions** Peter. There was no place for the Russian Tsar and Russia in Bolingbroke's "Plan for the General History of Europe" either. And this despite the fact that Bolingbroke assured Cornbury that "we will hardly find a century in history that would begin with such a grandiose

spectacle as the one in which we live ...". Bolingbroke had in mind the then current 18th century, but in the first half of the 18th century in which Bolingbroke lived, there was no more grandiose and weighty "spectacle" than the entry into the arena of European history of Petrine Russia ... It is unlikely that Bolingbroke - with all his arrogance of an aristocrat Tori, could not help but realize it. But he did not want to admit this, as they say, "categorically and point-blank" ... And if the general history of Europe was written by Bolingbroke or under his leadership, then Russia would be in such a "history" only in the backyard! The question is - would Bolingbroke's

"history" be history? Why such an obvious bias in a person who is actually smart? Alas, the answer is obvious - everything is explained by hatred for Russia and for Peter, who made Russia an important factor in the European political process and thus interfered with England's claims to the sole decision of the fate of

Europe. Or here's another thing... Imagine that the history of the Northern War was written by the Swedish king Charles XII... Such a "history" would be full of victories and campaigns of Charles, if Poltava were mentioned there, then in two words, as a small episode... But the fact that won the Northern War, nevertheless, the Russians, and not the Swedes, would

"historian" Karl as some strange whim of fortune, and not as a result of the enormous sovereign efforts of Peter and the Russian people.

All this is reminiscent of an old anecdote ... Like, in the Encyclopedia of the XXI century, Leonid Brezhnev will be said in one line: "Brezhnev is a petty politician of the great era of Alla Pugacheva." Well, maybe so - if the history will be written by pop "stars".

It would seem that Bolingbroke's times are long gone... But Europe's dislike for Russia remains.

What caused it? Maybe - the vastness of Russia and the fear of its power, especially in the Soviet era? But what about America?.. And great, and powerful, and really dangerous for Europe, but Europe is not afraid of America, and even loves

America...

What's the matter? In the 70s of the 19th century, Danilevsky wrote: "By the beginning of the 18th century, Russia had almost ended the already victorious war with its eastern neighbors. The spirit of the Russian people, awakened by the events under the leadership of two ever-memorable people: Minin and Khmel'nitsky, also won a victory over the Polish gentry who had changed the Slavic principles of the people, who wanted to force the Russian people to the same betrayal. Not in the distant future, without a doubt, there was a struggle with one or another people of Europe, which ... always sought to expand their power and influence in all directions ...".

Danilevsky, one of the theorists of neo-Slavophilism, wrote his book even before the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, and Europe's dislike for Russia (as well as the love of Europe at that time for Turkey) was deduced from Europe's fear "before the dawn of Slavic unification dawning on the horizon, before that colossal rival who has to rise up if this unification takes place"... In the second

volume of "Russian Crossings" it will be shown that Russian Slavophiles built pan-Slavic plans on sand and calculated from scratch. Neither the southern, nor, even more so, the western, Slavs did not aspire to the arm of Russia. They only wanted Russia to ensure their interests with an armed hand, sacrificing their own - which Tsarist Russia did more than once.

And if we talk about the geopolitical, or rather, civilizational, watershed between Russia and Europe, then it has a different

historical and psychological character. The history of Europe and the history of Russia after the Mongol catastrophe of Kievan Rus developed in such a way that Europe became mercantile, self-serving and rationalistic, and Russia developed as a **human** historical community with a broad soul, with a unique ability for social impulse and original creativity. The European peoples were gradually closed each in the "case" of their small, actually, national territory, and the Russian people kept pushing and pushing the boundaries of the Russian ecumene, while expanding both their national soul and their perception of the universe. Chekhov brilliantly gave the image of a "man in a case" - a narrow

gymnasium pedant Belikov, contrasting him with a spiritually and physically healthy teacher of history and geography (these subjects were clearly not chosen by chance) Kovalenko ... Belikov was afraid of Kovalenko, and Europe instinctively fears Russia and cannot understand it just as Belikov could not understand Kovalenko and his sister Varenka. Nevertheless, it's time for Russia and Europe to understand each other - in the

common interest. Although, in general, Russia would do well to understand itself before that. Mind, mind understand! In the meantime, the state of affairs

is deplorable. It was profitable for Europe's wealthy elite earlier, and it is still beneficial to this day to portray the matter in such a way that the barbarian de Russia-Muscovy lived for itself and lived, century after century, in its bearish corner ... And it did not take any part in European history, and in no way on it Not influenced.

European "historians" don't want to remember that Kievan Rus was not just a full-fledged, but the most influential European state...

Moreover, they do not want to recognize the decisive sacrificial role of early medieval Rus' in saving European civilization at the cost of the death of their own civilization under the Mongol boot.

It's easier to say that there was no original Russian civilization, but there were stupid Slavs, to whom the "civilizer" Rurik somehow instilled some civilizational skills ... And if not

there was a Russian civilization, then, it turns out, there was nothing to sacrifice "this Russian" ... There was, therefore, no Russian civilizational sacrifice! So it is more convenient for the West.
Even though it's stupid.

The modern West does not want to remember the post-Mongol Russia of Ivan III the Great, which European politicians **of that time**, modern to Ivan, could not ignore. And as for the Rus' of Ivan IV the Terrible, the Livonian War, the political elite and Western historians generally prefer to keep quiet - except that they savor its "Tatar" aspect in the spirit of Schlichting's libels.

And this despite the fact that, starting from the time of at least the same Ivan III, Russia had a real and powerful influence on the history of Europe **by the very fact of its existence**. Western historians exclude pre-Petrine

Russia from the European historical process and present the case in such a way that in those centuries Russia did not seem to exist for Europe ... They say that in the place of Russia then there was a kind of civilizational "blank spot", almost empty space. But what if in the place of Russia Ivanov III and IV, in the place of Russia of Alexei

Mikhailovich and Fyodor Alekseevich, there really were only dense forests inhabited by bears and barbarians taken out of history? What would happen to Europe then? Wouldn't the Ottoman Empire "iron" it from end to end, which would not have needed to

look back at the very powerful

Muscovy, capable of hitting the presumptuous Turks in the rear?

The Russian factor was then a factor of **constant** pressure on the Ottomans. And what - it was not important for the then situation of the European states, was not a factor **in the general** history of Europe? In 1683, the Turks laid siege to Vienna, and then

Austria and Europe were saved by the troops of the Polish king Jan Sobieski. But could Sobieski have come to the aid of Europe if he had not provided himself with a friendly Russian rear? Yes, the contribution of post-Mongolian Russia to the European history of culture, science

and technology over many centuries has been

insignificant or even zero. Unlike Europe, post-Mongolian Russia cannot boast of Russian Petrarch and Shakespeare, Spinoza and Hobbes, Newton and Pascal, Michelangelo, Raphael, Rembrandt... But if we mean the political history of Europe in the 15th-17th centuries, and even more so, the political history of Europe in **the** 18th and, especially, the XIX centuries, the presence of Russia in this history - indirect or direct, not only took place, but was also significant, and from a certain moment - decisive. To humiliate and belittle the past of Russia in the eyes of

the Russians themselves is an important **and urgent** political task of the modern West. This task is solved not only by the West itself, but also by its Russian clients and agents, including bourgeois pseudo-"historians".

And I hope that my book will be one of the obstacles to this. Much attention has been paid in my book to the anti-social and anti-national behavior of the Russian princes in the pre-Mongolian, Mongolian and post-Mongolian periods of Russian history. However, the ruling strata behaved this way not only in Rus'. This was mentioned in the book, but it does not hurt to recall this in the afterword to it, and for evidence we turn not to the historian, but to the writer.

An intelligent writer who describes a particular historical period understands it no worse, if not better than a professional historian. Dumas père said that history for him is a nail on which he hangs a picture of his fiction, but this applies only to his novels, and not to, for example, the strictly documentary "History of Louis XIV" belonging to Dumas. The English historical

novelist Walter Scott was also accurate in his historical descriptions. Considering the era of Louis XI, the French unifier king, Scott wrote about the second half of the 15th century in France:

"... powerful vassals (Louis XI. - S.K.) ... began to treat their duties so dismissively that at the slightest pretext they were ready to rebel against their overlord ... Following the example of the main vassals, each petty vassal tried to defend his independence as much as it he was allowed by the distance from the royal court, the size of his possessions and the impregnability of his castles and fortifications. All these petty despots, not

reckoning with the law, ... brutally oppressed their subjects and dealt with them with monstrous cruelty. In Auvergne alone, there were at that time more than three hundred such independent nobles, for whom incest, robbery and violence were the most common thing Along with all the

horrors and misfortunes caused by the plight of the state, insane extravagance and luxury reigned among the petty nobles, which they flaunted in imitation of the great feudal lords, squeezing the last juices out of the impoverished, ruined people "... Really, in Russia it didn't come to that then - if we mean extremes ...

Alas, as you know, Russians harness for a long time, but they drive fast. And from some point - already in the post-Petrine times, the Russian elite outdid the European elite in neglecting the rights of the masses. However, already then, in the 15th century, the similarity of the European elites with the Russian elite was observed,

in the matter of neglecting the national interests. The era of Louis XI in Russia corresponds to the reign of Ivan III the Great; the French king and the Grand Duke of Moscow were on the thrones almost simultaneously - 38-year-old Louis in 1461, and 22-year-old Ivan - in 1462. And their state tasks turned out to be in many respects similar - curbing their own ruling elites.

Moreover, Louis XI was very tough here, being a systemic analogue of our Ivan IV the Terrible, for which he was slandered by the French elite no less than our Ivan the Terrible ... Elite memoirists of those years portrayed Louis as a "world spider", a "vengeful tyrant" who ruled in interests of "rude and vicious citizens" and who sought to "destroy the noble houses of France."

Well, this is familiar to us and according to Ivan IV's assessments ... And this is the usual fate of a major leader who goes against the willfulness and destructive way of thinking and actions of the elite, even if he acts in the name of strengthening the historical position of the elite strata in society, as did the same Louis XI in France, or Terrible and Peter

in Russia. And yet, what about the fate of Russia? What is she in?

Almost forty years ago, the Soviet historian Alexander Aleksandrovich Zimin finished his last book in a six-volume series and called it *The Knight at the Crossroads*.

Well, the theme of Russia at a crossroads is a long-standing theme of Russian fate, which once again confirms his famous painting "The Knight at the Crossroads" painted in 1882 by Viktor Vasnetsov ...

He ran into three paths, Three
paths he, three rosstans. On those
rosstans there lies a white combustible stone.
And on the stone, the signature is
signed: "On the left to go - to be
rich, On the right to go - to be
married, How to go straight - I live not to be ...".

Just finishing the book, I thought about a simple, and therefore not easy thought that comes to mind ... It is no coincidence that the creators of Russian epics point precisely to the straight road, as threatening death. The heroes of epics and Russian fairy tales choose it, and just **on it they** win ... This is what the storytellers had in mind, telling us that to make the right choice means to choose **the direct** path!

The straight path is not an easy path, but it is the right path, the path to truth, to one's historical right... In this stubborn root, "pr ..." is the root of Russian fate, or rather, the fate of the Russian people. The Russian people, faced with a historical choice, always chose the direct path in the end ... And if Russian fate strayed on the roundabout path, then it was knocked down there by the self-serving elite, hostile to the Russian fate.

In the preface to his "Vityaz" A.A. Zimin wrote that it is "easier for a historian to tell how everything happened than to understand why it happened" ... However, it's time to understand why it happened one way or another in Russian history, and why it happened so, and not otherwise.

And in order to understand this, you need to know Russian history on all the paths it has traveled - both direct and roundabout ... And I hope that my

the book will help this knowledge and the understanding that follows from it.

And, finally, the last thing... Previously, at least in the time of Ivan the Terrible, even in the times of Peter the Great and Catherine and later times of Tsarist Russia, and, even more so, in the times of Lenin and Stalin, the dignitary elite always had, in addition to the treacherous, and state-minded, the creative stratum... It was she, together with the great Russian people, who pulled Russian history "uphill". At the same time, the more competent the leader of the state was, the more he met the historical tasks of Russia, the stronger and more confidently this stratum, saving for the future of Russia, acted, the more numerous and capable it was, the more the potential of the people was revealed and used ...

Now, in Putin's "Russia", the "leader" is **still the same**, and I don't even want to talk about the "elite"! Now in this "elite" there is not even a hint of spiritual health, anxiety about the future of Russia, or state potential...

So, we need to realize and loudly declare - to everyone, but above all - to ourselves, that we live in the most decisive times of the Russian state ... That the Russian dilemma lies in simple words: "Either a new wiser socialism, or an oligarchic final cataclysm" ... We must it is to understand, declare, and find **non-** elitist leaders who are ready to drag Russia into the socialist "mountain", and not "downhill", into the oligarchic cesspool.

And what is the current "intelligentsia" doing instead?

And the current intelligentsia "educated", instead of asking questions **point-blank**, discusses to the point of hoarseness - was Rurik a Varangian? And joyfully informs each other that Mikhail Zadornov or someone else there established that Rurik is a Slav from the Slavic island of Rügen ... But the

point is not that - from the island of Rügen, or not from the island of Rügen, did Rurik come to Novgorod? And not in that - was this island Slavic or not Slavic in those ancient times? And not even whether Rurik was a Slav or a Varangian?

The bottom line is that Rurik somehow appeared in a society with an **already** existing and fully developed statehood, with

original and self-sufficient traditions - traditions, if not millennial, then at least centuries old ... But this should not be even more

important for us today! We, knowing Russian history in its main, unshakable moments, on the basis of this knowledge, are obliged to put the following question at the forefront: "How and why did it happen **today** that the great Kiev princes Vladimir the Holy and Yaroslav the Wise are depicted simultaneously on the monument of the 1000th anniversary Russia in Novgorod, and on the banknotes of Bandera's "Ukraine", separate from "Russia", where hatred for everything Russian is officially brought up? This

is one of the most important questions **of our** era! This is the most

important question, as well as the question: "Can such a leadership be considered ruling in the interests of Russia, which, sitting in the ancient Russian Moscow Kremlin, considers the ancient Russian capital city of Kiev, the mother of Russian cities, the capital of a foreign state and does not take any steps for a new voluntary, of course, the reunification of Ukraine with Russia?

The answers to such questions are obvious, but they are being sought on the straight path that Russia took in October 1917 and strayed from in August 1991... It has been

noted, not without bitter truth, that the lessons of history teach that they teach nothing. But, perhaps, looking at the past Russian millennia, remembering the consequences of the princely congress in Lyubech, the centuries-old strife of the elites, the post-Khmelnitsky Ukrainian "Ruin" and the Russian Troubles, the times and causes of Russian victories and defeats, we will extract, nevertheless, a constructive lesson from our

own history? A lesson in faith in oneself, in one's destiny

and in one's abilities... A lesson in unity and unity, a

lesson in historical reason... A lesson in rejecting the ugly elite and dividing people on shearers and shorn ones...

And maybe Europe will also learn a lesson from the past? Ignoring Russia and its interests has done Europe a disservice more than once... And the current pitting of Europe and Russia on the basis of the internal Russian Ukrainian crisis can do an even worse job...

However, we have so far left Russia at a very remote
today's crossroads - immediately after the death of Peter the Great ...

In the short term, Russia had exactly three-quarters of the 18th
century, and they had to be lived through.